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The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate how Kurdish female fighters 
are represented in the media. According to Dilar Dirik (2014), the Western 
media has given a great deal of attention to Kurdish female fighters, but, 
according to Emanuela C. Del Re (2015), it has “focused on the sensational 
aspects rather than on analysis of the facts”. The objective of this paper was to 
determine whether the Italian, English and Turkish press provide in-depth 
analysis when they describe their motivations and reasons for fighting or 
whether they merely treat their ideas in a shallow way. 
The method adopted by the author to conduct the research was quantitative 
content analysis. Moreover, the author sought to analyse whether the Italian 
media and the English media shared the same perspectives and used the same 
frames when describing the female fighters. 
Finally, the research was aimed at determining whether there was a perspective 
shared by all Western newspapers and whether this was different from that of 
the Turkish media. Ultimately, it was found that female emancipation was not 
treated merely a good tool to improve the PKK’s image in the international 
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In this chapter the author will examine the Kurdish question, the war in Syria 








1.2 The Kurdish question 
Kurdistan, “the country of the Kurds”, is not a state: it does not have any legal 
status. It is a region surrounded by four different political, cultural and ethnic 
worlds which have been fighting for centuries: the Arabic, the Persians, the 
Turkish and the Russian. The Kurdish region is divided among the states of 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. According to Öcalan	(2001), the name “Kurdistan” 
relates to the Summerian word kur, which meant something similar to 
“mountain”. 
Since the rise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 13th century, the Kurds 
succeeded in establishing some regional autonomy. The Ottomans managed 
their internal affairs through a system of millets, which are protected 
communities. The Kurds had, just like other ethnic minorities, no official status, 
and thus they belonged to the Muslim-majority millet. They were permitted to 
govern many of their own affairs. However, after the First World War, the 
Ottoman Empire came to an end and the European powers feared a new large 
Muslim empire; thus, they divided the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent a 
challenge of the status quo.  
In 1920, therefore, although in a different form to that expected, the nation state 
of Kurdistan seemed to be born, without taking into account the socio-cultural 
complexity of the Middle East. In 1920, the Treaty of Sevrés regulated the terms 
of the peace reached with the Ottoman Empire, essentially determining its 
dismemberment. The treaty provided for the creation of a new state identity, 
Kurdistan, which should have extended to an area straddling the states 
currently existing in the Middle East. In particular, Articles 62 and 6418 of the 
treaty explicitly provided for the construction of a Kurdish national state which 
would initially have been placed under the protection of mandatory European 
powers, in order to obtain complete independence thereafter. In 1923, the 
Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty defined 
the new borders of the region but did not mention Kurdistan, nor even the 
existence of the Kurds. Ottoman-era Kurdistan was divided between four states: 
Iran, which was already a sovereign state; Turkey, established in 1922 by 
Kemal Atatürk; Iraq; and Syria (the latter two initially being ruled by mandate by 
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Britain and France, but becoming independent at a later stage). The Kurds had 
become a series of peripheral border populations without a central state. 
(Federici V,2015) 
According to Mirella Galletti (2004), until the 1990s, the Turkish government 
defined the Kurdish as “Turkish from the mountains”, denying their existence in 
Turkey. In Iran, Kurdistan was considered to consist of an area which was much 
smaller than that claimed by Kurdish nationalists. The same applied to Iraq. All 
of the central governments involved tried to assimilate the Kurdish areas, as 
they were considered important from economic and strategic points of view. 
The hegemonic powers (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) denied the Kurdish their 
existence over the years, imposing punishments on Kurds if they referred to 
their roots. According to Öcalan (2001), the Persians declared the Kurds to be 
an ethnic subgroup of the Persians, while the Turkish regime derived its claim 
from the alleged campaign to conquer Anatolia, claiming there had been no 
other people there before the Turks arrived. 
 
Iran 
In 1925, Reza Shah seized power in Iran via a coup. He started secularising 
Iran and creating a homogenous country. The Kurdish language and culture 
were prohibited, and Kurdish political leaders disappeared. In 1941, the British 
and Soviet armies entered Iran. The Kurds were happy to feel themselves 
liberated from the oppressive Shah, and they experienced greater freedom 
under Soviet occupation. In 1945, the Iranian Kurds formed the Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) under the leadership of Qazi Mohammed. 
(McDowall, 2004) 
Although other political parties were active, the KDPI was the most important. 
Many of today’s Kurdish political parties, such as the KDP in Iraq, trace their 
history to the Iranian KDPI. Iran contains the second-largest number of Kurds in 
the world, but over the years, it has fought the Kurdish nationalist movement 
and further demoralised it by assassinating its main leaders, including Abdul 
Rahman Ghassemlou in 1989 and his successor, Sadeq Sharafandi, in 1992.  
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(M.Gunter, 2004). In fact, the Islamic revolution of 1979 did not improve the 
lives of the Iranian Kurds. Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution, denied the 
concept of a nation in Iran, replacing it with “umma”, a religious community. 
During 1979-1989, the war between Kurdish nationalist movement and the 
Islamic Republic caused the death of 50,000 people. 
 
Iraq  
Iraq, one must remember, is an artificial state put together by the British after 
World War I from the three former Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and 
Basra (Dodge T, 2003). It became independent in 1932, but the British 
administration retained power over the country through indirect rule. In 1958, 
the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup, led by a group known as the 
Free Officers. In 1963, and again in 1968, the Ba‘ath Party gained power in 
Iraq. In 1963, the Ba‘ath had come to power in Syria, and the party gained 
tremendous influence over the fate of the Kurds in both Syria and Iraq. The 
parties emphasised Arab identity and unity whilst denying the existence of 
Kurdish nationality. In both Iraq and Syria, Arabic was made the official 
language, Kurdish culture was suppressed and the Kurds were forced to 
become Arabs. Although the Iraqi Kurds had no rights, they experienced a few 
years of relative freedom under the Ba‘ath Party. For instance, in the 1960s, 
when the Kurds in Iran were oppressed, KDPI moved its headquarters to Iraqi 
Kurdistan, where it founded the KDP. The KDP would soon become the most 
powerful nationalist Kurdish organisation. 
According to Mirella Galletti (2004), the Kurds in Iraq represent the point of 
reference for Kurdish nationalism in all countries. However, in 1975, increasing 
criticism aimed at the party’s right-wing politics in Iraq resulted in the 
establishment of the leftist Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal 
Talabani. The situation further deteriorated when Saddam Hussein came to 
power in 1979. The repression of the Kurds occurred in two ways: Arabisation 
and deportation. The latter involved Kurdish people who lived in Iraqi Kurdistan 
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towards the region of southern Iraq. They were deported, being unable to bring 
their goods with them, and all of their belongings were taken. 
One of the common methods of Arabisation is via marriage: every Arabic 
person who married a Kurdish woman received a large amount of money. 
Despite the Kurdish women becoming very popular, according to Mirella Galletti 
(2004), they generally preferred to take their own lives rather than marry an 
Arabic person, because they would be refused and rejected by their families, 
and by the Kurdish society, if they did so. 
During the genocidal Anfal Operation, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were 
deported; their villages were destroyed, and many were killed. The name Anfal 
is taken from the Quoran which authorised the confiscation of the belongings of 
infidels; it is used to provide religious justification for what is happening. 
Chemical weapons were also used against the Kurdish people. (Galletti M, 
2004) 
After the failed Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and the invasion of Kuwait, both Kurds 
in the north and Shi’ites in the south took the opportunity to rebel. The 
international community eventually established a safe haven and a no-fly zone 
in northern Iraq. A UN resolution in 1991 demanded that the Iraqi central 
government immediately end the oppression of the Kurdish people in the area. 
Never before had the Kurds received international protection on this scale. In 
1991, they established a de facto autonomous region and an independent 
government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with the protection of 
the international coalition. It was beyond the reach of the regime of Hussein, 
which was toppled by the American invasion in 2003. In the same year, after 12 
years of political autonomy, the Kurds gained the right to have their own 
parliament, budget and army in the new constitution. They institutionalised self-
rule in the KRG. 
Since the recognition of the KRG in Iraq, the Kurds in Iran became more active 
again. A new movement, the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (P-JAK), 
which was found to have links with the Turkish PKK, started military action 
against the Iranian regime. Iran naturally viewed the establishment of the KRG 
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with suspicion, just as in Turkey	which also faced challenges from the Kurds. 
The situation, however, remains precarious, because nobody recognises this 
state. Turkey has even warned if the Iraqi Kurds declare their independence, it 
will lead to future warfare. Iran and Syria also oppose Iraqi Kurdish 
independence because of the instability it would create in the Middle East.  
There are two main Kurdish parties in Iraq: the Iraqi Kurdish parties Barzani's 
Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) and Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK).	They are the surname of the two political rivals: Jalal Talabani and 
Masoud Barzani.Although they fought together in the civil war from 1994 to 
1998, they remain divided on the ideal model of the Kurdish state. Barzani and 
Talabani have both realistically denied any claims of independence, opting 
instead for federalism in a post-Saddam democratic Iraq. (Gunter M,2003) 
According to Mirella Galletti (2004), there is a strong ideological discrepancy 
between the PKK, which has a Marxist background, and the Kurdish parties in 
Iraq, which are more conservative and/or of “democratic inspiration”. Instead, 
Turkey perceives KRG as another step toward Kurdish independence. 
Turkey  
In 1922, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a former Young Turk, created Turkey with the 
support of colonial European powers. Atatürk wanted to establish a 
homogenous nation-state, and began a process of modernisation, releasing the 
nation from the Islamic Ottoman heritage. After initially promising the Kurds a 
certain amount of autonomy if they supported his ideas, Atatürk realised it was 
necessary to eliminate minorities if he wanted to achieve political unity for his 
new nation. The Turkish regime started to purge Turkey of non-Turkish 
influences, which meant that the Kurdish language was forbidden. The 
education of Kurdish language was also banned, and Kurdish political 
movements were not tolerated. 
In the 1970s, Kurdish left-wing activists began to organise themselves on a 
national scale to find a revolutionary solution to their problems in Turkey. In 
1978, they established the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK. The leader of the 
PKK is Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in prison since 1999. After the military 
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coup in 1980, the majority of the members of the party escaped and found 
refuge in Syria and Lebanon. The PKK became a key player in the Kurdish 
resistance against Turkish oppression. In the repression that followed, 
thousands of Kurdish fighters, but also civilians, were murdered, and even more 
Kurds became refugees as a result of clashes with the state. Many of them 
sought refuge in Syria. The conflict between the government and the PKK 
stabilised in 1999 when Abdullah Öcalan was arrested. Peace negotiations 
started, and the PKK seemed to abandon its violent strategy. Around 2003, it 
adopted a more libertarian ideology (Chapter Two of this paper will focus on the 
changing ideology of the PKK). After years of further repression by the Turkish 
regime, the conflict resumed in 2004. In 2012, new negotiations began, but 
these efforts also ended without success. (Eleuthera,2017)  
 
1.3 The war in Syria 
In the same year that Öcalan (2011) wrote the Democratic Confederalism, in 
Syria, a protest started due to the continuous massacres perpetuated by 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime against the protesters. They were Syrian civilians in 
general, not only Kurds. It was the beginning of a civil war, involving four 
military fronts: ESL, ISIS, Kurdish people in Rojava where in 2012 the PYD and 
YPG took the control. In 2014, while ISIS had already conquered most of the 
northern territory of Syria and of Iraq, the PKK and YPG started coordinating 
with the Peshmerga of northern Iraq. Their operation blocked the siege of ISIS 
on Mount Sinjar, where Yazidis were refugees. At the end of October, when the 
YPG was demonstrated to be effective against ISIS, the US started to send it 
troops and equipment to fight ISIS with bombs around Kobane. (Dirik D, Levi 
Strauss D., Taussig M, Lamborn Wilson P,2017), As Bill Weiberg stated, in this 
situation, the US assisted a bizarre event whereby American imperialism aided 
anarchists. (Dirik D, Levi Strauss D., Taussig M, Lamborn Wilson P, 2017 ) 
Erdoğan , the Turkish president, did not approve of this situation. In October, 
due to US pressure, he had to allow Peshmerga to travel through Turkish 
territory to reach Kobane, but at the same time, he refused entry into Syria of 
the PKK fighters who wanted to be part of the defence of the city. The border 
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with Syria had been closed, and the 400,000 people who wanted to escape had 
to pass a strict checkpoint. If suspected to be part of YPG, they were arrested. 
Erdoğan defined as terrorists both PYD members and ISIS members alike. 
The strategy put in place by Erdoğan is based on an alliance with the Free 
Syrian Army and the Syrian opposition against Assad, and Erdoğan asked the 
US to create a no-fly zone in exchange for Turkey’s participation in the fight 
against ISIS. He wants to create a buffer zone controlled by Turkey in northern 
Syria exactly in the area controlled by TEV-DEM. Although the PYD-YPG and 
the Free Syrian Army participated in the defence of Kobane, between them, 
there was a certain amount of tension, because Hazed-al-Assad, Bashars’s 
father, supported the PKK despite it depriving the Syrian Kurdish people of their 
civil rights. (Dilar Dirik, David Levi Strauss, Michael Taussig, Peter Lamborn 
Wilson,2017). According to Bill Weinberg, both Assad and Erdoğan are using 
the technique of divide et impera (divide and rule) based on the rivalry between 
the Kurdish and Arabic people. At the same time, the rise of ISIS has led to an 
alliance between the US and Iran, while the PKK has found an ally in the PJAK. 
This party has been fighting against the regime in Teheran. 
Western countries have been contributing in the form of a military coalition to 
restrain ISIS. For instance, Italy donated guns to the Kurdish forces in the war-
torn territory (E. Del Re2015) . In order to justify the fact that the US provided 
support to the PYD against ISIS even though the PKK is listed as a terrorist 
party, the PYD had been considered a different organisation from the PKK. 
Thornton (Dilar Dirik, David Levi Strauss, Michael Taussig, Peter Lamborn 
Wilson,2017 ) asserts that the Kurds are suffering the majority of the casualties 
in the war, and so they have become essential for the coalition partners. 
Furthermore, this support of the US and European coalition partners could 
cause confusion as regards understanding why they would help “terrorist 
groups”. In one way or another, the Syria-based Democratic Union Party, the 
PYD, has a relationship with the PKK even though there has not been a direct 
interconnection. As Güleç (2014) states, the PYD is known as the Syrian wing 
of the PKK, but in an ideological relation. According to the US Department of 
State ("Country Reports on Terrorism": 329), the PKK is still listed as a foreign 
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terrorist organisation. A report by the state in 2015 mentioned the PYD and the 
YPG. It indicates that the Turkish government regards the Syria-based PYD 
and its military wing, the YPG, as terrorist organisations. Nonetheless, neither 
the PYD nor the YPG have appeared on any list of terrorist organisations. 
Moreover, Peshmerga from Iraqi-Kurdistan, who came to Kobane to help YPG 
has appeared on the list ("Country Reports on Terrorism": 149). When there 
had been conflicts in Kobane and interventions from the PYD in the city, the US 
Department of State’s spokesperson, Marie Harf, clarified in 2014 that the “PYD 
is a different organization from PKK legally, under United States law” ("Daily 
Press Briefing" - October 20). However, in 2016, John Kirby explained, “we 
don’t, as you know, recognize the PYD as a terrorist organization”. He also 
stated, “we see Kurdish fighters on the ground that have been successful 
against Daesh as an important partner in this fight”.(Daily Press Briefing”– 
February 8) 
On 26 January 2015, the Kurdish forces had gained an important victory 
against ISIS in Kobane, and in October, the YPG created a new alliance with 
the most progressive forces of the Free Syrian Army. The new coalition has 
taken the name of SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), and it is pursuing the 
project of a united, multi-ethnic Syria. In September, the situation had been 
further compromised after Russia supported Assad. Although most of these 
attacks were directed against ISIS, they also damaged cities and involved 
civilians. 
In the war two rival Kurdish groups, the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government) in 
Iraq and the PYD (Democratic Union Party, or Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) in 
Syria, have fought together (Gunter: 105). 
These defensive forces have also aroused the interest of the international 
media, especially their female units. The PYD’s armed wing, the YPG, is the 
male unit. Its female wing is YPJ (the Kurdish Women’s Protection Unit). It was 
formed in 2012 against deadly attacks from the Syrian president Assad, the al-
Nusra Front and ISIS (Griffin 2014). Salih Muslim is the leader of the PYD, and 
he has also had a voice in decisions about YPG and YPJ (Thornton: 877).  
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Conversely, Peshmerga is the military force of the KRG. Its commander in chief 
is Masoud Barzani, and its origins were in the late 1800s, although it was 
formally formed in the 1920s, after World War I ("Profile: Who are the 
Peshmerga?" 2014). Although the fighting female unit from Peshmerga is few in 
number in Kobane, it has also attracted the media’s interest, but not as much as 
the YPJ women have done. As regards the relationship between the PYD and 
Peshmerga, the support from Peshmerga started in mid-January 2015. 
Peshmerga went into Kobane to defend the city in accordance with Masoud 
Barzani’s claim and both Salih Muslim’s and the PYD’s consent (Thornton: 875-
877). According to Çandar (2014), the deployment of Peshmerga forces could 
not have changed the military balance, because only 150 fighters of Peshmerga 
entered Kobane. Even so, Peshmerga’s presence in Kobane is a historical 
event not in a military sense, but in relation to Kurdish national unity.  
In January 2018, Turkey began a massive military assault, Operation Olive 
Branch, on a Kurdish-controlled enclave of Afrin in northern Syria (Aljazeera, 
2018). Turkey had been threatening the Kurdish forces throughout their 
advance, along with the liberation of areas from ISIS in northern Syria, 
because, for Turkey, Kobane and Afrin are connected to the PKK. 
 
1.4 The Rojava Revolution 
The Syrian Kurds, during the war, took control of a territory called Rojava. 
Rojava is now divided in cantons regulated by the Öcalan’s Democratic 
Confederalism based on a social contract that institutionalises gender equality, 
ecology and pacific conviviality between different religions and cultures. On the 
night of July 18, 2012, the YPG took control of the roads leading in and out of 
Kobane City. “They fight not just against ISIS but also against the patriarchal 
system of which ISIS is an expression. With the YPJ, it was demonstrated that 
the women can do everything”. (Dirik D, Levi Strauss D., Taussig M, Lamborn 
Wilson P, 2017) According to Öcalan, women have had an important role within 
Kurdish society since the Neolithic agricultural era, but this strength was drawn 
from the agricultural revolution. 
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The People’s Defence Forces (YPG) and the Women’s Defence Units (YPJ) 
have led the resistance in Kobane. In total, 35% of the fighters are women. 
(Dilar Dirik, 2015) The YPG units were crucial to creating a safety corridor to 
rescue the Yazidis in the Sinjar Mountains. In the YPJ and the YPG, gender 
equality is a central part of education and training. Inspired by Öcalan’s idea, 
the Rojava cantons enforce co-presidencies and quotas, and they have created 
women’s defence units, women’s communes, academies, tribunals and 
cooperatives. (A Tangled Wilderness, 2015) The name Yekîtiya Star (the Star 
Union), began to be used in 2004 (the star is connected with the ancient 
Mesopotamian goddess Ishtar). The Rojava Umbrella Women’s Movement was 
founded in 2005, and, under the Ba’ath regime, Yekîtiya Star activists were 
arrested and tortured. Today, all women in western Kurdistan who are involved 
in TEV-DEM’s social, political and military work are also members of Kongreya 
Star (Congress of Free Women). It is a fundamental principle of the Kurdish 
women’s movement to build women’s institutions in every area, so that women 
can disengage intellectually, emotionally and spiritually from the authority and 
violence of patriarchal domination. (M. Knapp, 2016) 
Once the protest started, the process of democratic autonomy in Rojava has 
served as an experiment by which to create a society without a nation-state, 
according to the Öcalan’s theory of democratic confederalism. In it, men and 
the women have the same decision-making power, and Rojava is based on the 
principle of co-direction. The women can elect a female co-director, while the 
male co-director is elected by everyone, without gender distinction. Men who 
have committed violence against women are not part of the administration. The 
first acts of the government was to criminalise forced marriage, domestic 
violence, polygamy, child marriage, honour killings and bride prices. In addition, 
non-Kurdish women are encouraged to take part in administration and to 
organise autonomously. 
In the light of these developments, we will not examine the academic literature 







2.1 How Kurdish female fighters are framed by the Western media 
In conducting the research on this topic, the author began by researching 
Kurdish female fighters in Syria and how they are represented in the Western 
and Turkish media. According to Dilar Dirik (Dirik 2014) and Emanuela C. Del 
Re, the Western media had given a big deal of attention to the Kurdish female 
fighters but “focused on the sensational aspects rather than on analysis of the 
facts” (Del Re 2015). Some Turkish media outlets, such as the Daily Sabah, 
accused the Western media of being blind and that the New York Times is 
failing into a trap: ”Adapting feminist discourse for their own purposes, a terrorist 
woman can now be praised as a freedom fighter who kills for women's liberation 
and empowerment, which is what the two New York Times articles, directly or 
not, also do with eulogies to the YPJ fighters” (Daily Sabah 2018). At a time 
when the activism of the Kurdish people has become important to international 
debate, especially in relation to the struggle against the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria, it is crucial to analyse the roots of female involvement within the Kurdish 
movement and the impact of this phenomenon on the Kurdish reality as a 
whole.  
Zubeyde Sari, in the article "Women of Rojava”, published in Ozgur Gundem, 
September 2013, stated that “This may be the first time in history that women 
have played such an active role in organizing a revolution. They fight on the 
fronts, they serve as commanders, and they participate in production. There is 
no place in Rojava where women are not to be seen. They are everywhere and 
part of everything” (Zubeyde Sari, 2013). Actually, there are various examples 
of active female fighters in Western Europe, as in the history of Italy and the 
1916 Rebellion in Ireland. In that case, why do Western societies perceive it as 
innovative and revolutionary? 
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For instance, Rehana, known as the “Kobane angel”, has become the symbol of 
the Kurdish resistance against Isis. Her image as a beautiful young woman in 
uniform has travelled the world. She has become a legend, and her epic story is 
based on the idea that she has killed more than 100 members of ISIS, 
highlighting the two-faced angel with her brutality in war. This could give rise to 
the question: are these myths used to manipulate public opinion? Did Rehana 
and the other female fighters really do what the legends claim? (Emanuela 
C.Del Re 2015) 
It is possible to identify an opportunistic interpretation indicating that Kurdish 
actors have taken advantage of online forums and channels to increase the 
visibility of their cause. For instance, according to the Daily Sabbah, there is a 
"feminist rhetoric [used] as a tool to aestheticize terror” (Daily Sabbah 2018). 
The news story of ‘the angel of Kobane’, Rehana, has spread widely across 
social media sites, and it was even picked up by mainstream media outlets 
before a news story establishing the truth was published. In the story, Rehana 
was constructed as the heroic incarnation of a female combatant. It can be 
observed that Kobane was a turning point in the representation of Kurdish 
combatants and their role in the armed conflict in Syria. The representation of 
female combatants played a significant role in this regard. The fact that an 
Israeli-Canadian woman has joined the peshmerga has recently become part of 
the legend. The Israeli Times newspaper insisted that the woman had a criminal 
record. The newspaper then took the opportunity to destroy the myth by 
claiming that the resistance in Kobane has the goal of distracting ISIS from 
more strategic objectives and indicating that this would explain the deal of 
attention dedicated to Kurdish fighters (Del Re E.C 2018). 
According to the scholar Dilar Dirik, the Western media seems to depict the 
Kurdish women fighters without giving voice to their ideology via proper 
analysis: it is “Typical of western media's myopia, instead of considering the 
implications of women taking up arms in what is essentially a patriarchal society 
– especially against a group that rapes and sells women as sex-slaves – even 
fashion magazines appropriate the struggle of Kurdish women for their own 
sensationalist purposes” (Dirik D. 2014). Dirik has written the following about 
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her own life: “The truth is, no matter how fascinating it is – from an orientalist 
perspective – to discover a women's revolution among Kurds, my generation 
grew up recognizing women fighters as a natural element of our identity. 
Although there is still a long way to go, what some now ignorantly call 
‘tokenism’, has in fact shaped the consciousness of millions of Kurds” (Dirik D. 
2014). 
The aim of this research is to analyse how the Western media depicts the 
Kurdish women, considering whether it presents their ideas in depth, giving 
them the right context and importance, or whether it is merely presents them as 
an exotic phenomenon without analysing their reasons and the ideology behind 
their actions. It considers how the female combatants have been framed in the 
Western media and the extent to which these representations are gendered. It 
asks: are the women just being used to appeal to the Western media, or do 
they have an important role in what is referred to as the “Rojava Revolution”? If 
the media takes into consideration their ideas, which theory does it use to 
analyse them?  
 
2.2 The difficult scenario of the Western media's myopia 
The attraction of the West to fighting women has a long history that seems to be 
related to the persistence of exoticism. For example, Emanuela Del Re reports 
that during the conflict in the Balkans, the press focused on the heels they used 
or on their red nail polish while loading an AK47. Gaddafi travelled the world 
with an Amazon escort since 1970, and it was stated they were willing to die in 
order to protect him. Only later was it discovered that they were also abused 
and raped by him (Del Re,2015). The charm of the combination of military 
uniform and femininity is perhaps derived from the figure of Joan of Arc. 
Women in developing countries are perceived by the West with a new aura and 
as the apotheosis of the contrast between femininity and military uniform (Del 
Re 2018). 
In Western thought, the body has historically been associated exclusively with 
women, while men have been associated with the mind. Susan Bordo, a 
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modern feminist philosopher, elaborates on the dualistic nature of the 
mind/body connection by examining the philosophies of Aristotle, Hegel and 
Descartes, revealing that such binary distinctions as spirit/matter and masculine 
activity/feminine passivity have served to consolidate gender characteristics 
and categorisation. While men have historically been associated with the 
intellect and the mind or the spirit, women have long been associated with the 
body; the term negatively soaked has subordinated to the mind/body 
dichotomy. The notion of the body (but not the mind) being associated with 
women has served as a justification for retaining women as interchangeable 
properties, objects and raw materials (among men). For example, women's 
bodies have been objectified throughout history through the changing 
ideologies of fashion, diet, exercise programmes, cosmetic surgery, pregnancy 
and so on. This contrasts with the role of men as moral agents responsible for 
work or being allowed to fight in bloody wars. The idea of a woman being able 
to determine whether her body will be treated as decoration and to be protected 
is associated with the bodies of women of a middle or upper class. Conversely, 
there is another concept of the body that recognises its use in exploitative 
labour and is generally associated with the bodies of women in the working 
class or with black women (Bordo S 1993). 
The film industry has adopted a narcissistic way of portraying women as objects 
for men. Sexual objectification means looking at a person as an object merely 
for sexual pleasure and as an object for use. Sexual objectification is 
comparable with the “male gaze”, and both theories have effects on men and 
women in our culture today. Feminists perceive sexual objectification as being a 
major part of the patriarchal order in which women are not equal to men. Sexual 
advertisements have also led to the “male gaze” and sexual objectification, 
which, in turn, have created consequences described by feminist	theories,	
causing	psychological	problems	for	some	women	in	our	culture.  
The “male gaze” was a phrase originally coined by Laura Mulvey, in her essay 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, and her interpretation of the term 
relates to women as a spectacle in film. Barbara Fredrickson and Tomi-Ann 
Roberts wrote an essay, “Objectification Theory: Toward Understanding 
	
22	
Women’s lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks” (Fredrickson, Roberts 
1997), in which they focus on the consequences of the “male gaze” and viewing 
women of different ethnicity as sexual objects. As a result of sexual 
objectification, women have a self-image that they are constantly monitoring, 
which causes stress and mental disorders. Sexual objectification and gender 
oppression have the same consequences for women, which results in 
employment discrimination and sexual violence. Frederickson and Roberts 
agree that sexual gazing is what enables sexual objectification, and when these 
acts occur, women’s body parts are what define them as people rather than 
their personalities.  
The objectifying gaze, according to Fredrickson and Roberts, is noticeable in 
three different instances. The first is in public places involving an actual social 
encounter, and in most cases, women of colour are more likely than a white one 
to receive a sexual comment with such a gaze. The second scenario is 
objectification in the media that portrays the likeness of a real encounter in 
which a male is gazing at a female while the female does not notice the 
attention, as her attention is directed at something else. The “male gaze” is also 
a suitable phrase to describe the third instance of objectification in society. 
Fredrickson and Roberts describe the third instance in terms credited to Laura 
Mulvey, and the “male gaze”. They knew this visual sexual objectification in the 
media as being the most threatening in our culture. The “male gaze” is not 
limited to pornography; in fact, it is portrayed throughout many films, live 
television and advertisements. While men are mostly represented in detailed 
facial view, women are mainly shown as body parts alone. These media tactics 
are actually provoking sexual objectification in our culture today.  
Emanuela Del Re quotes an article of As'ad Abukhail, from October 2014: "who 
are you fooling? Did you spend ages classifying the Palestinians (secular and 
Marxist) as terrorists and now you want to attribute a tribute in the name of 
feminism and liberalism to the Kurdish female fighters?” According to Nacos 
(Nacos, 2005), in “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar 
Framing Patterns”, in the media, the reader is explicitly told that terrorism is the 
domain of men. The implicit message is inescapable: females do not fit the 
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terrorist profile. Nacos found evidence of the prevalence of gender stereotypes, 
such as the compassionate nature of females and male’s natural 
aggressiveness, that cause people to expect men and women to behave 
differently. As a result, “Women in politics are commonly seen as 
compassionate, practical, honest, and hard-working, while men are seen as 
ruthless, ambitious, and tough leaders”. Nacos argues that “Indeed, women are 
‘most newsworthy when they are doing something ‘un- lady like’ ”. 
Researchers also found that the media reports much more on the physical 
appearances (their figure, their hairstyle, their make-up, their attire, their overall 
appearance) and the personal traits of female candidates and office-holders, 
whereas male politicians receive more issue-oriented coverage. Many Middle 
Eastern women are covered up so that hairstyles and such things are hardly an 
issue, but the female fighters represent an exception in this context. Generally, 
Nacos noticed that female politicians are far more often defined by their family 
status than male politicians and are typically identified as the wives of a 
multimillionaire husband, the daughters of a well-known politician, the 
unmarried challengers of male incumbents or the mothers of several children. 
Finally, even after reporting the initial news that a woman has accomplished 
another “first”, the media tends to always identify these females as exceptional, 
because such achievements are not expected of females. By defining them 
together as “Black Widows” with personal grievances, the media ignores the 
fact that some, or perhaps many, of these women were not at all motivated by 
personal but political grievances. This is a point the author will try to verify. 
Related to the previous category is the popular image of the woman terrorist 
acting for the sake of love – not for deeply held political reasons. Sometimes, a 
woman turns to terrorism out of simple boredom, and the media represents 
boredom as one of the pathetic rights and privileges of the middle-class woman 
(Nacos 2005). Although women figure prominently in the history of terrorism, 
the female terrorist continues to be perceived as an exception to the rule. 
According to these studies, these Kurdish women fighters seem to be glorified 
by the international media because they are contesting the traditional portrayal 
of Middle Eastern women who are not “emancipated”. By taking up arms, they 
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are also contradicting gender and ethnic stereotypes, and this makes them 
newsworthy (Del Re, 2015). 
Dilar Dirk begins an article by talking about Rehana, who, according to the 
Western media, has killed more than 1,000 fighters for ISIL. She claims that 
they present this woman as a phenomenon worthy of a novel, so they do not 
emphasize her political ideas and aspirations: “They cheapen a legitimate 
struggle by projecting their bizarre orientalist fantasies on it – and oversimplify 
the reasons motivating Kurdish women to join the fight. Nowadays, it seems to 
be appealing to portray women as sympathetic enemies of ISIS without raising 
questions about their ideologies and political aims”. Edward Said, in Covering 
Islam, also wrote that the Western media still uses the dominant Orientalist 
point of view. This perspective developed by E. Said suggests that Western 
literature tends to describe the Middle East and the Far East as bizarre and 
curious, depraved. The Western media does not portray the reality of the East 
accurately, but has created an exotic picture, so it is not able to fully understand 
this different culture, but has rather created a charming narrative regarding it 
(Said). For Dilar Dirik, it is happening again when the Western media speaks 
about the Kurdish female fighters, because they are attracted by the image of a 
woman who is different from what is described in the Oriental fantasy. 
Emanuela Del Re underlines the fact that participation in the Syrian conflict and 
against ISIS has been subject to different interpretations. Kurdistan has allowed 
women Peshmerga to fight in the front line, but there is concern that they risk 
too much and are often kept away from being clearly exposed to the battle front. 
One of the elements of the myth is that women have a bullet to kill themselves if 
they are captured. There are also stories of women who have used themselves 
as a last act of heroism who inspire generations. Another narrative is that 
suicide bombings are part of the Kurdish fighting culture, while another legend 
tells that the ISIS escaped in front of the women not because they fear them, 
but because they are afraid that they will not enter paradise if they are killed by 
a woman. All of this reduces the value of the female fighter (Del Re, 2015). 
As Dirik points out, it does not help Kurdish women when they are glorified as 
enemies of the ISIS if their political struggle is not then deepened and 
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supported. In fact, these kinds of discourses aim to reproduce certain visuals 
and stereotypes of Muslim women. There is still a persistent representation of 
barbaric and uncivilised Islamic societies, along with passive Muslim women 
within a repressive society. As Said claims in Orientalism, Arab women are 
represented as exotic, erotic and suppressed objects. People tend to believe 
that the reports present the truth, while they are actually a product of a certain 
discourse representing the reality that shapes a structured meaning (Said). 
In fact, there has always been extensive news coverage in the Western media 
about the Middle East portraying Muslim women as suffering from wars in Iraq, 
Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, etc. Journalists frequently picture Arab women as 
suffering and desperate. In his article “The Visual Representation of 
Muslim/Arab Women in Daily Newspapers in the United States” (Falah, GW 
2005), Falah states that “Arab and Muslim women are rarely portrayed as 
having “normal” lives [...] Instead, images of Muslim women are used almost 
exclusively to communicate the abnormality of life in Muslim societies marked 
by violence, religious fanaticism, and political turmoil”. The Western media and 
human rights activists often victimise Muslim women, using the veil as a symbol 
of oppression. Several images ignore the diversity of women and present them 
collectively in a stereotypical way. There is a wide range of images of Arab 
women in war situations, whereby Falah emphasises two types of narratives: 
the passive victim and the active activist. The passive woman is often illustrated 
as an oppressed victim of religious fundamentalism or dictatorships, while the 
active woman is often involved in demonstrations or social movement. There is 
a construction of identity within ideological bias and power by framing the Arab 
women in certain war situations. Mirella Galletti, in "Western Images of the 
Women's role in Kurdish Society", suggests that Kurdish nationalists contributed 
to the spread of such stereotypes as the idea that the Kurdish women were 
different from their Middle Eastern counterparts (who were perceived as subject 
to total male control due to the influx of Islam and the backwardness of their 
society) and the myth of the ancestral freedom of Kurdish women. They did this 
for several reasons, but above all, because they wished to point out similarities 
in the cultural heritage between the West and Kurdish society and to obtain a 
wider consensus throughout the Kurdish national movement.  
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Dirik emphasises that this tendency to consider the Kurdish militants a form of 
public relations strategy does not take into consideration the different 
tendencies between the Kurds of various regions or that Kurdish women have 
always fought. Dirik claims that the Eastern media takes the most attractive 
women into consideration and begins a process of exoticism, treating them as 
Amazons. Instead, Dirik asserts that his generation has known Kurdish women 
as fighters. Dirik recalls Kara Fatama, for instance. Dirik claims that almost half 
of the PKK's forces are women. She also reports the case of the women in Iraq, 
Deli and Peshmerga. They often receive criticism for not drawing women into 
fighting at the front, but between 1970 and 1980, they took up arms with their 
husbands to fight against the Hussein regime. Treating Kurdish women as a 
form of public relations means treating Kurds as a homogeneous people by 
ignoring differences between them. 
 
2.3 Historical roots of the Kurdish women's movement 
 
For the purpose of synthesis, and due to the greater availability of sources, the 
analysis will focus on the historical and ideological roots of the Kurdish women's 
movement in Turkey and, in particular, on the history of the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (PKK) political militants. This paper will take into consideration the article 
“The roots of the revolution of the Kurdish women”, written by Francesca La 
Bella, and the article “Re-defining the role of women within the Kurdish national 
movement in Turkey in the 1990s”, by Necla Acik, who gives an insight into how 
some Kurdish newspapers close to PKK have framed the women participating 
in political fighting. 
According to the article by Francesca La Bella, “a careful examination of the 
literature on the subject highlights, in fact, the leadership of Kurdish women in 
Turkey in the creation of a specific theory of women's liberation. By borrowing 
part of the socialist tradition, this theory has undergone numerous 
transformations due to the interpenetration between general theory and local 
reality succeeding in delineating a process of female empowerment with 
peculiar characteristics”. For a correct understanding of these dynamics, it is 
therefore necessary to examine the historical and social contingencies at the 
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root of this experience. According to Francesca La Bella, “At the beginning of 
the last century, the liberation of women was used as an instrument to 
subordinate them to the Turkish nation. The Turkish generals have appealed to 
the Turkish women formally ‘emancipated’ by the state to highlight the gap 
between Turkish modernity and Kurdish underdevelopment. When thousands of 
Kurdish women began to expand the ranks of the PKK and its guerrilla army in 
1990, Turkey launched a broad offensive against the guerrillas. While men were 
labelled terrorists, official nationalism reduced women to prostitutes. From a 
patriarchal perspective, women could not be considered terrorists and their 
rebellion against the indivisibility of the Turkish nation had to be degraded in 
sexist terms”. 
 In parallel, the Kurdish nationalists themselves have prevented the evolution of 
an independent female movement. Although, during the course of its history, 
Kurdish society was mainly dominated by male figures, there are several 
examples of women who have achieved significant positions within the 
community. Many Kurdish authors have interpreted these cases as evidence of 
the position of respect held by women and as examples of a long tradition of 
equality. According to Francesca La Bella, Kurdish nationalists have contributed 
to the diffusion of such stereotypes for different reasons, but mainly to underline 
the common cultural roots between the West and Kurdish society and to obtain 
support for their own national liberation movement. It was a contradiction with 
their eyes turned to tradition; the nationalist parties have thus postponed 
women's emancipation, perpetuating the myth of the ancestral freedom of 
Kurdish women (La Bella, 2016). 
According to Francesca La Bella, the actions of the Turkish state and the 
activity of Kurdish nationalists have been closely intertwined. The Turkish state 
has adopted an aggressive policy of assimilation towards the Kurds, and the 
reaction of the Kurdish nationalists has been one of strong adherence to 
tradition. This social defence mechanism has strengthened women's 
subjugation by turning them into symbols of Kurdish identity against Turkey's 
imperialist control.  
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Women, who were almost totally illiterate, spoke Kurdish at home because it 
was the only language they knew, and in this way, they preserved the historical 
memory of their own people. Kurdistan is not an exception. It has always been 
considered more important to make men study, and the public space has been 
considered the exclusive preserve of the latter. Women were viewed as the 
private property of their family, and then her husband, being relegated to the 
household, deprived of the opportunity to work and subjected to continuous 
violence in body and spirit. Because of this, Kurdish women, on the one hand, 
have been subject less to state assimilation policies and, on the other, have had 
a further stimulus to mobilisation. In conflict, therefore, they found the possibility 
of changing their condition, even towards their own men.  
In this sense, it is necessary to underline that, in a society that is still strongly 
patriarchal, the condition of militant women is considered by many analysts to 
be different from that experienced by the Kurdish female population as a whole. 
In addition, an active military experience distinguishes any group, whether 
women or men, from an inactive civilian group. The tools of emancipation are 
the political and military involvement of these women. The PKK has, therefore, 
marked a significant break with the past, actively mobilising women, and, at the 
same time, the armed wing of the PKK, the ARGK, has, since the beginning, 
recruited a significant number of young female fighters. In training camps, 
women worked and fought alongside and equally with men, sometimes 
becoming military commanders.  
According to Necla Acik (Acik 2016), in Re-defining the Role of Women within 
the Kurdish National Movement in Turkey in the 1990s, the mobilisation of 
women in the Kurdish national struggle in the 1990s was accompanied by 
varying and often contradictory discourses. The feminist journals, addressing a 
more educated, middle class audience, focused on women as independent 
agents who fought against national oppression as well as against sexism 
coming among their own ranks. For these feminists, liberation included personal 
emancipation and the politicisation of the private life. The YÖK newspaper, 
conversely, was affiliated with the PKK that led an armed struggle. This was an 
organisation with a high level of influence over the Kurdish population at its 
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disposal. It successfully mobilised Kurdish women from the rural areas and the 
cities, including sections of Kurdish society that had never been this politicised 
before. It delivered a solution to the problems of national oppression and 
gender inequalities by re-constructing and linking a matriarchal society with the 
current struggle of the Kurds. 
 
The PKK launched its armed struggle in 1984, and throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, it heavily recruited women as guerrilla fighters. Within a decade of the 
start of the armed campaign, the Kurdish national movement reached its peak 
with the Serhildans (Kurdish for “uprising”) that took place during the period 
between 1990 and 1993. In these mass uprisings, women became even more 
visible in the public sphere, in particular as political activists. It was during this 
period that female branches within established Kurdish organisations were 
expanded or were formed if they did not already exist. More importantly, for the 
first time it led to the emergence of independent Kurdish women’s groups and 
organisations in Turkey.  
Necla Acik underlines that, because women have historically been the ones 
most oppressed and humiliated, they must possess will and determination and 
exert the greatest efforts in order to modify their situation. Because they are the 
most vulnerable targets for the enemy, they must fight hardest to overcome 
their weakness. Because they create life, they must work the hardest for its 
preservation. These lines of argument have been employed by PKK and used 
as a powerful argument to justify and increase the mobilisation of women in the 
national struggle. This allocation of the maternal role to women and its 
accentuation have been criticised by the feminist journals.  
However, at the same time, they also reproduced fixed images of “womankind” 
and identified women as possessing rigid features. The idea that women are 
“pacifists” by nature, whereas men are “warlike”, is particularly evident in the 
discourse surrounding war and peace. From the woman-as-pacifist 
classification, a female identity is derived that possesses a better aptitude for 
peaceful co-existence and tolerance than the male identity allows. This has a 
fundamental overlap with the historical notion of the women of the “golden era”, 
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and as such, the feminist and non-feminist journals, in similar ways, 
essentialised images of Kurdish women. 
 
The celebration of a female culture and a female identity serves to form a basis 
for women’s systematic organisation. Necla Acik underlines that such 
definitions do not necessarily lead to the hoped-for emancipation but can 
actually prove themselves to be detrimental to women’s attempts to actively 
participate in political and societal processes. She claims that the creation of a 
golden age or a Kurdish historiography is typical to nation building processes 
and perhaps constitutes the fundamentals of any nation-building project. Kurds 
claim Mesopotamia as their homeland for many centuries, which often 
symbolises the golden era of the past.  
In the historiography narrated by PKK-affiliated publications, Kurdish 
oppression was, and continues to be, considered analogous with the 
oppression of women. Ancient Mesopotamia, representing the golden era of the 
Kurdish nation, is described as a matriarchal society governed by fairness, 
attachment to the land and the equality of both men and women. Due to their 
ability to give birth and close association with nature and the earth, women in 
matriarchal Mesopotamia were believed to be in possession of the secret of life 
itself. This guaranteed them decision-making roles in the organisation of social 
life, which they exercised in favour of both sexes, without 
any domination or exploitation. However, according to this narrative, this ideal 
situation came to an end despite fierce resistance by these women. who 
eventually lost their power. The matriarchal society was replaced by a 
patriarchal and oppressive system. In the PKK narrative, this also marks the 
period of the end of Kurdish liberation and the beginning of Kurdish oppression. 
The Kurds are said to have lost their identity in the same way that the women of 
the past were robbed of their self-determination (Acik N 2016).  
The mass mobilisation of women in Kobane is the legacy of the decades-long 
resistance of Kurdish women as fighters, prisoners, politicians, leaders of 
popular uprisings and tireless protesters, unwilling to compromise on their 
rights. According to Dirik, “Appreciation for these women should not only praise 
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their fight against ISIS, but it should also recognize their politics. Those seeking 
to honour the bravest enemies of ISIS can begin by actively supporting the 
resistance in Kobane, remove the PKK from the terror list, and officially 
recognize the Syrian Kurdistan administration.” 
 
2.4 The ideological roots of the Kurdish women's movement 
There is a strong relationship between the political development of the Kurdish 
movement, particularly the women’s movement, and the ideas of Abdullah 
Ӧcalan, the imprisoned leader of PKK. For Ӧcalan, sexism is one of the main 
pillars of the nation state. “In short, the campaigns for excluding women and for 
manufacturing reverence for the conquering, warrior male authority structure 
were tightly interwoven. The state as an institution was invented by males” 
(Ӧcalan 2014). Having moved away from the initial male goal to obtain an 
independent Kurdistan, he now argues that the establishment of an 
independent nation-state does not improve the freedom of its people. According 
to Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, in “The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK): National 
Liberation, Insurgency and Radical Democracy Beyond Borders”, the reach of 
the organisation was such that by the 1990s, the “liberation of Kurdistan” was 
no longer unthinkable. However, in the 2000s, the period following the arrest of 
its founder and leader, Abdullah Ӧcalan, the PKK has experienced severe 
difficulties. Yet, rather than leading to the weakening of the movement, these 
difficulties led to a process of reinvention. Its ideology, organisational structure 
and commitment to political-military struggle, all very much at the heart of the 
controversy, have been transformed. This has been made possible mainly 
through the elaboration of new ideological and political approaches, which 
created opportunities for the PKK to enlarge its scope of interest and activities, 
thereby creating more space for a Kurdish public sphere.  
With the concept of democratic confederalism, PKK seems to be trying to 
improve its international image and to be taken off the list of terrorist 
organisations. In an Italian article, for example, it states that PKK is stopping 
terrorism; it is not part of it. According to the newspaper Il fatto quotidiano, the 
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PKK stops terrorism, and it is not part of it. As is well known thanks to the 
strong media attention given to the participation of women in the Kurdish war 
and the liberation of Kobane, the female issue plays a fundamental role for 
democratic confederalism, as theorised by Ӧcalan. The question of gender is in 
fact more than a simple claim of rights; it is one of the main points of Ӧcalan’s 
criticism of contemporary society and, consequently, constitutes one of the 
pillars on which to base a new one. According to the leader of the PKK, female 
discrimination has its roots in the patriarchal structure of modern society and in 
the historical union it has achieved with military culture.  
According to Francesca La Bella (2016), women played a fundamental role in 
defining their role in society; their emancipation was often considered 
secondary to the struggle for national liberation. The author argues that “in this 
perspective, some analysts have stated that Kurdish feminism has played a 
mere supporting role compared to the broader Kurdish nationalism. In this 
sense, women would be ‘authorized’ to fight for their rights only where this 
process could lead to benefits for the realization of the national Kurdish project”. 
According to a study conducted by Chyntia Enloe (2004), titled “Gender is Not 
Enough: The Need for a Feminist Consciousness” international affairs 80. 
(2004), the role of women in the "war fought" has always been negligible, 
because it has been considered insignificant; consequently, the contribution of 
the female sex would historically be contested in the reconstruction processes 
of peace and reconciliation, so-called DDR processes (disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration), thus fuelling the ideal-typical vision of the war 
that conceives of it as an exclusively male activity. From this point of view, one 
of the central aspects of women's liberation is free access to all levels of public 
life and the rejection of a process of “housewification” as a reduction of women 
to male property. The rejection of the isolation of women in the private sphere 
can be considered to descend from Marxist theory, but the analysis of Ӧcalan 
has gone beyond Marxist theory. 
The feminism who influenced the ideas of Ӧcalan and the female Kurdish 
fighters who are inspired by his “Jineology theory”, Jin” is Kurdish and means 
“woman”. Logy is derived from the Greek term “logos”, meaning knowledge; it is 
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not connected with liberal feminism. Ӧcalan was inspired by the theory of Maria 
Mies, a social feminist and eco-feminist who also focused on the division of 
labour. According to her, a materialist explanation forces us to analyse the 
nature of the interaction of women and men with nature, and through it, their 
human or social nature is accumulated. In this context, she criticises Engels for 
not taking this aspect into account. The feminine and the masculine define in 
each different historical epoch. Thus, in what she calls the principles of 
societies, matriarchal women were significant, because they were productive – 
they were active producers of life. In capitalist conditions, this has changed, and 
they are housewives, empty of all creative and productive qualities. Women as 
producers of children and milk, and as gatherers and farmers, had a 
relationship with nature different from that of men. Men relate to nature through 
tools. According to her, then, the supremacy of men does not come from their 
superior economic contribution, but from the fact that they invented the 
destructive tools through which they control women. In addition, she adds that 
patriarchal relations were established in the herding economy. Men learned the 
role of impregnation. The monopoly of weapons, and knowledge of this, meant 
that the male role in production led to changes in the division of labour. Women 
were no longer important as food gatherers or as producers; their role involved 
the raising of children. In this way, she concludes, "we can attribute the 
symmetrical division of labour between men and women to a predatory mode of 
production, or rather, appropriation, which is based on the male monopoly on 
means of coercion, ie, in the arms and in the direct violence through which the 
permanent relations of exploitation and domination between the sexes are 
created and maintained". 
The family, the state and religion have played an important role in endorsing 
this point of view. Although Mies claims that we must reject biological 
determinism, she herself deviates towards it. Several of her proposals for social 
change, like those of radical feminists, are directed towards the transformation 
of male-female relationships and the responsibility of raising children. However, 
it is not possible to change it within the capitalist system. The capitalist mode of 
production must not only be transformed, but must be transformed along with 
the mode of procreation. 
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Maria Mies has also expressed harsh criticism of Marxist theory, introducing the 
concepts of male dominance and “housewification”. In her opinion, the Marxist 
analysis of the value of labour force does not pay attention to the relationship 
between a man who is active at work and a woman who is a housewife. Thus, 
if, for the capitalists, the work of women at home is considered a natural 
resource, even in proletarian families, women's work is considered marginal. 
This consideration is derived from the concept according to which, in the 
absence of bargaining power, women are subjugated by proletarian men just as 
colonies are subjugated by colonisers. “Housewification” is described as the 
most ancient form of enslavement, and gender discrimination is considered the 
basis of all unequal power relations, such as those between different classes 
and peoples (Mies 2015). 
What is happening in Rojava is revolutionary, and the space given in the media 
to the female soldiers has a very strong symbolic power. Thus, the present 
author argues that it may represent real female emancipation rather than merely 
a good tool to improve the PKK’s image in the international press coverage, and 
thus in the opinion of the Western public. According to Dirik, “Today, when we 
look at how the mainstream treats the Kurdish women’s resistance against ISIS, 
we can see very simplistic and problematic approaches that focus on the war in 
terms of a physical military fight only, even a certain Schadenfreude that ISIS is 
being defeated by women, a classical ‘girls beat boys’ type of attitude. The 
women’s political motivations, their ideologies are ignored or co-opted within 
this context, even by feminists”. Having considered different feminist theories, 
including liberal feminism, critical feminism and radical feminism, it is now worth 
examining which of these is predominant in the media. 
 
2.5 Methodology and Analysis  
To undertake this research, the author must begin by defining who the Kurdish 
people are. The method the author will use to conduct is quantitative content 
analysis. According to Berenson “Content analysis is a research technique for 
the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
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communication”. According to Hanson (1989), six steps are required to 
undertake a content analysis. It is these steps which the author will follow to 
understand if and how the promotion of gender equality is improving the PKK’s 
international image.  
Definition of research problem: How are Kurdish female fighters framed by 
the Western media? Is the media giving attention to their ideas when 
describing female fighters?  
• Selection of the media and sample: the author will analyse the news 
coverage given to PKK, Ӧcalan and Kurdish females in different 
newspapers. She will analyse the period 2011-2018, and she will use 
the following keywords in the research: “Kurdish women”, “PKK”, 
“Ӧcalan”, “PYD”, “Rojava” and “Kurdish female fighters”. Media 
coverage of the PKK organisation could be key to showing how PKK 
is perceived by various countries. As Ӧcalan was hosted as a refugee 
in Italy, the author will take into consideration two Italian newspapers: 
La Repubblica (centre-left) and Il Corriere della Sera (centre-right). 
The author will analyse an example of international press coverage 
the Guardian and The Times.  
• She will take into consideration different Turkish newspapers in the 
English language, chosen according to different political sides: Bianet 
is pro-Kurdish and leftist; Diken is leftist; Hürriyet Daily News is 
centre; and Dailysabah is considered nationalist.  
• It is also crucial for the research to determine whether the fighters 
who speak for themselves are chosen by reporters as a collective 
subject that speaks for all participants in the group. 
• Definition of analytical categories, e.g.:  
PKK as a terrorist party  
Kurdish cause  
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Kurdish women/Kurdish female fighters – how the media portrays 
them in relation to Kobane  
1) struggle for equality/emancipation/liberation 
 2) personal/emotional motivations: Revenge, Out-of-touch-with-
reality, love. 
3) physical appearance  
4) exceptionalism 
• Construction of coding schedule. The coding schedule will include 
information such as article length, the name of the newspaper, type of 
article and the political alignment of the newspaper  
• Checking reliability: she will check if the categories are reliable in the 
analysis.  
• Data preparation and analysis  
 
Target group  
The target group of the research study are Kurdish, Turkish and Syrian people 
living in Ireland and national journalists and lecturers internationally. This paper, 
it is hoped, will serve as an academic study to bring about awareness of the 
Kurdish cause and demonstrate how gender equality is possible in the Middle 
East, along with the ideas that support it. 
  
Ethical issues  
The general ethical principles to be applied during research include voluntary 
participants being aware of the risk involved in participation, confidentiality and 
anonymity, knowing the benefit of participation, informed consent and the right 
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to withdraw. Most of the research will be based on content analysis, although 
the author will endeavour to follow these principles. 
 
Potential challenges  
• PKK is still considered a terrorist party by the US and the European 
Union.  
• In Turkey, Kurdish identity is a controversial topic, especially given the 




It is hoped that this study will demonstrate that the gender revolution in Rojava 
is truly happening and that it is no mere public relations strategy. The author 
also wishes to demonstrate that in this fight, women’s political motivations and 








The data consisted of news articles from the national media in Italy, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom between 2008 and 2018, analysed via frame analysis. The 
newspapers examined from Italy included La Repubblica and Corriere della 
Sera, while those from the UK were the Guardian and the Times. The Turkish 
publications considered were the Daily Sabah, the Bianet and the Hürriyet.1 The 
goal was to determine whether the revolution in Rojava was reported, in 
addition to whether it was truly happening or was merely public relations 
propaganda, as the Turkish newspapers often claim. The research also sought 
to ascertain whether the Western newspapers highlighted only the 
sensationalist aspects of the fighters or also gave attention to the ideologies 
that drove them to fight. Finally, the research was aimed at determining whether 
there was a perspective shared by all Western newspapers. 
According to Dirik, Kurdish women fighters is a novel phenomenon. The media 
underestimates the ideology behind their fight by projecting bizarre Oriental 
fantasies on it and oversimplifying the motivations causing Kurdish women to 
join the fight. It is appealing to portray women as sympathetic enemies of ISIS, 
without raising questions about their ideologies and political aims. In the words 
of Dirik, “Appreciation for these women should not only praise their fight against 
ISIS, but it should also recognize their politics. Those seeking to honor the 
bravest enemies of ISIS can begin by actively supporting the resistance in 
Kobane, remove the PKK from the terror list, and officially recognize the Syrian 
Kurdistan administration”. 
They have become icons of heroism and bravery, with a number of celebratory 





noticed by Emanuela del Re is that Western newspapers create myths that 
degrade ISIS by deconstructing the masculinity of the enemy while sexualising 
the YPJ. Thus, the charming female fighters are portrayed as winning against 
ISIS not because of their military value, but due to ISIS’s fear of being killed by 
them. Moreover, this would confirm Dirik's thesis of the Western media 
oversimplifying the motivations behind their choice to fight. 
 
3.2 Data collection and methodology 
The content analysis method was adopted for this analysis. It is a quantitative 
method; its purpose is to identify and count the occurrence of specified 
characteristics or dimensions of a text and, through this, to be able to state 
something about messages, images and representations of such texts, along 
with their wider social significance.2 According to Hanson Anders, this method 
cannot be objective in a “value-free” sense – it is based on making a subjective 
choice as regards which dimensions chosen for analysis are the important or 
significant aspects to consider. Because of this weakness, the author decided 
to assign a number to every article taken into consideration, using an online 
automatic number generator to track the articles chosen for analysis. 
The idea was to compare the image represented by the Western newspapers 
with that of the Turkish newspapers, but also to distinguish between English 
and Italian newspapers. This was also because Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, 
had been hosted in Italy before being imprisoned in Turkey. The chosen period 
was included because it involved several important events: 
 
• The start of the war in Syria, on March 15, 2011.  
• The release of Kobane by the Kurdish Protection Units in the spring of 
2015.  
• The assault on Afrin in January 2018. The Turkish forces, supported by 





north-west of Syria, and they took control of certain areas. Afrin, close to 
the Turkish border, is a critical enclave in the north-west of Syria which 
could have offered an outlet to the Mediterranean for the Kurds. The 
campaign is being conducted against the People's Protection Units 
(YPG) and the Kurdish forces in northern Syria, which are considered by 
Ankara to be part of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). 
The collection of data was conducted via the Internet, so the issues of these 
newspapers were online versions, and in some cases, they were paid versions. 
The author took the Turkish press into consideration because she believes that 
reading the English edition was important, since it indicates the image of the 
country that the newspaper wants to communicate to a foreign audience. The 
number of articles available in the English language in the Turkish press was 
limited.  
Madı̇na Aynur Benakay, in The Badass Female Fighters: Media Representation 
of Kurdish Women in Kobane, took into consideration fashion magazines such 
as Elle, Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan and Teen Vogue. For this study, the author 
chose national newspapers, because she believed that articles in fashion 
magazines may be inclined towards sensationalist viewpoints. The author 
considered the macrostructure, the heading and the subheading, in addition to 
whether the picture was consistent with the topic. The concepts of background 
information and context were also adopted.  
Context information is about social and political views of the facts. In this study, 
the author sought to highlight whether the article was generally in favour of the 
Kurds or not. Moreover, she wanted to ascertain whether there was a definition 
of the historical context and the reasons for the conflict. The purpose was to 
identify whether the media was giving attention to the ideology behind the 
Kurdish fight or whether it was merely creating a narrative about the personal 
stories of the female fighters, in order to satisfy the expectations and tastes of 
the audience. 
Analysis by J. Galtung and M. Ruge has shown that several factors are 
consistently applied across a range of news organisations in order to decide the 
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selection and prioritisation of news (frequency, reference to persons, reference 
to something negative and consonance). The more an event is associated with 
these criteria, the more likely it is to be reported on in a newspaper. 
“Consonance” is a news value which indicates that, if the media suggests that 
something will happen, it will happen in the manner in which it was previously 
reported. It is based on expected features of the world on which the media 
reports and which the audience expects. 
According to Brigitte Nacos (2005), gender stereotypes are found in the media, 
such as the idea that females have a compassionate nature, while males are 
naturally aggressive, and these affect people by making them expect men and 
women to behave differently. Following the study by Nacos, the author decided 
to examine whether the newspapers gave attention to the reasons that had led 
women to war, along with determining what interpretative framework the 
journalists used. Using the study of Brigitte Nacos, the author has distinguished 
four main frames used in both national presses: 1) idealistic, with a struggle for 
equality/emancipation/liberation; 2) the desire for revenge; 3) out of touch with 
reality and love; and 4) escaping from their backward culture or from ISIS. The 
first frame presented the women combatants’ participation as ideological; they 
were fighting for equality, emancipation and national liberation. The second and 
third frames were used to underline women’s personal reasons for engaging in 
battle (loss of family members, for instance, being naïve and following a 
husband, or for love). The fourth frame was employed when there was a desire 
to change the female condition in respect of the environment offered by the 
archaic traditional culture and the project pursued by Isis. 
The author tried to analyse the photos and descriptions to determine whether 
there were references to women's physical appearances and their feminine 
features. The author also decided to examine whether there was a frame that 
depicted women as extraordinary and tougher than men, in order to verify 
whether there was a tendency to “emasculate” the enemy. In the analysis, the 
author also identified whether the journalist was a man or a woman and 
whether he/she was European. This was because of the desire to examine 
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whether an exotic, Orientalist image prevailed or whether attention was also 
given to the reasons and the historical context. 
In the analysis regarding the article written by Brigette Nacos, the author tried to 
investigate how the female fighters were described and whether they fell into 
the categories described by her. For instance, the author found worthy in the 
analysis the “Terrorist for the Sake of Love Frame”. Related to the previous 
category is the popular image of the woman terrorist or fighter who fights for the 
sake of love, not for deeply political reasons. There is a stereotype of the 
female terrorist who joins terrorist groups and activities, following her lover or 
husband, or perhaps her father, brother or cousin. The author has noticed that 
this frame is popular when describing women’s part in jihad. The author then 
tried to compare the descriptions of the Kurdish fighters and foreign female 
fighters with those who had joined the jihad, in order to ascertain whether the 
same frames were used. 
Nacos also emphasises that female terrorists are almost always physically 
attractive, trim and pleasant. With respect to female terrorists, the concept of 
the “naïve, bored, non-political, out-of-touch-with-reality woman” (Nacos 2014) 
who turns to terrorism simply out of boredom is frequently used. The author 
sought to determine whether there was a reason for joining the fight on both 
sides, and she was especially interested in foreign female Western fighters 
participating in the fight on both sides. Moreover, the author sought to analyse 
whether the Italian media and the English media shared the same perspectives 





3.3 Content analysis 
According to Berelson (1952), content analysis is a method of study and 
analysis of the messages of systematic, objective and quantitative 
communication with the purpose of measuring certain variables. Content 
analysis must be systematic, both in selecting the sample and in conducting the 
actual analysis. The selection of the sample must follow the established 
procedures, and each element must have a fair chance of being included in the 
sample. Furthermore, during the analysis, all of the content under examination 
must be treated in exactly the same way. The author used the same categories 
when conducting the research for all of the articles. The categories used were 
taken from the article of Nacos (2005), and they were equally used on the 
analysis of all newspapers taken into consideration. 
The analysis of the content must be objective. Even if perfect objectivity is 
unattainable, it is still possible to have operational definitions and rules for 
classifying variables as explicitly and exhaustively as possible, so as to allow 
another researcher who repeats the same process to reach the same 
conclusions. 
The author decided to choose four categories:  
1) idealistic, with a struggle for equality/emancipation/liberation 
2) the desire for revenge 
3) out of touch with reality and love 
4) escaping from their backward culture, or from ISIS.  
In the idealistic category, the author included feminist ideas and political ideas 
(such as democratic confederalism and the Kurdish cause). As regards the 
desire for revenge, this was connected, for example, to the loss of a family 
member. The third category, out of touch with reality and love, related to when 
the journalist focused on a partner or husband as the reason for females 
choosing to fight. Such females are viewed as out of touch of reality when they 
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are depicted being naïve and not totally aware of the weight of their decisions 
and consequences. 
The author defined the content of the research as daily newspaper articles 
published from 2011 to 2018. The author considered unit of analysis articles 
written in English to make the content understandable to potential readers of 
this paper. The second language was Italian, but the author will translate and 
explain in English the meaning of the articles taken into consideration. The 
author also took into consideration newspapers from the United Kingdom 
instead of Ireland, simply because there were more pages dedicated to the 
topic in UK newspapers during the period considered, 2011-2018. The Italian 
daily newspapers considered were La Repubblica, Corriere della Sera, while 
the UK publications were the Times and the Guardian.  
Content analysis must be quantitative. The method must therefore quantify the 
message in such a way as to allow precise conclusions. Quantification allows 
researchers to summarise their results author to present them concisely. During 
the phase of category construction, the author tried to define content categories 
suitable to the topic object of the analysis. According to Berelson (1952), these 
categories must be exclusive and reliable: every unit of analysis can be inserted 
into only one category. In cases where the unit of analysis could be placed into 
two different categories, the author considered the numbers of words dedicated 
to the two different topics when there was an overlap. In addition, the captions 
associated with photographs were considered. This also helped to avoid 
overlaps between the idealist category and the frame escaping from their 
backward culture and ISIS. The category had to contain all of the units of 
analysis considered so that elements were not allocated to another category. 
The categories and to be reliable in order to allow other research to yield the 
same results. 
The author also established a system to quantify the data, involving the use of 
the number “one” to indicate the presence of an element or a frame. The author 
counted the frequency of the units of analysis in every category of content. 
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At the end of the process, the author performed an analysis of the data, and 






The Guardian is a British daily newspaper. It was known from 1821 until 1959 
as the Manchester Guardian. The Trust was created in 1936 "to secure the 
financial and editorial independence of the Guardian in perpetuity and to 
safeguard the journalistic freedom and liberal values of the Guardian free from 
commercial or political interference". The paper's readership is generally on the 
mainstream left of the British political spectrum. The newspaper's reputation as 
a platform for liberal and left-wing editorials has led to the use of the "Guardian 
reader" and "Guardianista" often (but not always) as pejorative epithets for 
those of left-leaning or politically correct tendencies3. 
In the article “Turkish women get behind the wheel”, Kurdish women are 
portrayed as taking the lead on the drive for gender equality in Diyarbakir, 
south-east Turkey, where PKK and Turkish troops have previously clashed. 
Here, it describes the emancipation of the Kurdish women respect the Turkish 
one. It is worth mentioning that in this article, Sakine Cansiz is described as “a 
legend among PKK members' about the Female Kurdish activist shot dead in 
Paris”. The article suggests that she participated in the armed struggle in 
northern Iraq, and in the picture accompanying the article, she appears beside 
Öcalan. The Guardian is linking the female fighters to Öcalan, but in the article, 
the PKK is not considered a terrorist party.	
In the article “Kurdish peshmerga fighters: women on the frontline – in pictures”, 
the female fighters are presented as learning to use guns and training. They are 
pretty, but no makeup or objects associated with female identity feature. They 
are presented as equal to their male colleagues. Meanwhile, in the article “ ‘We 
are so proud’ – the women who died defending Kobani against Isis”, revenge is 
the frame mostly used to describe the reason why the girls decided to start 







teacher and be a fighter – despite my mother’s disagreement. Shireen vowed to 
join the People’s Protection units, YPG, to seek revenge for her teacher and 
defend Kobani”. In one part, the article emphasises that some female 
accessories are replaced by the female fighter as she rejects her femininity to 
be transformed into a war machine: “Her bag, which was full of perfume and 
cosmetics, came to be loaded with bombs and bullets”. In the article, the family 
connection frame is part of the motivation to fight. However, it is also stated that 
“Ruhan, 19, wanted to know more about the political rights of the Kurdish 
people in Syria. She was keen to attend all the national activities organized by 





Foreign female fighters 
In “Ottawa investigates reports that Isis has captured Canadian-Israeli woman”, 
the Guardian journalist speaks about a foreign woman who joined the Kurdish 
female fighters, and it reports that she decided to participate as she truly 
wanted to help the Kurdish. In the article, Anna Campbell’s father claims, “I 
don’t think I had any right to stop her fighting in Syria”. Mr Campbell empathises 
with the idealism behind her choice: it is “humanitarian, ecological, feminist and 
equal political representation,” states Dirk, Anna’father. “Those were the issues 
she came to dedicate her life to, and she came to the conclusion that Rojava 
was where she had to go”. 
The journalist Mark Blake mentions the ideology of Ocalan; he also reports on 
the creation of a system of co-presidency, whereby a man and a woman share 
power at every level. In the article, “Number of women and children who joined 
ISIS significantly underestimated”, the journalist Nadia Khomami presents the 
case of the women joining ISIS. She suggests that the narratives within ISIS 
itself related to women’s roles in combat have also evolved, broadening the 
circumstances under which women may be asked to take up arms. The article 
cites push-and-pull factors for women who travel to aid Isis, including feelings of 
discrimination, persecution or of not belonging to society, as well as ideological 
motivations and efforts by Isis to portray women’s empowerment. The women 
are moved to a sense of belonging, but also an idea of emancipation that seeks 
to be connected with ISIS. However, the article does not explain ideas in a 
profound manner, but the focus is more on the integration initiatives that the 
government has to take in order to fight the risk of ISIS’s appeal for people 





3.5 The Times 
The Times is a British daily (available from Monday to Saturday) national 
newspaper based in London. It began in 1785 under the title the Daily Universal 
Register, adopting its current name on 1 January 1788. In 1959, the historian of 
journalism Allan Nevins analysed the importance of the Times in shaping the 
views of the events of London's elite.4 
In “Revolutionary Kurdish feminist leads assault on Raqqa”, Tom Coghlan, a 
reporter from Beirut, describes a woman called Rojda Felat, who is the 
commander of an assault on Raqqa, a revolutionary feminist. The point of view 
is the same as that of the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, considering her to 
be in the front line of a feminist revolution, but in this article, there is no mention 
of changing the role of women in Western countries. There is also no mention 
to the leader Öcalan. There is instead more attention to her marital status, but 
this is mentioned only briefly 
Foreign female fighters 
The Times's approach is different from that of La Repubblica, which describes 
foreigners going to fight with the Kurds. For instance, it describes Gill 
Rosenberg, a former member of the Israel Defence Force, who travelled to 
Syria to fight against Isis, and it emphasises that he has an obscure 
background. In the same article, it speaks about the number of Britons traveling 
to Syria and Iraq to fight with Isis as they were the same thing. It may be the 
case that they were brought there simply by boredom. However, when the 
journalists of the Times write about Anna Campbell, the first British woman to 
die fighting alongside Kurdish forces, they underline her ideology and her desire 
to participate in the revolution of women. Regarding the women who fight for 
ISIS depicted in the article “Married to a jihadi”, the reason behind joining the 
jihad, for women, is the sense of exclusion in their countries, and they are 





in the article is linked with personal reasons and also depicts naivete on the part 
of the women. 
3.6 The Italian newspapers 
As Mirella Galletti states, Öcalan has had a special relationship with Italy. The 
PKK leader chose Italy as a traditionally tolerant country with little Turkish or 
Kurdish presence, where the PKK has never created problems related to public 
order, and where the government forces seem sensitive to supporting the 
claims of the Kurdish people. The prime minister at that time was Massimo 
D'Alema, who was also the leader of the Italian left; this also encouraged 
Öcalan’s decision. The Italian-Turkish rapport in that period became difficult, 
and Turkey promoted the boycotting of Italian goods. The government was then 
forced to request the removal of the Kurdish leader from Italy on January 16, 




This is the newspaper with the second largest circulation in Italy. Founded in 
1976 by Eugenio Scalfari, it is ideological positioned in the area of the secular 
and reformist left. (Castronovo,1994) 
The author examined ten articles on this newspaper, ranging from 2007 to 
2018. They are all in favour of the Kurdish cause, not only regarding ISIS, but 
also against the attacks of Turkish troops in Afrin. The first article taken into 
consideration was written in 2008. It describes the Kurds before the Syrian war, 
the Kurdish fighters against the Turkish troops and their role in the PKK. The 
title is “PKK. Cosi’ combattono le donne guerriere”, which relates to how female 
warriors fight. The following is an opinion expressed by a woman interviewed in 
the article: “Moreover, even the PKK eventually had to change its mind about 
us, for the passion we put into it. I understand that it is not normal for a girl to 
take a weapon and shoot herself. I also did it as a form of rebellion against my 
family and society. From an emotional point of view, we women are more 
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exposed to war. If caught, we end up being tortured for longer”. The ideology of 
the Kurdish seems to be promoted, and the article connects the ideas of their 
fight with the political leader Öcalan, while the historical contest is also 
described.  
According to the analysed articles, the women decide to fight both for members 
of the nationalist Kurdish cause and for the liberation of women. However, the 
articles analysed highlight that the cruelty of ISIS as a motivation for the 
struggle was more common than the Kurdish cause or the Öcalan project. The 
desire to escape from an awkward contest therefore also plays a fundamental 
role in motivating women to fight, along with the intense fear of falling into the 
hands of ISIS and of being victims of their model of society. 
In fact, in the article “Mosul, le donne curde che sfidano l'Isis al fronte: Un 
proiettile sempre pronto in caso di cattura", (At Mosul, the Kurdish women, 
challenge Isis on the battlefield, a bullet in case of capture), and it is stated that 
the fighters prefer to fight or take their lives rather than fall into the hands of 
ISIS, the main enemy. There is a contrast between smiling and courageous 
women defying death every day, while Isis fighters are depicted as cowards 
afraid of dying at the hands of a woman. Here, it is often possible to observe 
how the newspaper attempts to “emasculate the evil, the male ISIS enemy”. 
(Del Re,2015) 
The article “La liberazione di Raqqa ha il volto di una donna in armi: ecco chi è 
Rojda Felat” describes Roida Felat, commander of the Ypj (the women's 
protection unit), which is the female arm of the Ypg. The headline translates as 
“the liberation of Raquua has the face of a woman”, but this phrase is inserted 
into a more general discourse. Felat fought for the freedom of people from 
terrorism and tyranny, whilst also seeking another freedom: “That is for Kurdish 
women, and Syrians in general, to be free by the constraints and control of 
traditional society”. The journalist, Paolo Gallori, describes her as a radical 
feminist planted in the Syrian hell: Rojda Felat is at the forefront of a cultural 
mutation that leads to the full recognition of the rights, aspirations, and lives of 
women of all ethnic groups in Syria. And not only. because, on closer look, 
according to her words, even Western women will need it. For Rojda Felat, as 
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long as "the capitalist system will consider women as objects", the women must 
fight. Indeed, the women are objects perfectly capable of leading men to victory. 
In the military, we are often seen with condescension, they believed that we are 
too delicate and lacking the courage to use even a gun or a knife. You can see 




Foreign female fighters 
La Repubblica also presents stories of dead European women trying to help the 
Kurds. They are compared to Che Guevara and other historical heroes. Ayse 
Deniz Karacagil, a Turkish woman who died in 2017 while fighting against 
Isis, is referred to by her nickname of "Little Red Riding Hood", which has 
connotations that could make one think of something naive or childish. The last 
sentence of the article, however, speaking of her death, emphasises the 
importance of heroism: "A symbol had been cried, but nobody had understood: 
the time of the heroes was over with Little Red Riding Hood.” 
In most of these articles, the journalist is a woman and a European. However, 
there are also men who share the same perspective. The women who are 
fighting Isis are not naïve or detached from the reality, but this frame has been 
used regarding the women who are fighting for Isis. In the article “A Raqqa, nel 
carcere delle donne della Jihad”, the journalist, Raqqa, in a jail for women who 
have engaged in jihad, describes the situation of ISIS wives who came to fight 
from Germany, Morocco, Tunisia and Russia. Isis wives have joined because 






Il Corriere della Sera 
ll Corriere della Sera is a historic Italian newspaper, founded in Milan in 1876. 
Published by the RCS Media Group, it is the Italian newspaper with the highest 
circulation and readership. Its slogan is "The freedom of ideas", and its political 
orientation is considered "moderate centre".(Castronovo,1994) 
 The author has taken into consideration 13 articles from 2013 until 2018. She 
has noticed that there is a favourable attitude to the Kurds, and both ideology 
and historical context are analysed. Female journalists wrote most of the 
articles, but many of these journalists wrote more than one of the articles, and 
the prevalence of females could be explained by the fact that these people are 
considered experts in the matter, rather than being chosen because they are 
women.  
The article underline as predominant motivations to fight, the liberation of 
women and the terror of a future dominated by ISIS. However, this aspect, the 
fear of ISIS, is much more pronounced than in La Repubblica and is also part of 
the title of some articles. In the article “Arin, dall’università alle trincee «Noi, 
ragazze curde contro l’Isis»” ("Arin, from the university to the trenches: ‘We, 
Kurdish girls against the Isis’ "), the journalist Lorenzo Cremonesi emphasises 
the value and courage of these girls. The fighters are so exceptional that it 
makes the journalist (a man) ashamed of being away from the battlefield. In “the 
girls from the university to the battlefields”, he writes, “they fight like men and 
they die like them”. 
In the article “La curda Nisir che si è arruolata perché le donne non restino in 
cucina”, the meaning of the title translates as “The Kurdish Nisir who enlisted, 
because women do not remain in the kitchen". It clearly expresses the intent of 
liberation of the women. "We fight for all women, for gender equality. Because 
women will not anymore be relegated to the kitchen. We know how to do 
something else and we are demonstrating it", the Kurdish Nisir states, and she 
adds, “We want to be an example also for the Western world”. There are 
references to Öcalan and his ideology as the basis of the commitment of 
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women to the war: "there can never be a revolution without the liberation of 
women". The article also speaks of the centres for women (referred to as 
“Jineology”, which, in Kurdish, means "science of women"). 
The article states that, "In the Western imagination, in fact," the Kurdish woman 
is above all a guerrilla and that the role of weapons has its own importance. But 
the political dimension is certainly the most relevant because it makes all the 
balances of patriarchy shake". The journalist Bendetta Argentieri also points out 
that the women are constantly involved in military decisions. She refers to the 
ideology of Öcalan and asserts that the philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy has 
asked that the PKK be removed from the list of terrorist organisations. 
Foreign fighters 
In “Le donne del Isis, da spose a combattenti jihadiste”, Benedetta Argentieri 
and Marta Serafini write about the women of ISIS who transform from wives to 
jihadist fighters. They underline that there has been a change in ISIS, bringing 
women into the battlefield as fighters. This article also mentions foreign girls 
from France and Germany who left their countries to marry and be part of the 
jihad, revealing that their families often do not agree with their decision, and so 
they often break ties with their past and their relatives. The article does not, 




3.7 The British Press Vs. the Italian Press 
It has largely been asserted that the dominant frames detected in the British 
media are exceptionalism, personal/emotional motivations, physical 
appearance and, finally, the struggle for equality and emancipation. It is evident 
that the tabloid newspapers place increasing emphasis on the exceptionalism of 
women taking up arms and reproduce the traditional gender approach that 
considers women more as victims rather than actors in an armed struggle. In 
most articles, one can observe a fascination with female combatants and the 
uniqueness of their presence on the battlefield. These articles usually involve 
visual material depicting women in combat clothes either during a training 
session or while taking a break from war-related activities. Photos of women 
holding Kalashnikovs have gone viral, as they reveal women’s participation in 
war as non-traditional. In one article, a family member of a deceased combatant 
mentions that she used to wear jewellery and full make-up, and her bag was full 
of cosmetics and perfume. However, she now fills her bag with bombs and 
bullets. 
The British and the Italian media have repeatedly covered the primary 
motivations of female combatants for joining the armed struggle. It is striking 
that the victim frame is used in order to depict a background story regarding 
women’s motivations to take up arms. Sexual violence, including rape and 
torture, beheadings and the experience of being a sex slave to fighters, along 
with other violent occurrences, have been given as the primary motivations that 
drove these women to join combat units. However, most articles presented 
these depictions as something that the women left behind when they became 
fighters, and the current dominant discourse is the heroine frame, in which the 
newspaper articles depict combatants as stepping out of that zone of 
victimhood. For instance, one presented a YPJ combatant as stating that she is 
always careful to leave one bullet in her weapon in order to use it on herself if 
she is captured by ISIS fighters. According to such narratives, women have no 
choice but to join the combat units, because they are fighting for their survival, 
escaping rape and torture. Revenge has also been mentioned as one of the 
most fundamental motives for women to take up arms.  
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The UK and Italian media framing constantly underline the adversaries against 
whom the female combatants are fighting: the jihadists. This surely relates to 
the depiction of ISIS in the international media in general. Combined with a 
potential Orientalist approach, in the eyes of Western audiences, it is 
universally accepted that they are portraying an unquestionable evil. Articles 
report the horrible acts committed by IS and the vulnerable situation of women 
in this region as a result of the genocidal and brutal actions (including sexual 
violence) that have taken place during the course of the war. The tone of the 
news stories is not neutral, as in the case of civil wars or articles depicting rebel 
groups in other parts of the world. The female combatants fighting IS are 
represented as admirable people worthy of attention. 
The present author agrees with Mari Toivanen’s assertion that the frame of 
exceptionalism is dominant in every newspaper (Toivanen, Baser, 2016). All of 
the newspapers repeatedly remark that the female combatants are “terrifying” 
the ISIS fighters. They mention the concept that warriors are more terrified of 
being killed by female combatants because they believe it will prevent them 
from reaching heaven or that they will lose the 72 virgins promised in return for 
their martyrdom. The present author does not agree that Kurdish political 
activism regarding the PKK is not criminalised in either Great Britain or Italy, 
and she does not agree that the ongoing Kurdish conflict is, to some extent, 
depoliticised in news reporting. The terminology used to refer to female Kurdish 
combatants includes terms such as “guerrillas” and “rebels”. On no occasion 
are the YPJ combatants referred to as “terrorists”, although a few news stories 
raise the issue of PYD’s alleged connection to the PKK and the latter’s 
presence on the EU list of terrorist organisations.However, in some articles, 
there is explicit reference to the Ocalan’s ideology and the fact that these 
Kurdish women are fighting for a national cause but also to transform the 
society in which they live and society globally. Perhaps we may note that the 
Italian press is more willing to treat the female fighters and the foreign people 
who join them as heroes, comparing them to Che Guevara or symbols. This 
could be explained by the fact that the Italian press has always been more 




3.8 The Turkish Press  
 
The Turkish press has faced challenges and changes since Turkey became a 
candidate for the European Union in 1999. For example, the rapid tabloidisation 
of newspapers in the 1980s and the commercialisation/deregulation of the 
media in the 1990s generated a tendency toward sensational news journalism, 
but the availability of commercial media also made visible formerly excluded 
issues (such as the Kurdish question, minority rights, etc.), as well as fuelling 
consumerism and a cheaply gratifying nationalism (Christensen 2010). The 
EU’s 2008 Country Progress Report Turkey suggests that Open debate 
continues in the Turkish media on a wide range of issues, including those 
perceived as sensitive by Turkish society” (European Commission 2008: 14). 
The EU has played a key role in the potential democratisation of Turkey through 
the imposition of democratic benchmarks.  
However, certain topics still incite aggressive reactions. For instance, in 1998, 
according to M. Christensen, Andrew Finkel, a foreign correspondent based in 
Turkey, “was laid off from his position at Sabah, a popular daily, following a 
column he wrote about radical Kurdish PKK party leader Abdullah Öcalan’s 
flight to Rome in 1998. In this article, Finkel interpreted Öcalan’s flight to Europe 
as a sign of the PKK’s weakness rather than as evidence that he enjoyed 
European support, which was the common reaction to the issue at the time” 
(Christensen 2010). In 2007, Christensen wrote that “the general problems 
faced by journalists in Turkey today are the result of a combination of factors, 
namely hyper-commercialization, clientelism, a patrimonial relationship between 
the media and the state, lack of unionization of journalists and lack of job 
security” (Christensen, 2007).  
The main groups with cross-media ownership in Turkey are as follows: Albayrak 
Medya Grubu (conservative/Islamist/pro-government); Ciner Yayın Holding 
(mainstream); Çukurova Medya Grubu (mainstream); Çalık Medya Grubu 
(conservative/pro-goverment); Doğan Medya Grubu (mainstream); and 
Samanyolu yayıncılık-Feza Gazetecilik (Islamist/pro-government). The Doğan 
Group is one of the largest business groups in Turkey, with extensive activities 
pertaining to the media, tourism, energy, real estate and insurance sectors, and 
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it controls almost half of Turkey’s private media (Raşit Kaya & Barış Çakmur 
2010). 
According to Raşit Kaya, the increased commercialisation of the media did not 
help to alleviate the government’s control; instead, it made the media stronger 
and thus paved the way for the instrumentalisation of the media outlets 
according to corporate interests (Raşit Kaya & Barış Çakmur 2010), although, 
since 2015, less and less space has been available for a plurality of views. 
Companies close to the ruling AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Party for 
Justice and Development) have taken control of more independent outlets, such 
as the Dogan holding company (including Hürriyet – Turkey's largest daily 
newspaper – CNN Türk and the Dogan News Agency). According to Reporters 
Without Borders, this represents a major shift in the media landscape, because 
independent and sometimes critical newspapers have a rather small reach 
(European Union 2018). Indeed, there was an unprecedented level of media 
support, since, in addition to state-owned radio and television, the party in 
power was now directly controlling the second largest media group in the 
country in relation to daily mass circulation, Sabah, and a leading private TV 
channel, ATV. Furthermore, most of the mainstream media displayed a clear 
pro-government bias. In addition, according to a European Union report (a 
report on the freedom of the press published in2018), since the failed military 
coup in 2016, the freedom of the press in Turkey has deteriorated. In the 
aftermath of the failed military coup of 2016, a number of journalists were 
arrested.  
Daily Sabah is considered a Turkish pro-government publication, while the 
Bianet is considered pro-Kurdish, and Hürriyet, according to Euro Topics 
(European Press round) in 2009, had a critical stance against the government 
even if it began with a more favourable stance toward the government after the 
attempted coup in 2016. The author has chosen these three newspapers also 
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because they run an English edition, which meant that she could understand 
the content to conduct an analysis.5 
 
Daily Sabbah 
Daily Sabah (literally "Daily Morning") is a Turkish pro-government daily 
published in Turkey. It is published in English, German, Arabic and Russian; it 
is owned by the Turkuvaz Media Group, Daily Sabah, and the editor-in-chief is 
Serdar Karagöz. The author took into consideration 10 articles from between 
2015 and 2018. The keywords inserted using the internal search section of the 
online version were as follows: “Kurdish female fighters”, “female fighters”, 
“Rojava” and “YPJ”. The articles presented in this analysis were randomly 
chosen, by associating a random number to carry out an objective selection 
process in conducting the analysis. All of the 10 articles were opposed to the 
YPJ and the female Kurdish fighters. 
The author performed a discourse analysis, taking into consideration the 
headline and the content of the article, along with the picture chosen and 
whether these elements were consistent with each other. In the article chosen, 
the headline, “Tips from the New York Times on how to beautify YPG terrorism 
(Bulur 2018), clarifies what the journalist believes about the Kurdish female 
fighters. The picture chosen depicts a beautiful woman carrying a weapon; 
there is no caption to identify the person in the picture or the source of the 
image. The article was published in 2018, the same year in which Turkey 
started the branch oil operation against Afrin. 
According to the article, the PKK would use the image of women for "feminist 
rhetoric as a tool to aestheticize terror”. For the journalist, the feminist are 
claims are just a form of propaganda, and the New York Times is falling into a 
trap: “Adapting feminist discourse for their own purposes, a terrorist woman can 







empowerment, which is what the two New York Times articles, directly or not, 
also do with eulogies to the YPJ fighters”. According to the Daily Sabbah, the 
New York Times is “sugarcoat[ing] all the violence of the group under the guise 
of fighting for women's liberation” (Bulur 2018). The newspaper aims to 
demonstrate that the YPJ is a terrorist organisation like PKK and ISIS. In 
addition, the Daily Sabbah seeks to discourage Europeans and other foreigners 
who want to join the Kurdish in the fight: “So before you write that check to help 
them, before you pack your bags to go and join them, remember that spin is 
being put on the women of the YPG, YPJ and PKK, the reality is not at all as it 
is depicted in the Western press”. 
The main message that the newspaper delivers is that the strumentalization of 
women as a means to legitimise violence and the acts of the YPG (an affiliate of 
the PKK, itself recognised as a terrorist group by the US, the EU and NATO) is 
of no use whatsoever, as it does not change the fact that a terrorist is a terrorist, 
no matter what gender. The journalist insists that the YPG and its affiliates are 
synonymous with the PKK, a terrorist group that has spent decades fighting for 
Kurdish secession in southern Turkey (Aytekin 2018). What the Daily Sabbah is 
stating is that the Western media is “glamourizing the terrorism” and that YPG is 
just another face of the PKK, a terrorist organisation. Furthermore, the 
sympathisers of the PKK terrorist organisation have once again resorted to fake 
images, this time from the New York streets, to defame Turkey's Operation 
Olive Branch in north-western Syria. There are two lines of criticism: the PKK is 
using the female fighters as a PR strategy. The PKK is a terrorist party and the 
western media are blind 
In the article “The reality behind YPG heroines: Intimidation, signed, sealed and 
delivered” (Kandur 2015), there is an emphasis on images, and these are used 
to create a sense of “glamour” in order to describe what the PKK is trying to do. 
The picture chosen in this article depicts a beautiful Kurdish woman smiling, 
with no war or men in the background, just the Kurdish flag. It is also interesting 
to consider the capture below the image: “Many major media outlets worldwide 
polish PKK-linked YPG terrorists and are asking us to choose the side that 
stands against ISIS”. The women of the YPG and YPJ are being depicted as 
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heroines in the Western media, particularly in the article spoke about the BBC. 
The journalist Kandur asks, “does this group, closely affiliated with the PKK, 
really consist of heroes and heroines battling for freedom? What is the truth 
behind these organizations that are internationally recognized as terrorist 
groups?” The Daily Sabah states that “It is a message that is cleverly and tidily 
packaged for our digestion. Without much thought most readers avidly eat it up, 
thinking, ‘Ah, women standing up for what is right, how wonderful’ " (Kandur 
2015). 
Just like the Western media, the Daily Sabah speaks about the heroes: 
“revolutionaries are attractive. Che Guevara, William Wallace, Garibaldi, Lenin, 
these are men who stood up for what they believed in, fought against injustice 
and strove to make the world a better place. Or so we are told. Perhaps it is the 
American legacy based on a revolution that makes revolutionaries so attractive 
to the modern middle-class mind. But revolutionaries are no more glamorous 
than revolutions. Revolutions are dirty, bloody battles. And revolutionaries, 
more often than not, are men who will sacrifice almost anything in the name of 
their cause”. The article does not label ISIS evil, but it appears to seek to use 
the same images that the Western media uses to deliver messages, suggesting 
that the West is blind and that it does not see the truth, that the PKK is using 
the female fighters to improve its image and should not be listed as a terrorist 
organisation. The also report the alleged rape of women joining the PKK and 
the use of child soldiers. Other criticism is aimed at the Marxist and nationalist 
values of the YPJ linked with the PKK and the US, making fun of the idea that 
the Western countries have terrorists as the allies. 
When the Daily Sabbah speaks about foreign people being ideological in 
motivated to travel to Syria in order to join the "Rojava revolution”, it tells us that 
they cannot be considered a uniform group but that, among them, there are 
also “crusaders and lunatics”. In the same article, the Daily Sabbah speaks 
about Anna Campbell, describing her motivation to join the fight: “Ironically she 
was one of the dozens of foreign fighters, who fought against a NATO ally for 
the purpose of creating a socialist utopia in Syria” (ÖzkizilciK 2018). In this 
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article, the reasons to join are listed as a lack of knowledge about what is 






In this case, the newspaper seems to share the stance expressed by the Daily 
Sabbah. The author takes into consideration six articles for the analysis, 
selecting them using the keywords “Kurdish female fighters”, “female fighters”, 
“Rojava” and “YPJ”. Two of these articles are not in favour of regarding the 
female Kurdish fighters as neutral. In fact, no article offers a favourable view of 
them. In one article, written by Kiziltan (2014), regarding the PKK and the “free 
female fighter” rhetoric, it asserts that gender equality is a fundamental feature 
of the PKK, which was founded as a Marxist organization: “many news sources 
reported, while depicting the heroines of the PKK, conducting individual 
interviews and sharing their extraordinary life stories. Nevertheless, there are 
serious complications about these statements”. It claims that women have 
voluntarily joined the PKK because they are attracted to the propaganda and 
the aims of the organisation or because of family pressure. It states that, 
especially during the early stages of the PKK’s existence, the group kidnapped 
young women for recruitment and forced children whose families were already 
involved with the PKK to join the organisation (Kiziltan 2014). Quoting the 
Abdullah Öcalan ideology, the article tries to destroy one of the fundamental 
pillars of the Rojava revolution and the YPJ: the idea that women are treated as 
equal to men in their fight and the portrayal of the PKK as having a record of 
gender discrimination. The emphasis is on the PKK forcing children and women 
to join the fight and on alleged rapes perpetuated against the women in the 
organisation. When the newspaper speaks about Anna Campbell’s death, it 
does not mention any ideological reason that would have motivated her to join 








Diken is an online Turkish language newspaper edited by Erdal Güven and 
Emrah Temizkan. The newspaper was first published on 27 January 2014. 
Simavi describes Diken's mission thusly: "To be a thorn in the media that's 
asked to portray our country as a rose garden and to defend our democracy, 
basic freedoms, and secularism. And while carrying out this mission, to bring 
the profession of journalism the dignity and honor that it deserves”. The author 
encountered difficulty with researching the online English version, because 
there was no internal search section in the website. Thus, the analysis involved 
exploring the website to find articles about Rojava and the Kurdish female 
fighters. Only three articles were found. The coverage was neutral in these. 
In the article “Dutch journalist spends five months in Rojava, says YPG and 
PKK are separate but closely linked”, Zaman (2016) states that “media 
coverage of the area known as Rojava has been broadly favorable. The main 
Syrian Kurdish militia, the People’s Protection Units or YPG has attracted 
particular sympathy for its spirited battle against the so-called Islamic State. 
However, foreign journalists usually do not spend more than a week or two in 
the region. Moreover, the steady blast of pro-YPG propaganda dressed up as 
news can blur the picture”. It also recognises that “Women are far more 
powerful now in Rojava than they have ever been. So much so that even 
parties that oppose the PYD joke about it saying ‘we no longer have any power 
as men.’ Marriage of minors has been banned. Polygamy [permitted under 
Syrian law] has also been banned in Rojava.” In the picture associated with the 
article, there is a man, the reporter who has been interviewed by A. Zaman. 
 
The Bianet 
The Bianet (an acronym for the Turkish phrase Bağımsız İletişim Ağı – meaning 
"Independent Communication Network") is an independent Turkish press 
agency based in Istanbul. It was established in 2000 by journalist Nadire Mater, 
a former representative of Reporters Without Borders. The only article found 
using the keywords “Kurdish female fighters” was “Kobane: the struggle of 
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Kurdish women against Islamic State” (Açık 2014). Even in the headline, it is 
possible to understand the perspective taken. The females are the main 
protagonists of the struggle against the enemy, ISIS. The journalist speaks 
about the most visible change, the inclusion of women in the defence forces 
and the police, as separate units through the establishment of the Women's 
Protection Units (YPJ) and the Women's Security Forces (HAJ). The article also 
refers to the empowerment of women as being key to the Rojava revolution, 
which explains its popularity, particularly among women. It stresses that the 
ideological support provided by the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has 
helped women within the Kurdish movement in North Kurdistan/Turkey to 
question and challenge women’s oppression and gender inequalities, and many 
women have begun to develop a feminist consciousness. 
Using the keyword “Rojava”, it was possible to find an article about the death of 
Aziz Güler, who lost her life while fighting against ISIS (BIA News Desk 2016), 
but there is no mention of why she joined the fight. Using the same keyword, 
“Rojava”, the article “Thousands of women celebrate Women’s Day in Afrin” 
(BIA News Desk 2018) was also accessed. This article reports that “the women 
chanted the slogan ‘Long live women’s resistance’ ”. In the same article, there 
is an explanation of the Rojava cantoon, but there is no mention of the reason 
that caused the women to participate in the fight. Perhaps the reason that the 
author could not find any mention of the reasons for joining the fight was 
because the article was published in 2018, the year in which Turkey began 





When the author first decided to write about this topic, she was very 
enthusiastic, because observing news about female fighters was something 
new for the author, even though the author is a woman living in western 
Europe. The fact that women were fighting beside men and in a manner similar 
to them seemed extraordinary. The fact that they were Middle Eastern women 
was an element that further appealed to the author’s attention. However, after 
the author read many texts that Dilar Dirik wrote and an article by Mirella 
Galletti and Francesca La Bella (2016), the author began to think she was a 
victim of the “typical western media’s myopia” and an “orientalism perspective” 
(Dirik,2014) in considering Kurdish female fighters to be unusual and 
exceptional without understanding their long commitment to the struggle. After 
reading an article by Emanuela Del Re, the author concluded that the media 
were creating symbols and myths when speaking about the female fighters and 
that perhaps it was difficult to verify some events in times of war. One example 
is the myth of ISIS escaping from the YPJ, because they were going to the hell 
if they were killed by women. According to Emanuela del Re, the “emasculating” 
of the enemy aims to underestimate the YPJ in terms of their real value as 
fighters. Thus, the author sought to determine whether the media was merely 
presenting the fight of the Kurdish female fighters as an “exotic phenomenon” 
(Said 2002) presenting Oriental women without a veil and with a gun, without 
exploring the history and their ideology. 
The author decided to examine the ideology behind their motivation to fight, and 
the author was surprised to discover that they were not fighting based on the 
same values of western Europeans: they are not fighting having the western 
women as a model of freedom. They take inspiration from Ӧcalan and the 
rejection of the process of “housewification” (Ӧcalan,2011), which they view as 
a means of reducing women to male property. They are against the patriarchal 
system, and they believe that the capitalistic system produces the mechanisms 
that deprive women of freedom. As Evren Kocabicak has stated, women in 
Western countries have obtained economic, social and political rights, and they 
are equal to men, but this is merely superficial: women are still prisoners of the 
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hierarchy that constitutes the State and Society (Isyandan.org 2016). What the 
Kurdish female fighters want is a transformation of society towards a model of 
direct democracy and according to the democratic confederalism theory created 
by Ӧcalan. The author decided to examine Western newspapers to verify 
whether their opinion and Ӧcalan’s theory were reported. The author also 
analysis essays in fashion magazines], and she discovered that during the 
ongoing conflict was, to some extent, the ‘democratic confederalism’ ideology 
was depoliticised in news reporting 
Using Geraldine Nacos’s (Nacos, 2005) four frames, the author found that, in 
the Italian and British newspapers, the motivations of Kurdish women to take 
part in an armed conflict were represented as both personal (regarding the loss 
of family members, survival, revenge, escape from rape and sexual abuse) and 
ideological (women’s rights, the struggle for liberation). News articles that 
focused on individual stories not only represented the inter-connectedness of 
these personal and political goals (and experiences), but they also employed 
close-up views of the personal stories of individual combatants, in order to give 
the conflict a human face. This was particularly the case with the Italian media, 
which sought to represent the YPJ combatants as heroes and provide an 
example for the young generations. For instance, in one article the journalist, a 
man, underlined that he was ashamed to be unable to help them (Repubblica). 
Although Kurdish political activism (particularly in relation to the PKK) is 
criminalised as a terrorist organization in both Great Britain and Italy, the author 
has noticed that the terminology used to refer to female Kurdish combatants 
included terms such as “guerrillas” and “rebels”. On no occasion were the YPJ 
combatants referred to as “terrorists”, although a few news stories raised the 
issue of the PYD’s alleged connection to the PKK and the latter’s presence on 
the European list of terrorist organisations. The frames that the media used to 
narrate the accounts of female Kurdish fighters made their stories interesting for 
Italian and British audiences by omitting certain aspects that might come across 
as controversial but which were largely present in Dayly Sabbah, the Turkish 
pro-government newspaper. In both materials, the struggle of YPJ combatants 
could be described as entailing a certain level of glorification. In the British 
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case, this was combined with the sexualisation of the combatants. This is not 
surprising, according to Mari Toivanen (Mari Toivanen, 2016) and Dilar Dirik (D. 
Dirik, 2014), since YPJ combatants were portrayed as fighting against the 
Islamic state, which was commonly accepted as “evil”.  
The author does not agree with the opinion that their struggle became all the 
more newsworthy in the Western media because these women were contesting 
Orientalist stereotypes of women in the Middle East, particularly those based on 
gender, religion and ethnicity. Dilar Dirik and the newspaper Dayly Sabah 
(2018) appear to take opposing views. While Dilar Dirik is absolutely pro-
Kurdish, but they seem to agree on one point: the Western media is blind and is 
not analysing the reality in sufficient depth. The Orientalist theory (Said 2002), 
in this case, seems to be a preconception by the Western media. Its 
perspective, involving the “glamorization of terrorism”(Dayly Sabbah), is more 
commonly drawn attention to by the Turkish media. Thus, it seems to be a 
paradoxical situation that both sides adopt the same critique.  
Dirik asserts that the western media is not taking into consideration the ideology 
behind the Kurdish female fighters, but rather only the “myth” and “the novel 
phenomenon”(Dirik, 2014), and at the same time, the Turkish pro-government 
press is accusing the Western media of being blind and manipulated by Kurdish 
propaganda. By analysing several media, including a daily newspaper and 
taking into consideration a newspaper in Italy where Ӧcalan was hosted as 
refugee, the author came to a different conclusion. She also considered it worth 
comparing the findings with the Turkish daily newspapers. Particularly in Italy, 
the Kurdish female fighters are connected to idealism and heroism, which 
remind the audience of liberation from fascism, or they are often connected to a 
broader feminist liberation movement that involves all Western women as well. 
This is particularly true when Western newspapers speak about the Western 
women who have joined the Kurdish female fighters. The English newspapers, 
for example, emphasised the idealistic background behind the choice of Anna 
Campbell, the first English woman who died in the fight. 
Regarding the women who are fighting with ISIS, the perspective is different. 
The author decided to take into consideration some articles about the women 
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who are fighting on the other side, who fight for opposing values, rather than 
freedom of choice and the application of an extremist vision of Islam. The 
author has noticed they are represented as naïve, detached from reality or 
marginalised in Western society, where they have been recruited. In these 
cases, the frames described by Nacos are clearly applied. In the articles 
analysed, none mentioned the ideology behind their choices. These women 
travel to aid ISIS, doing so for several reasons, including feelings of 
discrimination, persecution or of not belonging to society, as well as ideological 
motivations, based on the efforts by ISIS to portray women’s empowerment. 
The women are moved by a sense of belonging, but also the idea of 
emancipation that they consider to be connected with ISIS. However, the 
articles do not explain the ideas in a profound manner. 
It is true as Emanuela Del Re wrote that war creates narrative myths and that 
the Western media has a kind of fascination for such myths (Del Re, 2015). At 
the same time, this could have helped with improving the image of the PKK or 
brought more attention to the Kurdish cause. However, maybe the reason that 
brought them to the Western media’s attention is not causing them to neglect 
the ideology behind them. Thus, the author does not believe the Western media 
is completely blind regarding this topic, as the Kurdish pro-government media [ 
Dayly Sabbah is claiming.  
As regards the limitations of this research, the author admits that this research 
could have analysed in greater depth what the Turkish media, in the Turkish 
language ,had to say about the Kurdish female fighters. She could also have 
conducted some interviews with Turkish people perhaps Turkish journalists’ 
about their views regarding the topic, especially now, after Operation Olive 
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Most of the stories that emerge from Baglar, the largest and poorest district in 
Diyarbakir, in south-east Turkey, have been reports of violent clashes between 
Kurdish people and police. 
Baglar is home to refugees who were forced from their homes when Turkish 
security forces emptied more than 3,000 villages during their conflict with the 
Kurdish separatist PKK in the 1990s. 
But now it is making headlines for another type of revolution: the local 
authorities want to put women behind the wheel of buses and taxis as early as 
next month. Currently only 12.6% of all private drivers in Diyarbakir are female. 
Funded by a European Union grant aimed at increasing youth employment, the 
municipality provided education in computer skills, accounting, communication, 
public relations work, typing and gender equality for 120 women between the 
ages of 18 and 29. 
Ninety out of the 120 received an ordinary type B driving licence, while 30 went 
on to receive the type E licence necessary for driving public buses. 
According to the mayor of Baglar, Yüksel Baran, the low education level of 
women is one of the district's most serious problems – 50.4% of all women over 
18 are illiterate, and only 0.8% of the local female residents go to university. 
"Schools here are incredibly crowded; sometimes we have 40 to 50 students in 
one class. There are no libraries, no labs and no computers in Baglar schools. 
Compared with other Diyarbakir districts, we are at a distinct disadvantage," she 
said. 
The municipal EU projects co-ordinator, Funda Ipek, said that one of the main 
aims of the programme was to get unemployed women out of the house. 
"There are many young women with great potential, but most of these women 
stay at home. They don't participate in public life. All that potential is wasted." 
According to the government's statistics, only 4% of female Baglar residents 
have a regular paid job. It is not the first women's employment project the 
Baglar municipality has launched; in 2010, 13 women were employed as 
cleaners, a job that had until then been carried out exclusively by men. 
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The municipality also supports a women's co-operative where women learn to 
make and sell their own products: traditional clothes, potted preserves or dried 
vegetables. 
Cigdem Kaplan, one of the women who obtained a bus driver's licence through 
the programme, said the project had helped her question gender stereotypes. 
"They always say: 'You have your fingers in dough. Why do you poke your nose 
in a man's job?' If that's true, why are all bakers, all carpet cleaners, all cooks 
here men? Shouldn't a woman be able to become a bus driver then, too?" 
Another woman who participated in the project, Demet Tanrikulu, said she felt 
much stronger since completing the courses: "I learned to stand up for myself, 
not to give in, to voice my own opinions. I acquired self-confidence, understood 
that I could do things." 
Kaplan agreed: "A woman that quietly endures is idealised in society – she is 
considered the perfect wife. But as a group we started to question and criticise 
things until then considered normal: violence, or the fact that women often only 
live to please their husbands, parents or brothers in order to avoid conflict." 
Ipek thinks that the programme is was a small first step in the right direction. 
"Once people get used to female bus and taxi drivers, the general attitude will 
change. And more women will want to leave the house and work. They will say: 
'I can do this, too.'" 
Mehmet Bilen, a Diyarbakir cab driver, said he liked the idea of female 
colleagues. "Why not? A good idea!" He laughed. "The only problem will be that 
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Sakine Cansiz, who	was	shot	dead	in	Paris with two other female activists, was a 
founding member of the Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK). 
Originally from Tunceli (formerly Dersim), she was present at the founding 
meeting of the PKK on 25 November 1978 in a tea house in Fis, a town close to 
Diyarbakir in the predominantly Kurdish south-east of Turkey. 
After the military coup of September 1980 she was imprisoned along with many 
other members of the PKK, and spent many years jailed in Diyarbakir prison, 
where 34 inmates died of torture between 1981 and 1989, and hundreds 
suffered lasting injury. According to PKK members and former inmates, the 
treatment of political prisoners in Diyarbakir prison was one of the main reasons 
	
81	
for the organisation's radicalisation and the armed struggle against the Turkish 
state, which escalated dramatically in 1984. 
Cansiz led the Kurdish protest movement inside prison and by the time she was 
released she had become a "legend amongst PKK members", according to one 
activist. She entered the PKK training camp in the Bekaa valley, then under 
Syrian control, and joined the armed struggle in northern Iraq under the 
command of Osman Öcalan, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's younger brother. 
Osman later distanced himself from the PKK. 
It is there that Cansiz started to organise the women's movement inside the 
organisation. In her book Blood and Belief, journalist and PKK expert Aliza 
Marcus writes that by 1993, one-third of the PKK's armed forces were women. 
Mehmet Ali Ertas, activist and journalist at the pro-Kurdish DIHA news agency, 
described Cansiz as the main representative for the Kurdish women's 
movement. He said: "She was the most prominent and most important female 
Kurdish activist. She did not shy away from speaking her mind, especially when 
it came to women's issues." 
In 1992 Cansiz was dispatched to Europe by Murat Karayilan, then the leader 
of the PKK's armed wing. She spent some time in Germany before finally 
moving to France, where she continued to work for the organisation. 
Vahap Coskun, assistant professor at Dicle University in Diyarbakir, said that 
Cansiz had been known to be very close to the jailed Abdullah Öcalan. When 
he was interrogated after his imprisonment in 1999, Öcalan said about her: "I 
started the women's movement to free [women] from the feudalism of men and 
to create a strong type of woman. I wanted lively discussions. In relation to that 
I do remember the name of Sakine Polat [Cansiz]." And he added: "In mind and 
















Kurdish peshmerga fighters have been in training for many years. Here, 
Maryam Ashrafi photographs women learning to use guns and training in 
various parts of Kurdistan. The Kurds of Syria and Iraq have become a major 












This week Kurdish forces took full control of Kobani, a Syrian town near 
the Turkish border, after months of bombardment by Islamic State. Mona 
Mahmood speaks to four Kurdish families about the female fighters who 
died helping to wrest control of the town from Isis 
Shireen Taher 
Mustafa Taher, 30, a lawyer and Kurdish language teacher, on his sister 
A few months after the revolution in Syria broke out, the Syrian regime 
permitted predominantly Kurdish towns in Syria to teach the Kurdish language 
in their schools. This included my home town, Kobani. My sister Shireen, then 
19, was supposed to study English literature at Damascus University in autumn 
2012, but it became inconceivable to travel between Kobani and the capital 
given the increase in violence throughout Syria. Shireen instead studied the 
Kurdish language in Kobani while waiting for the chance to join the university. 
Of my 11 brothers and sisters, I was closest to Shireen. We were more like 
friends than sister and brother. She was sensitive, fond of parties and loved 
sport. We were great fans of Barcelona football team. When the World Cup final 
was held in Johannesburg in 2010, Shireen travelled to Damascus where I 
worked as a lawyer, so we could watch the matches which were screened in 
large parks. 
Shireen was inspired by her female Kurdish language teacher, Vian, 29, a 
fighter with the Kurdistan Workers’ party, PKK. It was a sombre day for the 
locals of Kobani when Vian was killed in a fight against Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-
Qaida affiliate and Syrian jihadi rebel group, in the Syrian town of Tel Abyad on 
26 July 2012. At the funeral in Kobani to extol Vian’s martyrdom, my father gave 
his old gun to Shireen and told her to follow her teacher and be a fighter – 
despite my mother’s disagreement. Shireen vowed to join the People’s 
Protection units, YPG, to seek revenge for her teacher and defend Kobani. If 
Shireen had not volunteered, I would have done. 
 Shireen Taher had hoped to study English literature at university. Photograph: 
The Guardian 
Shortly afterwards, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis) launched attacks 
against Kobani. They were initiated by a car bomb at the Red Crescent centre 
on 11 November 2012. My father, 67, and his friend were nearby and were 
killed, alongside 12 other martyrs. During my father’s funeral, Shireen said: “I 
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always thought that one day my father would be named as the father of martyrs, 
but I never thought that I would become the daughter of a martyr.” 
Our father’s death gave Shireen an enormous jolt to adhere to his will and be 
an outstanding fighter. Especially after we went to the mortuary for his body. It 
was hard to identify given the massive damage caused by the explosion. 
Shireen was devastated by the martyrdom of several of her friends. She could 
hardly cope with the loss of her father and teacher. Life became meaningless 
for Shireen. She would spend days training in the military camp on weapons 
like the Kalashnikov, rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades. 
During her two years of training, Shireen would visit us. I could not believe how 
much her personality changed during her long embedding in the military camp 
in a Kobani suburb. She used to have a Barcelona flag around her neck and 
wore full makeup. I can’t remember her hands without rings or bracelets. Her 
bag, which was full of perfume and cosmetics, came to be loaded with bombs 
and bullets. 
The day I decided to move my mother and sisters to Turkey, like most of the 
locals of Kobani, to escape the hellish Isis attack against our town, my mother 
insisted that I call Shireen. She told my mother: “If you leave Kobani, you won’t 
be my mother any longer.” But after three days, Shireen asked my mother to 
leave as soon as possible as Isis was getting closer to the city. 
Shireen was camping west of Kobani when Isis militants were pushing forward 
towards the city with their heavy weapons and tanks. The Kurdish resistance 
was able to distract the progress of Isis with their light weapons but they could 
not stop it forever. Shireen was hiding in a trench near the Kurdish radio 
broadcast office. I rang her from Turkey five hours before her martyrdom to 
check on her. She said: “Do not worry, I’m still alive.” At 8pm, my other sister – 
who had stayed in Kobani working in the hospital as a nurse – called Shireen 
out of her fear for her safety. Shireen asked her not to contact her any more as 
the fight was getting worse and she could no longer speak on her mobile. 
  
When my mother answered, the man told her to come and get her 
daughter’s head 
Then we heard about a heavy fight launched by Isis against Kobani. At 10pm, 
we got a call from my sister’s mobile. It was a man’s voice. He asked if he was 
speaking to Shireen’s family. One of my sisters confirmed that we were, and he 
told her that Shireen was killed by Isis and she needed to collect Shireen’s 
head. 
Before my sister could break the news of Shireen’s martyrdom to my mother, 
the Isis militant contacted my mother in Turkey and told her Shireen wanted to 
speak to her. When my mother answered, the man told her to come and get her 
daughter’s head. My mother lost consciousness , and was taken to hospital. 
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We called Shireen’s friends at the war front, who said Shireen and five other 
female fighters were ambushed on 30 September by an Isis tank that shelled 
them all to death. I returned to Kobani to get Shireen’s body for her funeral, but 
her friends told me her body was still with Isis and no one was able to go into 
the district where she had been killed. I returned to Turkey with my sister – she 
had a nervous breakdown and could not stay in Kobani any more. 
Although Shireen’s martyrdom was heartbreaking for my family, we are all 
proud of her sacrifice and the sacrifice of all her friends killed defending 
KobaniHameera Muhammed 
Muhammed Khashman, 45, a businessman who is a refugee in Turkey, 
remembers his sister’s adopted daughter, Hameera Muhammed 
Hameera was born three months after her father was killed in a car accident in 
1982. It was difficult for her mother to cope with the expense of four children on 
her own. My sister, a friend of Hameera’s mother, offered to adopt the baby and 
raise her with her eight children in Kobani. Hameera was cheerful with a sense 
of humour, and married a taxi driver from Kobani when she was 18. 
On a trip to Aleppo two years ago, Hameera’s husband was killed by a sniper 
while she was giving birth to their youngest son. It took Hameera three days to 
get her husband’s body back to Kobani as a result of heavy fighting between 
the Syrian army and the rebels in Aleppo. It was hard for Hameera to cope with 
the expense of her five kids. She relied only on selling dairy products from a 
cow that had been owned by her husband and on subsidies from her parents. 
Her father-in-law offered Hameera and her children a room in his house but she 
refused to leave her home. After a series of quarrels, her father-in-law took 
Hameera’s five kids to his house and she went to live with her parents. 
Hameera was devastated by the loss of her kids. She wanted to see her baby 
to breastfeed him but she was not allowed. All of Hameera’s mother’s attempts 
to repair the rift between her and her father-in-law did not work. Hameera’s 
depression and her yearning to be reunited with her kids became obvious. 
When the fight escalated in Kobani between Isis and Kobani’s fighters last 
September, Hameera’s family was one of thousands who crossed the border 
into Turkey. Driven by fear and horror, Hameera’s mother was unable to check 
whether she had all her nine children with her. It was only when she reached 
the refugee camp in Turkey that her eldest daughter told her Hameera had 
stayed in Kobani to fight Isis, and that she had joined the resistance. 
After a week, Hameera contacted her mother asking for forgiveness. She said 
he thought joining the resistance in Kobani to fight against Isis would make her 
father-in-law treat her differently and let her see her children. She told her 
mother she had been wounded in her shoulder and hand during a fight against 
Isis. Hameera’s mother pleaded with her to come to Turkey. She said she was 
not well trained, that the war is not a joke and that it is for men not women. 
It was the first day of observing Eid al-Adha in Turkey, so I visited my sister in 
the camp to check on her and her family. They were on the phone to Hameera, 
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who told them she was getting better but she missed them and her kids. 
Hameera’s mother asked her to come back as the fight was getting tougher and 
she was worried about her. Hameera’s answer was that she wouldn’t be able to 
speak on the phone any more. 
Ten days later, Hameera’s sister got a phone call from someone who said 
Hameera had been hiding in a building with a few other fighters when a mortar 
had shelled the building and killed them. The building was still occupied by Isis 
and Hameera’s body with others were inside. 
Hameera’s mother insisted on giving her a funeral in the camp as a martyr. She 
hopes she will get Hameera’s body back so she can bury her in Kobani and her 
kids can visit her. 
Berivan Fadhil 
Ibrahiem Fadhil, 46, a shopkeeper and now a refugee in Turkey, recalls his 
sister 
Berivan was a 22-year-old ordinary, smart, ambitious girl, trying to find her way 
in a wildly violent place like Syria. I never thought I would see the day when 
Berivan would be holding a gun to defend her town Kobani to her last drop of 
blood. Scenes of horror and brutality in Syria were highly affecting her. She 
could not sleep for a few nights after she watched the Isis military campaign 
against the Yazidi minority in Sinjar, and was frightened that Kobani would face 
the same fate. Berivan said to her mother: “I’m going to join Kobani’s fighters 
and no power on earth can stop me.” 
Berivan was only two when her father was killed in a car accident in Aleppo, 
leaving behind a family of seven kids without any support. Despite the difficult 
circumstances, Berivan did really well in school, with the aim of fulfilling her 
dream of joining a college of medicine. It was only a few days before her final 
exam when the revolution broke out in Syria.This meant that she was not able 
to travel to Aleppo to do the test. 
Berivan’s mother was terrified by the kidnapping of a number of Kurdish 
students by Isis militants while they were on their way to do the exam in Aleppo. 
It was a hard choice, but Berivan’s mother preferred that if her daughter were to 
be killed, it should be in defence of Kobani rather than from a kidnapping or 
murder by Isis. It would be a more honourable death for the family. 
  
Most of the young Kobani locals had left their schools or jobs to focus on 
training 
We had to leave Aleppo two years ago to escape the heavy shelling of the 
Syrian army planes that accompanied the clashes between factions and 
devastated the life of the locals. Being at home most of the time, Berivan’s 
dream of becoming a doctor was withering with the escalation of violence in 
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Syria. She spent most of her time listening and watching news of the war in 
Syria and the rapid advance of Isis in Iraq. 
We did not have many options. We headed to Riqa where we have a few 
relatives, seeking refuge and protection. But it was not long before Isis ravaged 
Riqa and turned it into its main base for the Islamic state, where military 
campaigns are waged against its enemies including the Kurds. All the Kurds 
were a target for Isis, under the accusation of being defectors and loyal to the 
Syrian regime. 
There was no other escape but to go back to Kobani, which we did a few 
months ago. The town was relatively secure under the control of the Kurdish 
labour party, despite the shortage of water and power as a result of the tough 
siege imposed by Isis on all entrances to the city. Most food products and fuels 
were smuggled into Kobani, business was dead, and we relied on our savings 
to maintain our life. 
When the danger of Isis was creeping back towards the Kobani suburbs six 
months ago, lots of Kurdish men and women volunteered to join the Kurdish 
People’s Protection forces in preparation for a showdown. It was the moment 
Berivan had been yearning for. She did not wait to get her family’s approval and 
enrolled with the force. She embedded in military camps for training on light 
weapons with her cousins and friends. The military camp was in the Kobani 
suburbs and Berivan could only come home once a week. I used to go and see 
her in the camp when she could not make it home. I could see that she was 
mainly talking about politics and human rights abuses. She said she would not 
stand a second in Kobani under the Isis command. 
As a family we could not object to Berivan’s decision as most of the young 
Kobani locals had left their schools or jobs to focus on training for the protection 
of Kobani. It was a big relief for my mother that Berivan stopped asking to go to 
Aleppo to do her final exam – this put an end to the ongoing nightmare of Isis 
kidnapping Berivan and selling her as a slave, as they had done with Yazidi 
women. As a man with three kids, I could not join in with the training out of fear 
for my kids’ future if I were to be killed. 
In the eighth months Berivani spent in the military camp, I tried in my visits to 
her to warn her of the risks of being killed as she was young and not used to 
military life. But she would not let me finish. Her morale was high and she would 
not reconsider. 
Although we were swamped with fear and worry about Berivan getting killed in 
a fight, she was still haunted by the dream of completing her studies. She used 
to spend long hours reviewing her school books when she was allowed home. 
But the security situation deterioration rapidly. Isis increased the intensity of 
their attacks against Kobani villages with mortars, artillery and car bombs. 
Most of the villagers ran to the centre of Kobani, fearing Isis attacks. We were 
worried about our family and about the kids who were terrified by the mortars 
that would fall randomly on the city. I rang Berivan to say: “We are all leaving to 
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Turkey, what are you going to do?” She replied: “I’m not coming with you, it has 
become a matter of life and death to defend Kobani.” 
We became really worried on 18 Octobe. Berivan’s mobile had been switched 
off for days. It was difficult to reach the military camp or to know where, until my 
mobile rang. It was Berivan’s friend. He said: “I’m sorry to let you know that 
Berivan was killed by a car bomb as she was advancing towards Isis positions.” 
I’m so proud of her martyrdom – I refuse to get consolation for her loss and 
would rather be congratulated for her heroic death. 
Ruhan Hassan 
Adnan Hassan, 50, a refugee in Turkey, talks about his niece 
Ruhan, 19, wanted to know more about the political rights of the Kurdish people 
in Syria. She was keen to attend all the national activities organised by the 
different political movements in Kobani. She was the youngest child of a family 
with seven kids and limited financial resources, and they could not afford to 
send her to the city to complete her secondary schooling. 
Ruhan read a lot about the Kurdish labour party leader, Abdullah Öcalan, co-
founder of the PKK, who has been in jail in Turkey for more than 15 years. 
Ruhan was inspired by his books about Kurdish women and their rights. She 
joined the women’s protection force in Kobani and in 2013. Ruhan proved to 
have good skills in fighting against the terrorists, and she encouraged her 
cousin to join the fight too. 
All the fighting forces in Kobani were on alert after the massive attack launched 
by Isis against Kobani last September. Ruhan’s father asked her to come home 
and leave the fight to men. She said she preferred to be dead rather than live 
under the control of Isis and be taken as a slave. 
The situation was worsening in Kobani with the flooding in of more Isis fighters. 
Ruhan’s family struggled to stay to be close to her, but Isis militants started to 
shell the city centre. There was no way they could stay in Kobani – even their 
Arab neighbours became a risk after collaborating with Isis against the Kurds. 
Ruhan’s father told her she needed to flee with them to Turkey. Ruhan said she 
had decided to die in Kobani. 
Like most of the Kurdish families in Turkey, Ruhan’s family watched Kurdish TV 
to keep up with the news of the fighting and the names of wounded and martyrs 
among the Kurdish fighters in Kobani. 
Then the TV announcer read the names of the martyrs. Ruhan’s mother jumped 
out of her chair when she heard Ruhan’s name. It was a terrible and sad day. 
The family ran to the Turkish border to go back to Kobani to find out what had 
happened to Ruhan. Getting back to Kobani was impossible under the non-stop 
fight with Isis and the military siege imposed by the Turkish police. 
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Ruhan’s father kept trying her cousin and other friends for any news of his 
daughter. Her cousin said Ruhan had been at the western front of Kobani with 
three other female fighters firing against Isis until they ran out of ammunition. 
They did not want to be taken as prisoners by Isis so they used their last hand 
grenades to kill themselves. 
• This article was amended on 30 January 2015. The original caption on 
the picture of Ruhan Hassan was incorrect. This has been changed. 
 
 






The Canadian government said on Sunday it was investigating reports that a 
Canadian-Israeli woman who joined Kurdish militias fighting in northern Syria 
has been captured by Islamic State (Isis) fighters. 
According to a blog linked to Isis, several female fighters who fought alongside 
the Kurds have been taken prisoner, including Gill Rosenberg, a Canadian-born 
resident of Tel Aviv. Israel Radio reported Kurdish sources denying the claims, 
saying Rosenberg was not in the area when it was attacked. 
A Canadian government spokesman said in a statement his country was 
“pursuing all appropriate channels” as it sought further information and was in 
touch with local authorities. 
Asked by an Israeli television station about the reports, the Israeli defence 
minister, Moshe Ya’alon, said: “I cannot confirm that and I hope that it isn’t 
true.” The Shin Bet, Israel’s general security service, told the Jerusalem 
Post:“There are no further details at this stage”. 
Rosenberg, 31, joined Kurdish troops fighting Isis earlier this month. A former 
pilot who served in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), she reportedly contacted 
Kurdish fighters over the internet before travelling through Iraq to train at one of 
their camps on the Syrian border. 
In an interview with Israel Radio aired in November, Rosenberg said she was 
training with Kurdish guerrillas with the intention of fighting in Syria. “They are 
our brothers. They are good people. They love life, a lot like us, really,” she 
said. 
On 20 November, a message posted to a Facebook page in Rosenberg’s 
namesaid: “My Facebook account and friend requests are being managed by 
someone else until I have access again in apx [sic] 2 weeks time on or around 
week of [8 December]. Please do not message as this is not me. Thank you.” 
Messages of concern were being posted on the Facebook page this weekend. 
Isis, which has killed five western hostages, is believed to be holding 39 Indian 
construction workers captive. Last week the group was reported to have 






The Times articles on Kurdish Female fighters 
 
Coghlan T.(2016) Revolutionary Kurdish feminist leads assault on Raqqa. 
The Times, May 27 2016, 
 available at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/revolutionary-kurdish-
feminist-leads-assault-on-raqqa-29kdsrgpc ( accessed: 10 November 2018) 
 
 
A revolutionary feminist who is inspired by Bismarck, Napoleon and Saladin is 
leading the assault on Raqqa, the capital of Islamic State’s self-declared 
caliphate. 
Rojda Felat, a Kurdish woman in her thirties who has been battling the 
extremists for three years, is the joint commander of the offensive on the city. 
She leads 15,000 Kurdish and Arab fighters, backed by US special forces and 
coalition aircraft, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces. 
She said: “My main goal is liberating the Kurdish woman and the Syrian woman 
in general from the ties and control of traditional society, as well as liberating 
the entirety of Syria from terrorism and tyranny.” 
She said that she drew inspiration from women who fought to the death, such 
as Arin Markin, who is thought to have blown herself up with a grenade rather 
than face capture and potential enslavement by Isis during the defence of the 
Kurdish town of Kobani in 2014. 
Commander Felat has fought in battles in Hasakah province and for the town of 
Shadadi. She dodged a question on her marital status: “All the Syrian families 
are my family. Wherever I go I find my people who welcome me with love,” she 
said. 
One of her comrades said that most female fighters had taken a vow of chastity 
until the battle against Isis was over. There are thought to be more than 10,000 
women serving with Kurdish forces, some in all-female brigades and others in 
mixed battalions. 
“They are convinced that Isis don’t want to fight females,” Alan Semo, the 
British-based official representative for the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, 
said. “According to Isis’s version of Sharia if you are killed by a female fighter 
you don’t go to paradise. Isis are very scared of them.” 
The forces Commander Felat leads with Ebu Feyyad, her male counterpart, 
have advanced four miles into Isis territory and seized five villages since the 
start of the offensive on Raqqa was declared on Tuesday. 
“Our campaign is moving very well according to the plans, no problems so far,” 
she said. “The more we advance towards Raqqa the more Isis’s resistance is 
increased. 
“My strong beliefs and honest goals help me overcome any obstacles or 
challenges. The state of weakness that the woman in Rojava [a Kurdish-held 
territory] and Syria had experienced has gone now. We are not weak any more. 
Women are playing a vital role in leading and managing the society.” 
Raqqa is about 25 miles from the front line and Kurdish leaders have said that 
their immediate goal is to take the approaches to the city. A separate US-
backed offensive in Iraq is aimed at the city of Fallujah with the intention of 
dividing Isis forces. 
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Kurdish forces advanced on the village of Fatisah, north of Raqqa, yesterday, 
reportedly with the help of US special forces equipped with anti-tank weapons 
and jeeps mounted with heavy machineguns. 
 
 
Coghlan T. , Mostrou A.(2014). Woman volunteer with Kurd fighters 
‘kidnapped by Isis. The Times, December. Woman volunteer with Kurd 
fighters ‘kidnapped by Isis, available at: 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/woman-volunteer-with-kurd-fighters-
kidnapped-by-isis-mft3gdztzkw ( accessed: 10 November 2018) 
 
A woman with dual Canadian-Israeli nationality who volunteered to fight 
alongside Kurdish fighters in Syria is reported to have been captured by Isis 
militants. 
The Canadian government said that it was investigating reports that Gill 
Rosenberg, 31, had been kidnapped together with several other Kurdish female 
fighters. 
Ms Rosenberg, a former member of the Israel Defence Force, travelled to Syria 
via Jordan and northern Iraq on November 2. She has since posted pictures of 
herself with Kurdish fighters and apparently working in a Kurdish bakery. 
“In the IDF, we say Aharai — After Me. Let’s show ISIS what that means,” she 
wrote on her Facebook page. 
Claims of her capture were reported on Islamist websites. The Samoach al-
Islam blog, which acts as a mouthpiece for Isis, reported that she was captured 
in the area of the disputed town of Kobani after jihadists launched an attack with 
three suicide car bombs on Friday. 
Several Kurdish sources questioned however whether Ms Rosenberg had been 
anywhere near Kobani. An American fighter serving with the Kurdish groups in 
Kobani also questioned the claim. In Israel, the Foreign Ministry said that it was 
examining the claims, which it said were made by sources “of dubious 
credibility”. 
Ms Rosenberg was reportedly convicted of involvement, with 11 other Israelis, 
in a 2009 phone scam that swindled elderly Americans out of a total of $25 
million. She was sentenced to four years in a US prison, though her sentence 
was later shortened and she was deported. 
She is among a growing number of western volunteers to have travelled to 
Kurdish-held northern Syria hoping to fight Isis. Led by a former US soldier 
named Jordan Matson, the self-styled “Lions of Rojava” include at least two 
former British soldiers, James Hughes and Jamie Read. 
There are continuing concerns over the number of Britons travelling to Syria 
and Iraq to fight with Isis 
Yesterday it emerged that a suspected jihadist was brought back from Syria by 
his father, who is believed to be the first British parent to have rescued a son 
from the hands of Islamists. 
Karim Mohammadi flew from his home in Cardiff to Turkey before using 
community contacts to secure safe passage across the border to Syria. His 19-
year-old son Ahmed was reportedly in contact with Reyaad Khan, 21, and 
Naseer Muthana, 20, two jihadists from Cardiff who appeared in an Isis 
propaganda video in June. 
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Other parents are now expected to replicate Mr Mohammadi’s successful 
rescue attempt. “There’s a great sense of honour and family value in what Mr 
Mohammadi did,” a police source told The Sunday Times. “Parents know that 
the British government is helpless in helping bring back their children. The 
government has no representation in Syria and it refuses to negotiate with 
militant and terrorist groups.” 
In Kobani yesterday at least 50 Isis militants were killed in clashes with Kurdish 
fighters, suicide bombings and airstrikes, according to the British-based monitor 
group, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 





( Gibbons K. |  Brown D, |  Spencer R. 2018)YPJ fighter Anna Campbell 
‘knew the risks she faced’ when travelling to Syria. The Times, September 
9 2016, 
 available at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ypj-fighter-anna-campbell-
knew-the-risks-she-faced-rfl5sbvwr ( accessed: 10 November 2018) 
Anna Campbell’s life ended in a missile attack in Syria but the activism that led 
her to the Middle East was learnt from her mother at the dinner table of the 
family home in East Sussex. 
The former public schoolgirl became the first British woman to die fighting 
alongside Kurdish forces after persuading commanders to send her to the city 
of Afrin, which was under Turkish bombardment. 
Her father, Dirk Campbell, a composer for Hollywood films, said yesterday that 
his daughter’s campaigning had been inspired by Adrienne, her mother, a 
renowned environmentalist who died of breast cancer in 2012. 
Anna Campbell on why she fought with the Kurds 
Ms Campbell, 27, from Lewes, explained her reasons for joining the Kurdish 
I joined because I wanted to support the revolution and because I wanted to 
participate in the revolution of women that has been built up here and also join 
the weaponised fight against fascism and the enemies of revolution,” she said. 
forces in a video recorded for release in the event of her death.  
Ms Campbell, who adopted the nom de guerre Helin Qerecox, was the first 
woman of eight Britons to have been killed in Syria while with Kurdish forces. 
She died on Thursday last week while fighting with the Kurdish Women’s 
Protection Units (YPJ) in the city of Afrin, northern Syria. 
Her father said both he and his daughter understood that she was putting her 
life at risk by travelling to Syria and he expressed regret at not having done 
more to prevent her from leaving. She had travelled to Syria in May last year 
and was due to return to Britain in two months. “Obviously I was worried for 
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her,” he said. “I told her she would be in danger, that she could come under 
bombardment, but she was insistent. It was something she desperately wanted 
to do and there was no stopping her. 
“Anna was very brave, she was very beautiful and was a dedicated idealist. She 
was very intelligent and creative. She was a leading light in many areas and 
very popular.” 
Mr Campbell, 67, a specialist in ethnic instruments whose film credits 
include Harry Potter and Goblet of Fire and The Last King of Scotland, said he 
had last spoken to his daughter two months ago. “She went there knowing what 
might happen to her. I said, ‘You could be killed’ and she said, ‘I know. There’s 
nothing I can do to reassure you about that,’ ” he said. 
“I had to let her do what she wanted to. I couldn’t force her not to go. She was a 
grown woman, she could make her own decisions in life.” 
Mr Campbell said his daughter had dyed her hair black to appear less 
conspicuous when she travelled to the front line. 
He told a memorial meeting in Lewes last night: “I’ve been asked what my 
reaction was that my daughter was willing to pick up a rifle, willing to train as a 
member of a military organisation, and I said because you have to fight fire with 
fire. 
“It is protecting the vulnerable, the underprivileged, the disadvantaged, the 
suffering.” 
His daughter was educated at the independent Lewes New School, which had 
been set up with the help of her mother, before moving to the £10,000-a-year St 
Mary’s Hall in Brighton. She then studied at Sheffield University, took a course 
in blacksmithing and moved to Bristol where she trained as a plumber and was 
living before travelling to Syria. 
Mr Campbell said that his wife and daughter had many conversations about 
politics and were both at a demonstration in London about eight years ago 
when women stormed the Houses of Parliament. 
His daughter went on to work in the Dale Farm travellers’ camp in Essex and 
the “Jungle” refugee camp in Calais as well as campaigning alongside her 
mother on environmental issues including the “Lewes pound”, an alternative 
currency to promote local shops. 
Miss Campbell’s sister, Rose, attends a vigil on Cliffe Bridge, Lewes, yesterday 
Chelsea Renton, a close family friend who is an artist and Green Party 
councillor, said: “Anna believed in women’s rights, in freedom and she was a 
young woman who stood up for that.” 
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Marina Pepper, another environmental activist who had known Anna since she 
was a child, said: “My advice was not to go to Syria, for absolutely selfish 
reasons. 
“Anna was a beautiful, caring person and I did not want her to get hurt. But 
when someone like Anna cares so passionately it is difficult to undermine these 
arguments with practicalities.” 
Macer Gifford, a former currency trader from Cambridgeshire, travelled to 
Rojava in northern Syria with Anna last year. He wrote on Facebook yesterday: 
“She was kind, funny and brimming with energy. She wanted to fight Isis and to 
rid Syria of the evil that has ripped the country apart.” A YPJ spokeswoman said 
Ms Campbell’s “revolutionary spirit . . . demonstrated the power of women”. The 
YPJ is allied to the People’s Protection Units (YPG). 
Turkey insists that the YPG and its affiliates are synonymous with the PKK, a 
terrorist group that has spent decades fighting for Kurdish secession in 
southern Turkey. 
Behind the story 
Before the death of Anna Campbell, only one other British woman was known 
to be fighting with the YPJ, the Kurdish Women’s Protection Units (Richard 
Spencer writes). 
Kimberley Taylor, 28, called Kimmie by her friends, was a maths graduate from 
Liverpool University who was passionately attached to left-wing causes and had 
first travelled to the Middle East as a journalist to report on the plight of Yazidi 
women. 
So outraged was she by what she encountered that she decided to take up 
arms herself. The YPG/YPJ had played a prominent role in rescuing Yazidis, 
whose main territory in northern Iraq is next door to Kurdish-controlled parts of 
Syria. 
Over the following months, she worked in a propaganda unit of the YPJ as she 
learnt fluent Kurdish, often appearing in the western media. Eventually she was 
transferred to fighting duty and took part in the liberation of Raqqa last October. 
She says she misses her family but wants to stay in Syria to work in public 
diplomacy for the YPJ’s cause. 
 
( Pesta A.2018) Married to a jihadi. The Times, available at          
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/married-to-a-jihadi-hz8smwgjr 




Married to a jihadi 
Tania Joya was a devout Muslim from London. Her husband, John Georgelas, 
was a convert to Islam from Texas. For ten years they both believed in jihad 
and a caliphate. But when they moved to Syria and Georgelas became an Isis 
commander, his pregnant wife changed her mind and fled to America with their 
three children. Now her story is making headlines on both sides of the Atlantic 
Late one August night in 2013, Tania Joya found herself stranded with her 
husband and three young sons in a Turkish city not far from the Syrian border. 
The hotels were jammed with refugees, and the family had nowhere to go. 
Her husband, a convert to Islam, was from Texas. Tania, who had been raised 
in Harrow in northwest London, had been married to him for ten years. They 
had most recently been living in Egypt, but had fled the country amid the chaos 
that followed the 2013 ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government. 
They’d headed for the eastern Turkish city of Gaziantep, about 30 miles from 
the Syrian border, where people spoke Arabic and her husband could find work. 
He was a jihadist – soon to become one of the most senior westerners in Isis – 
who dreamt of forming a caliphate, an Islamic kingdom to rule the world. She 
was growing increasingly disenchanted with his quest. 
Standing on a dusty street that August night, Tania, who was five months 
pregnant, was furious. The family had been living like nomads for a decade, 
and she was sick of it. As she argued with her husband, a run-down minibus 
pulled up, letting people on and off. Her husband talked to the driver, then 
turned and said, “He knows a place where we can stay.” Tania was hesitant. 
Would this be safe? But she told herself not to have a public meltdown. They 
needed a place to sleep. She and the children were so exhausted they could 
barely stand. So the family piled onto the bus, squashing into seats with a 
dozen others. 
She had no idea where they were going. As the bus rolled through the predawn 
darkness, carrying the family south of the city, Tania began to suspect they 
were headed for Syria. Her husband had been wanting to go there; he’d been 
talking about it for weeks, but she had vehemently objected. She did not want to 
take her children into a war zone. The country had become one of the most 
dangerous places on earth, with rebel groups, terrorists and warlords all fighting 
with the ruthless government. She confronted her husband, who confirmed her 
suspicions. “It will just be for a few nights,” he said. They were already 
approaching the border. She looked out the window and saw graffiti on a wall. 
Scrawled in broken English, it read, “Welcome in Syria”. 
As a girl, Tania Joya liked the usual things – riding her bike, dancing around her 
room to house and garage music – but she says she felt unwanted, both at 
home and in her community. Born in 1983, she had been given the name Joya 
Choudhury, but her family, friends and teachers called her Tania. She was the 
fourth daughter of her Bangladeshi-born parents. “The fourth unwanted 
daughter,” she says, citing the deeply rooted cultural belief that boys are more 
worthy than girls. “Families have babies after babies, hoping for a boy.” She 
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recalls how people would sympathise with her father and say, “Four daughters? 
I’m so sorry.” He would sigh, “I know, I know.” 
Her father worked for an airline, while her mother ran a small catering business. 
The family home was right next to a halfway house. The ex-cons weren’t too 
thrilled about their nonwhite neighbours. “They smashed our windows,” Tania 
recalls. Assuming the family was Pakistani, they would yell, “Pakis, go home!” 
Sometimes, they’d use the roof of the family’s car as a toilet. 
One of her fondest childhood memories was a visit to Bangladesh, where she 
stayed with wealthy relatives in a mansion with a cricket field. She loved 
Bangladesh. She felt at home among people who looked like her. “Nobody 
treated us like we were second class,” she says. “I thought, ‘Why can’t we live 
here?’ ” 
Her family was Muslim, and her relatives encouraged her and her sisters to 
dress modestly. “If I snuck out with bare arms, Bengali men would say, ‘Don’t 
you have any shame?’ ” she says. Tania never felt close to her father; she 
describes him as verbally abusive. “I didn’t respect him as a role model,” she 
says. In primary school, she faced slurs from bullies, who called her “darkie” 
and “Paki”. 
When Tania was around seven years old, her father was laid off and started 
working odd jobs. At school, Tania wrestled with dyslexia. Her mother began 
taking in foster children to help pay the bills. 
John said, ‘You’re not supposed to be happy in this life. This life is prison. The 
next life is paradise’ 
At secondary school, Tania began to feel sick and noticed a slight protrusion in 
her abdomen. “I thought I had cancer,” she says. “People said I was a 
hypochondriac.” Relatives and doctors dismissed her concerns. She looked up 
her symptoms, diagnosing herself with a tumour. In the meantime, her health 
concerns inspired her to turn to religion. She had grown up reading the Koran, 
but had not taken religion very seriously. Now she started praying regularly. “I 
thought, ‘I better start praying, because God must hate me.’ ” 
When her family moved from Harrow to a more affordable place in Barking, east 
London, Tania made a new set of friends at school. They were devout Muslim 
girls, and they pressured her to become more devout herself. “I thought I had 
been living a lie, being ignorant of Islam,” she says. As her devotion grew, “I 
started wagging my finger at my family, judging them, calling them insincere 
Muslims.” She became best friends with an Algerian girl who wore a jilbab, and 
her friend encouraged her to wear one, too. Tania thought it would prove how 
pious she had become. Her family felt differently. “My parents hated it,” she 
says. “My sisters were angry at me. But no one could tell me why.” 
When she was 17, she saw news of the 9/11 terror attacks on TV. She went to 
school and told a friend, “Isn’t it terrible?” Her friend replied, “Is it? Is it so 
terrible?” Some of her new friends were supporters of jihadism. They saw the 
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attack as retaliation for persecution of Muslims throughout time. “I was 
intrigued,” Tania says. “At school I was studying social sciences, government, 
politics. When 9/11 happened, I became aware of political Islam.” She started 
skipping school and reading about the history of Islam. 
She read up on jihad. The term, often associated with terrorism, has different 
shades of meaning, she noted, including a personal struggle to better oneself 
and a wider struggle to fight disbelievers and tyranny. “Every Muslim is 
supposed to have their own little jihad; some go in a violent way, and others just 
do the self-jihad,” she says. She was drawn to war because she had come to 
believe there was a war against Muslims. She decided that to reject jihad meant 
rejecting much of the history of Islam, since the Prophet Muhammad “expanded 
through war”, she says. 
She began to feel that wearing a jilbab would “prove my religious devotion”. “I 
was trying to prove that I’m not ashamed of who I am. Growing up in Harrow, I 
had been ashamed of it. People would say, ‘Oh, you’re a Muslim? You’re not 
allowed to have fun. You’re not allowed to do anything.’ There was a stigma. 
But when I moved to Barking, it was a more working-class area. People were 
more religious, and there was a stigma for being too westernised. If girls wore 
jeans or make-up, they would get slut-shamed.” Part of the appeal of the jilbab 
was that she could “escape from the negative attention”, she says, including 
harassment from boys, who would grope her in her western clothes. “I was 
getting mixed messages.” 
And so, one morning she wrapped herself in a jilbab and wore it to school, 
along with a niqab covering her face. She showed only her eyes. When Tania 
arrived, her new friends applauded, but not the head, who told her to remove 
the veil. “He called me in and said, ‘You’re not wearing this. Once you get past 
the school gates, that mask comes off.’ Then he asked, ‘Why would you wear 
this?’ I said my religion is more important than my looks.” 
Her parents were alarmed, too. “My dad hated it. I was just being yelled at and 
being told, ‘Why do you have to do this?’ For them, it was going backwards. For 
me, it was, ‘Well, I’m trying to share something that I have pride in,’ because I’d 
never been proud of anything until then. They didn’t get it.” Employers baulked 
as well. When she applied for jobs at local clothing shops, she was told she 
would need to shed the robe. Strangers on the street jeered, “Go marry bin 
Laden,” or, “Got a bomb under there?” 
As Tania continued to wear the jilbab, she became more isolated. At the same 
time, her stomach was protruding more prominently, and a doctor told her she 
needed to have an MRI. She simply wanted to escape from it all. And so, in 
2003, at 19, she went on a Muslim matrimonial site. An American convert to 
Islam named John zoomed in on her. “He kept pestering me, sending me 
messages. I wanted someone older, someone who had experienced life. He 
was two weeks younger. He was just a boy to me.” She showed his profile to 
her relatives and friends. “I didn’t trust my own judgment,” she says. “I didn’t 
have the confidence to think for myself, because I thought that I needed God 
and religion to think for me.” They thought he was handsome. They also liked 
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that he was an upper-middle-class American. He was persistent in his pursuit. 
“He promised travel, a big family, a stable life.” 
The Texan was living in Damascus, Syria, at the time, studying Arabic. He had 
grown up in a politically conservative American family with no background in 
Islam. Journalist Graeme Wood is one of the few to report extensively on John’s 
life. According to Wood’s book The Way of the Strangers: Encounters With the 
Islamic State, the family moved often when John was young. Like Tania, he’d 
battled childhood health issues. In his teens he rebelled by doing drugs, 
particularly marijuana, which helped him with depression. He went to college 
and took a course on world religion, which left him wanting to know more about 
Islam. Two months after 9/11, he had converted to Islam and taken an Arabic 
name, Yahya al-Bahrumi. 
After a month of exchanging emails in 2003, John and Tania agreed to meet in 
London. “He had a short beard. I thought he looked like a prophet from 
medieval times,” she recalls. “I didn’t find him attractive, but I thought, he’s 
come all the way from Syria; I felt an obligation.” So she focused on the things 
she liked about him: his knowledge of Arabic and Islam, and the promise of 
travelling the world and living in the Middle East, which sounded exciting. Plus, 
they shared a curiosity about jihad. She had been protesting against the US’s 
march towards war in Iraq and, when the protests didn’t make a difference, she 
says, “I felt like I needed to do more. I began to see jihad as a solution.” 
She had come to believe there was a war against Muslims. ‘I began to see jihad 
as a solution’ 
Her parents approved of him, impressed that he’d come from a privileged 
American family, and they knew that their daughter would do whatever she 
wanted, regardless. She agreed to marry him. After all, she says, “He was the 
most interesting and intelligent person I had ever met. I knew I could love him 
with time, and I was right.” Three days later, on March 18, they held a secret 
religious marriage ceremony. But still, fear and uncertainty loomed. “I remember 
throwing up that day. But I thought, ‘How do I go back on this?’ ” At the 
ceremony, she wore her jilbab. “The imam asked, ‘Are you being forced?’ I 
thought, I’m forcing myself. I was crying my eyes out. John was patting me on 
the back, saying, ‘I’ll take care of you.’ It was the first time someone was really 
nice to me.” 
Two months later, they held another ceremony, this one with her family. She 
was not sad to say goodbye. The newlyweds went to visit her in-laws in Texas. 
When Tania saw Plano, an upscale suburb of Dallas, for the first time, with its 
elegant homes and flowering trees, she was wowed. “I thought, ‘This is the life.’ 
John said, ‘This is all a deception to deceive your heart away from God.’ ” The 
couple settled in the town of College Station, where he had converted and still 
had a circle of friends, and where, living off money from their wedding, they 
spent their days hanging out, studying and discussing Islam. He became her 
spiritual guide, and she deeply admired his knowledge. Wealthy Arabs in the 
community helped fund his studies. She also liked his friends, who were mostly 
foreign students. “I felt this kindness. It was so alluring,” she says. “They held a 
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wedding party for us at the mosque. I was intrigued by meeting people from all 
over the world.” 
But marital strife came quickly. He expected her to be a subservient wife, a role 
she had a hard time accepting. “I found him really chauvinistic. He would say, 
‘Independent women have attitude problems.’ ” Nevertheless, she says, “I told 
myself to have patience. I worshipped him, because I thought God had put him 
in charge of me. I thought I needed to be a good Muslim woman. I was taught 
that obedience to those who have authority over you is obedience to God. And 
men are given authority over women in Islam. So I was at war with myself.” 
They didn’t stay in Texas for long. First they went to London, where Tania had a 




After London came Damascus. The Syrian civil war was still years away, but 
the couple met other jihadists and dreamt of a caliphate. “John and I were so 
thirsty for an Islamic state. I was so young and naive. I painted this rosy picture 
in my mind. I was picturing a utopia.” They were drawn to Syria, she says, 
because, “The prophecies told by Muhammad said that the Messiah, Jesus, 
was going to return to Damascus with an army of believers, and there would be 
an apocalyptic showdown.” 
Her husband began growing his beard and hair long, wearing tunics and 
cropped pants. Tania was displeased; she wanted him to look more moderate, 
so he could get a good job. 
She felt lonely in Damascus. “I wasn’t able to leave home without his 
permission,” she says. “John wanted us to live like poor people. He thought 
living as an ascetic would make him closer to God. The prophet says the poor 
enter paradise first. It’s kind of like getting programmed. I thought I was getting 
educated by him. You’re taught that this life is a dream; the next life is the 
eternal reality.” 
When she got pregnant, she told John she wanted to stop wearing the veil 
because it was unbearable. He consented, for a time. 
They returned to England, where he gave religious lectures online and in 
person to a pro-caliphate community. The couple legally wed in October 2004 
and moved to Torrance, California, where he had some Syrian friends and 
hoped to work as a counsellor in a mosque, but his extremist views were not in 
line with those of the mosque. Tania gave birth to their son on her 21st birthday. 
She suffered postnatal depression. In addition, her baby had colic. “John was 
against giving medicine to the baby. He believed in conspiracy theories that 
pharmaceutical companies wanted to get everyone addicted.” 
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Dressed in her robe and veil in California she heard the usual jabs, with a group 
of young women saying, “Hey, it’s not Hallowe’en.” She later admits, “I actually 
thought that was funny.” The couple moved to Dallas, where he got a job as a 
data technician at a company called Rackspace. He visited a jihadist online 
forum at night and offered tech support to Jihad Unspun, a propaganda site. He 
also sought ways to use his day job to wage jihad. In April 2006, he was 
arrested for accessing the passwords of a Rackspace client, the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee, a lobbying group that advocates pro-Israel 
policies. Tania says his plan was to hijack the website and post an essay about 
why America was wrong to go to war with Iraq. He was sentenced to 34 months 
in prison. 
With her husband behind bars, Tania headed to London, where she stayed with 
family and friends. She was considering a divorce. “I told him, ‘I don’t want to 
live in a home with no furniture. I don’t want to sleep on the floor.’ He begged 
me to stay.” And so she did. She still believed in him, and in a caliphate. Later 
she moved to Plano. Her clothing caused anxiety. “The neighbours wouldn’t say 
hello because of the way I was dressed,” she says. 
She told her husband she would not wear the robe and veil but only a 
headscarf, or hijab. Stuck in prison, he was losing control of her. He ordered her 
to cover herself in the religious robe when visiting him in prison. “He didn’t want 
his friends at the jail to see me as a modern Muslim,” she says. On her own in 
Plano, she got a taste of freedom and began wearing colourful headscarves, 
form-fitting clothes, three-quarter-length sleeves, “all the stuff I had been 
wearing under the robes”. She also got a TV and started watching news shows, 
hearing different viewpoints. She became interested in libertarianism. “When 
John first went to [prison], I didn’t have the confidence to think I could think 
without him. But now I was seeing different perspectives on life, I was still trying 
to be a good Muslim, still trying to obey him. That’s where the clash began.” 
I worshipped my husband, because I thought God had put him in charge of me 
When he was released from prison, the couple realised how much they had 
grown apart. While he had been isolated and immersed in studies of ancient 
Islamic history in prison, she had been teaching dance and yoga to Pakistani 
women. “He was upset,” she says. “I was getting in tune with American culture. 
He wanted me to dress Islamically. 
He would say, ‘Oh, look at you. Aren’t you so American.’ ” Her views were 
shifting, too. Publicly she supported her husband, but privately her devotion to 
him, and to his cause, was waning. “I wanted to be American,” she says. “I 
started questioning him. The idea of a caliphate was still important to me, but I 
was a mother now.” She wanted a stable home; her husband wanted her 
obedience. “He would tell me, ‘Stop doubting. Just obey.’ ” They fought often. “I 
would argue and say, ‘I don’t want to wear the hijab outside,’ and he would say, 
‘Then you can’t go out of the house.’ I was emasculating him. I had to pretend 
that I was supporting him, but inside, it was war.” 
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He had to spend three years on probation. For Tania, this was a blessing, 
because it meant the family had to stay put. He found work fixing computers 
and doing IT for an online shoe shop. She gave birth to their second son. And 
her husband took another wife in London, a conservative Salafi woman the 
couple knew. He married her by phone while Tania fumed. She says felt she 
had to go along with it. “I couldn’t go home,” she says. “I had never felt 
supported by my family.” But she was desperately unhappy. “I told John I would 
drive into the lake. I said, ‘I want to be happy.’ He said, ‘You’re not supposed to 
be happy in this life. This life is prison. The next life is paradise.’ ” 
As soon as his probation was up, he wanted to move. In October 2011 he took 
the family to Egypt, where he could escape the attention of the American 
government. He told his wife he could get a good job. She was now pregnant 
with their third son. It was a historic moment in time: the Arab Spring uprisings 
had forced out the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt. The region was erupting. 
In Egypt, the family moved around, while Georgelas translated fatwas and 
continued his studies. He gave online seminars in Arabic and English about 
preparing for a caliphate. By early 2013, protests against President Mohamed 
Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate elected a year earlier, were growing 
violent. In July, he was ousted in a coup. The family were living in Cairo at the 
time, and Tania says she heard gunfire at night. 
Her husband began talking about wanting to move to Syria, where a civil war 
had begun. “He felt like he had to go and help Syria. It’s a Muslim’s duty to help 
your family. I felt for the Syrians, but I didn’t want to bring my boys to a war 
zone. It wasn’t their fight.” As her brawls with her husband escalated, he 
became physically abusive, and she wanted out. “It came to a point where I told 
him, ‘I don’t love you any more.’ I felt suffocated. I would say, ‘One of us is 
going to need to die.’ He would say, ‘I could break your neck.’ ” 
With the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government, the couple no longer 
felt safe in Egypt. “There were tanks roaming the streets,” she says. “It was a 
military state.” In August 2013 they flew to Istanbul, then travelled to Gaziantep 
before making their fateful trip to Syria. 
At the Syrian border, armed men stopped the minibus at a checkpoint. Her 
husband talked his way through, claiming the family were Syrian. They walked 
into Syria and were immediately confronted by members of a militia group, 
interrogating people just across the border. John told them he knew important 
people – Islamic scholars in Egypt. They let him pass and even offered the 
family a ride to the nearby city of Azaz, where they were dropped off at an 
abandoned house. There was no electricity. “I felt like I was in a horror movie 
that wasn’t ending,” Tania says. 
 
Syria was a different country from the one she’d lived in a decade earlier. Her 
husband promised, “We’ll just be here a short time.” She desperately wanted to 
hold him to that promise, to keep her boys safe. 
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It quickly became clear how much danger they were in. When she stepped 
outside with her husband, she faced immediate threats. Militants had come 
from across the world to engage in jihad. She was wearing just a headscarf, not 
covering herself fully in a robe and veil. Militants would demand that she cover 
up. They would say, “Are you asking to be raped?” John would say, “I know. 
She is a problem.” She was in a precarious position, both on the streets and at 
home, disobeying and embarrassing her husband by publicly arguing. But she 
had reached the brink. “I was mouthing off,” she says. Jihad wasn’t about 
“academia, theory and dreaming” any more, she says. “Now it was real.” And 
she wanted no part of it. John, however, was in his element. 
Tania stayed home while he networked with the local Islamist militia. “There 
were shoot-outs on the streets. I would peek out the window and the fighters 
would yell, ‘Put your head inside!’ ” Her husband made friends with various 
militants, who gave him a hand, delivering water for the family and a tank of gas 
for the stove. Food was hard to come by and they ate mostly eggs, bread and 
shawarma sandwiches – chicken with mayonnaise and pickles. For light, they 
used candles. She didn’t know it at the time, but her husband was getting 
involved with the pro-caliphate group that would later come to be known as Isis. 
It was an incredibly dangerous time. After a few days, the family went to stay 
with a woman whose brother was a rebel fighter, thanks to more connections 
her husband had made. “He was always talking to people,” she says. “He could 
be very charming.” Her sons, who were eight, five and one and a half years old, 
were getting ill. Tania realised they would not be leaving Syria within two weeks 
as promised. When her husband got a mobile that worked in Syria, she called a 
relative and said she needed to escape. Then she said to call the authorities 
and report her husband. 
One day, after they’d been in Syria about three weeks, he said, “I’m not going 
back.” Tania was devastated. “I was pregnant, just begging him to take us to 
the airport. He didn’t listen. I told him, ‘F*** off.’ He said, ‘No, you f*** off.’ I said, 
‘Can I? Can I go?’ He said, ‘Yeah, just go.’ ” 
Two days later at dawn, Georgelas packed the family into the back of a van to 
take them to the border. Departing from Syria wasn’t as easy as entering. There 
was fighting along the border, and different militia groups controlled various 
areas. The family couldn’t get out where they had come in. The van driver took 
them as close to the border as the militia would allow and then let them out. He 
said the family would have to continue the journey on foot – about an hour’s 
walk to a barbed-wire fence with a hole in it, which they would need to pass 
through to enter Turkey. With suitcases, a pushchair and children in tow, she 
and her husband rushed towards the border, surrounded by olive trees and 
signs warning of landmines. Syrian refugees who were making the trek with 
them gave the family water. 
As the group of refugees approached the border, snipers began firing from 
towers, sending everyone fleeing for their lives. The family dashed to the fence, 
went through the hole and ran towards a waiting truck. Georgelas had arranged 
for the driver to bring Tania and the children to a bus station in Turkey. The 
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driver was a human trafficker smuggling refugees. Georgelas paid the man, 
then turned and ran back towards the border, with bullets still flying past. “He 
never said goodbye,” she says. “I was in utter shock.” 
While Tania and the boys climbed into the truck with Syrian refugees, the 
traffickers began brutally beating a man. “Apparently he had done something to 
get us shot at.” The truck left him behind. 
However, the driver didn’t go to a bus station as directed, instead dropping 
everyone off at a random spot by the side of the road. They were near a hill in 
the countryside, seemingly in the middle of nowhere. “Everyone scattered,” she 
says. She and the boys stood there alone, crying. Walking up the hill with the 
children in the hot, dry air, she called her husband on her mobile. “I hate you!” 
she yelled. The connection was bad, but she kept calling and shouting, “See 
you in hell!” 
As they approached the border, snipers began firing from towers. They fled for 
their lives 
As they walked, a man on a motorbike approached, but they didn’t speak the 
same language, and communicating was difficult. He indicated that he would 
take the boys on the bike, one at a time, to the bus station. Tania was terrified 
to send her children off with him. But she had no other options; she had to trust 
him. He drove the children one by one, as promised, and the boys waited for 
their mum at the station. Then the man drove alongside Tania as she walked 
with the pushchair to the station. As a Muslim woman, “It wouldn’t have been 
appropriate for me to sit with him on the bike,” she says. 
At the bus station, she met up with a contact arranged by her husband. He was 
in the business of helping Syrians and refugees, and he got them to the airport. 
They flew to Istanbul and checked in to a hotel. She was six months pregnant 
and weighed 6st 12lb. Confused and alone, her emotions raced. “He did give 
me permission to leave – I never would have known how to get out of there 
without his help,” she says. “Had I stayed, I probably would’ve been tried for 
apostasy.” 
Seeing how ill she looked, the hotel employees rushed her to the hospital. 
When she felt better, she travelled with the children to London, then later to 
Texas. “I thought the boys would have better opportunities in America.” 
Tania Joya, now 33, tells this story while sitting in a wine bar on a street lined 
with glittery shops and cafés in Plano, where she now lives. In a sleeveless top, 
denim skirt and suede heels, her hair casually tousled, she is a world away from 
her life in radical jihad. She takes a sip of sparkling white wine and dips a pear 
slice into a creamy cheese fondue. Couples stroll by on the pavement, 
disappearing into bars and restaurants at dusk. “When I look back, it all feels 
like a bad dream,” she says. 
Her transition to Texas in late 2013 was not easy. Despite being free, and living 
in a safe home with her in-laws, she felt alone. “I thought, ‘Who am I without 
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John?’ My identity was his identity,” she says. He wrote to her, trying to 
persuade her to come back to Syria. But she wanted a new life. “I told him, ‘I’m 
moving on,’ ” she says. She gave birth to their fourth son and legally divorced 
her husband, shedding his last name. When she learnt he had taken another 
wife, she cut off all ties, she says, noting, “I don’t know if he’s alive.” 
And then, she unwound. Free to think on her own, she began working on 
deradicalising herself, continuing the thoughts of escaping extremism that had 
been brewing for years. “I stopped thinking in terms of destiny, that everything 
is preordained. I thought about how I have control over my own life. I have 
control over my body,” she says. “I read about philosophy, existentialism. I 
thought about American values and freedoms, how unhappy I had been, trying 
to be someone I wasn’t. I thought about how women are pressured to cover 
themselves, but men aren’t pressured to control themselves. It didn’t make 
sense. God made me look the way I am, but I had to view it as a sin.” 
The shift away from extremism, she says, began with her children and wanting 
to keep them safe. Now she is thinking about the future. “I’d like to build a 
career helping with prevention and deradicalisation programmes, whether it’s 
Islamic or white nationalism. I feel very driven,” she says. “I lost years of my life 
in my twenties.” 
Riding home through the leafy, pristine streets of the suburb, she points to a 
hair salon. She jokes that she has years of beauty treatments to catch up on, 
having covered herself for so long. At her apartment, she sinks into a beige sofa 
in the living room. Photos of her four sons hang on the wall, along with a flat-
screen TV. She scrolls through her Facebook page, clicking on photos of her 
former husband and the boys as they grew up. In one, her husband lies on his 
back, smiling, holding one of his young sons in the air. 
As Tania gradually settled into life in Texas, she craved companionship, so she 
posted a profile on Match.com. “It was the first time I’d ever dated,” she says, 
smiling as she recalls the dating-unfriendly things she wrote in her profile. “I 
wanted to be honest. So I said I have four children. I said I’m looking for 
security. I said my husband had gone off to be the next Osama bin Laden.” 
Nonetheless, she says she got 1,300 replies. “I was like an alien when it came 
to dating,” she says. “I had always thought arranged marriage was good. Why 
date for more than three months?” She went on a few dates, navigating a new 
world. “I’d never been exposed to alcohol,” she says. “Men would try to get me 
drunk.” 
When Craig Burma came across her profile, he was intrigued. “She was 
beautiful, but I wanted to learn her story,” he says. “I wanted to understand.” 
When she told him about her past, he says, “I thought it showed her strength. 
She had faced such adversity.” The two talked for hours that night at a 
restaurant. She was impressed by his curiosity about the world. “I thought he 
was really smart and interesting.” 
Now they are engaged to be married. Craig, a director at a print and marketing 
solutions company, says, “I just love her like nobody’s business.” They attend 
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the Unitarian Universalist Church, an inclusive religion that draws people of all 
faiths. “It’s all about a progressive message,” she says, noting that the church 
quotes texts from many religions and spiritual figures. Her fiancé has helped her 
financially. “The happiness that I was craving so badly in my first marriage, I 
found it in Craig,” she says. “I’m very fortunate. My children are healthy, safe 
and happy. They have a good life. They’re very privileged to be in America.” 
As for Georgelas, he’s gone on to become the leading producer of English-
language propaganda for Isis, according to journalist Graeme Wood, helping to 
recruit fighters with his words. Meanwhile, Tania says she is hoping to help 
keep others from following her ex-husband’s path to radicalism. 
On a Friday afternoon in August, Tania’s sons burst through the door, all smiles 
and energy. But when they see their mum talking to a reporter, they’re suddenly 
nervous and shy. They disappear into another room, unsure if journalists can be 
trusted. Tania sits them down and explains what journalists do. She advises 
them to keep an open mind, always to get the facts before forming an opinion, 
and not to let others tell them what to think. “Don’t become extreme in your 





DailySabah articles on Kurdish Female fighters 
 
Jane Louise Kandur( 2015) 
 
The reality behind YPG heroines: Intimidation, signed, sealed and delivered 
available at  https://www.dailysabah.com/feature/2015/08/29/the-reality-behind-
ypg-heroines-intimidation-signed-sealed-and-delivered (accessed: 10 
November 2018) 
 
The women of the YPG and YPJ are being depicted as heroines. But does this 
group, closely affiliated with the PKK, really consist of heroes and heroines 
battling for freedom? What is the truth behind these organizations that are 
internationally recognized as terrorist groups? 
There was a 100 percent turnout in 350 villages in the vicinity of Siirt. 100 
percent of votes cast in these villages were for the Peoples' Democratic Party 
(HDP). The results created doubts about how fair the elections in these regions 
were. 
 
An unusual female heroine has recently started to appear on television and in 
newspapers. The heroic Kurdish female fighters of the Women's Protection 
Units (YPJ) and People's Protection Units (YPG) are fighting alongside Kurdish 
men, striking fear into the hearts of the terrorists of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
al-Sham (ISIS). 
 
One of these is Asia Abdulla, who, according to the BBC, is "co-chair of the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), the dominant political party in Kurdish-
controlled Syria. Like almost all officials here, a large portrait of the jailed PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan hangs in her office." 
 
In the same article, another woman, Diren, says: "Women are the bravest 
fighters." 
 
The article goes on to tell us that "she and three comrades are having lunch: 
flatbread, cheese and watermelon. Many of the fighters, like Diren, 19, are still 
teenagers. 
 
"We're not scared of anything," she says. "We'll fight to the last. We'd rather 
blow ourselves up than be captured by IS (ISIS)." 
 
The message being given here is clear – brave women are fighting for freedom, 
standing up against terrorism. It is a message that is cleverly and tidily 
packaged for our digestion. Without much thought most readers avidly eat it up, 
thinking, "Ah, women standing up for what is right, how wonderful." 
 
Revolutions and revolutionaries are attractive. Che Guevara, William Wallace, 
Garibaldi, Lenin, these are men who stood up for what they believed in, fought 
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against injustice and strove to make the world a better place. Or so we are told. 
Perhaps it is the American legacy based on a revolution that makes 
revolutionaries so attractive to the modern middle-class mind. 
 
But revolutionaries are no more glamorous than revolutions. Revolutions are 
dirty, bloody battles. And revolutionaries, more often than not, are men who will 
sacrifice almost anything in the name of their cause. 
 
The YPG is directly affiliated with the PKK, thus, the portrait of Öcalan on the 
wall. The PKK is internationally recognized as a terrorist organization, but when 
the question is concerned with the YPG or PKK, the sacrifice these noble men 
and women are making is quite often a sacrifice of morals. In fact, what we are 
talking about here is not a revolution, but a battle being waged by one group of 
terrorists in the PKK against another group of terrorists in ISIS. And many major 
media outlets are asking us to choose the side that stands against ISIS. 
 
The images presented by many major media outlets are nothing more than 
attempts to glorify something that is in fact base and horrific. 
 
The PKK has terrorized southeastern Turkey for years, threatening the heads of 
families, executing them when they do not heed their warnings, kidnapping 
women and children and making sure that what the PKK wants the PKK gets. 
 
The most innocent manifestation of this is the result of the last elections. There 
was 100 percent turnout in 350 villages in the vicinity of Siirt; 100 percent of 
votes cast in these villages were for the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). Such 
results can only create doubts in how fair the elections in these regions were. 
 
Yasin Aktay, a Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputy from Siirt, 
gave a press conference in Istanbul yesterday in which he said that in his 
village of Halenza there was 80 percent turnout and he received 75 percent of 
the vote. This is democracy, Aktay said. People voted for other parties, too, and 
he was pleased that he did not get 100 percent. 
 
Aktay also shared the fact that during the campaign the windows of his bus 
were broken a number of times. He never mentioned this because there were 
so many greater examples of oppression in the region, that this seemed 
negligible. 
 
As an example of greater oppression, Aktay shared two letters with the 
journalists present. He said that copies of many such letters had been 
forwarded to him, but he had not shared them to protect the original recipients. 
But without showing us the names, he shared the contents. I want to do the 
same here. 
 
The first hand-written letter paraphrased from the Turkish original reads: 
 
"We hope you are well… 
 





We called you. But you did not come. 
 
So we are writing you this note. 
 
Last year you were supposed to give us financial support. 
 
But you have delayed this. 
 
You should have come to us. But we have not been able to meet. 
 
You should come to our center within three days. 
 
Or you can send an intermediary to solve this problem. 
 
This problem directly concerns the XXXXXX family. 
 
But we thought it best to write to you. 
 
Please deal with this situation in the next three days. 
 
Greetings of the Revolution 
 
Herekol Public Relations Department" 
 
Below the "Public Relations Department" is a seal. A seal. A seal is something 
used by a legitimate state, business or institution to confirm that the document 
in question is legal. Not only does the PKK have a public relations department, 
it has an official seal. 
 
The second letter reads: 
 
"Your attitude to the elections after [our leader] Apo [Öcalan] declared the 
establishment of the Kurdish nation is an attack against this nation. 
 
You have also attacked us by not acknowledging the message we sent you. 
 
From this time on the attitude of yourselves and your close relatives has made 
you a clear and open target. The safety of your lives and property is at a risk." 
 
This letter is also completed with a seal. 
 
It is interesting that these letters are written in Turkish. In fact, one journalist 
asked why they were in Turkish. This question was almost immediately 
answered by other journalists. Kurdish is not a literary language, and Kurdish 
people find it easier to write in Turkish. The language of choice for 
correspondence of a people staging a revolution to establish a Kurdish state, 




A sealed letter shared by AK Party Deputy Yasin Aktay, whom received it from 
locals, clearly shows that PKK threats toward locals who doesn't choose their 
side. "As a person who tempted many people before, [I am saying that] you 
either come here to see us or [dangerous] things will continue to happen to you. 
You can benefit from this process. There is amnesty. You have to come to us in 
order to be able to forgive yourselves. It is up to you. If ask us, it (amnesty) is a 
blessing for your family too. If you do not come, there is no salvation for you 
even after a century. Do not fool yourself. Come to your senses. You cannot 
sleep even at your house. Why? Because you are guilty." 
 
And the media is glamorizing the YPG, an organization directly affiliated with 
the PKK. 
 
The glamorization of revolutionary ideals is nothing new. But just because it is 
not new, this does not make it ethical. Some of the women and young people 
who are fighting in the mountains have gone to defend their beliefs. But not all. 
 
In the early 2000s one woman wrote about her experiences in a book, "The 
Escape to Freedom." Dilaram (a pseudonym) joined the PKK at the age of 13. 
She spoke with a number of women in the PKK about the abuse and rape they 
suffered. The picture of women who join the organization voluntarily only to find 
that they are being oppressed and abused and unable to leave, chills the blood. 
Not only are there brutal incidents of rape, young women who want to leave the 
group are executed. 
 
So in contrast to the heroic depiction of brave women risking everything to fight 
for freedom and democracy, the reality is sordid. These terrorist organizations 
consist of criminals who threaten the local population, force them to vote as the 
PKK sees fit and force them to financially support this terrorist organization. 
This is an organization that lacks any form of morals, a group that kidnaps 
children and women, raping and pimping these women and executing anyone 
who does not do as they wish. 
 
On April 23, 2014, National Children's Day in Turkey, the PKK celebrated this 
day dedicated to the joy and happiness of children by kidnapping 25 students 
aged between 14 and 16 from Lice in Diyarbakır. To bring this event to public 
attention, more than 21 of the families affected protested outside the Diyarbakır 
municipality building. The protest had to be abandoned in the end and the 
families were accused by some of "betraying the Kurdish cause." They betrayed 
the cause by wanting their teenage sons and daughters returned to them. 
 
The governor of Ağrı, Musa Işın, told reporters that "[A] group of women were 
forcibly taken from their homes while their husbands were threatened with 
death. In another instance … 40 young girls were abducted and raped." He also 
claimed that thousands of Kurdish children have been kidnapped, with as many 
as 6,000 children being forced into PKK ranks. The deaths of these children, 
occurring during attacks on Turkish people and land, are used as tools of 
agitation and defamation. Işın concluded by saying: "No sane person with a … 
conscience and heart can claim that an organization that kills in your name, 
extorts money, sets fire to cars, rapes your young girls and offers them to their 
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leaders, and who starts a war against all holy values of the Kurdish people 
defends Kurdish rights."So many so-called revolutionary groups have been 
presented to us as being romantic and heroic. They are supported and supplied 
by the West to fuel a fight against a greater evil, for example, the Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan, fighting the Soviet threat, were supported by Western powers, and 
from these noble fighters al-Qaida and the Taliban emerged. ISIS directly and 
indirectly benefitted from the war against Saddam Hussein, most apparently in 
the use of the equipment and weapons left behind by the U.S. forces. There is a 
new spin being put on the women of the YPJ. 
 
Surely, we will not be taken in again. These women may be heroines. They are 
surely brave. But before we support them, before we flock to be by their side, 
we have to ask ourselves, what will develop. The PKK, YPG and YPJ are 
terrorist organizations that do not hesitate to abuse women, tear families apart, 
threaten and intimidate. No matter how much they try to legitimize themselves 
with seals and uniforms, they are beyond being revolutionaries. In the world's 
eyes, they are terrorists. True, they are fighting ISIS. But can we say that one 
terrorist organization is inherently better or worse than another? Can something 
that is morally reprehensible suddenly be acceptable because it serves a 
certain aim? A terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist. So before you write that check 
to help them, before you pack your bags to go and join them, remember that a 
spin is being put on the women of the YPG, YPJ and PKK, the reality is not at 







Şeyma Nazli Gürbüz (2017) 
 
PKK continues to abuse young women, while Western media turns a blind eye 
to terror group 




(accessed: 10 November 2018) 
Several reports from national and international organizations cite several cases 
of abuse of women and children, giving evidence of the PKK and its affiliates 
forcibly recruiting underaged girls, without the consent of their families, along 
with other abuses. Yet, despite this evidence, western media remains silent on 
the issue 
The abduction and exploitation of women by the PKK continues with the latest 
incident revealing that a young woman named Leyla Güneş was shot by PKK 
terrorists and survived death while trying to escape the terrorist organization 
last week. Yet, similar to many other cases of abuse of women, Güneş's story 
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was not covered in Western media, which overlooks PKK abuses and tends to 
glorify the PKK and other terrorist organizations affiliated to it, such as the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its People's Protection Units (YPG) militia, 
by portraying violations of human rights as freedom fighting women. 
 
Güneş, who was brainwashed into joining the PKK three years ago, was saved 
from the terrorist organization and reunited with her family. She was only 15 
when the PKK reached out to her and her friends when they were picnicking. 
Her mother tried to contact her and other PKK members in order to have her 
released, but failed each time. Three months ago, however, Güneş decided to 
surrender to security forces. Yet, when Güneş began running toward the 
military units who came for her, to surrender, other militants in a cave threw 
grenades at her before shooting her. 
 
Thought to be dead after security forces killed the other militants, Güneş was 
sent to a hospital morgue until it was realized that she was still alive. Now 
Güneş suffers from memory loss and receives psychological treatment to 
recover her three lost years. 
Güneş is only one example of dozens of young women who suffer from similar 
exploitation in PKK ranks. There are many reports from surrendered female 
terrorists, saying that they were forced to fight against Turkey. 
A video the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) released in May shows another young 
woman from the PKK, Zehra K., who also surrendered, and who in another 
video says that she was fooled by the terrorist organization: "My biggest 
mistake was to be fooled by the PKK. Because the PKK is burning both the 
Republic of Turkey and the Kurdish nation. So what I want to say to young 
people is that the organization forced me into this, but what I understand [now] 
is that they should take refuge in the state." 
In addition to abduction, it are also several cases in which the husbands of 
kidnapped women have had their lives threatened while the women were facing 
several abuses, including rape. 
The book "The Escape to Freedom," which was written in the 2000s by a 
women who escaped from the PKK, reveals her and other women's 
experiences while in the terrorist organization. Joining the PKK when she was 
13, Dilaram (a pseudonym) says in the book that even the women who joined 
voluntarily eventually find that they are oppressed and abused and are unable 
to leave. Even if they want to escape, there is a high possibility that they will be 
executed. An example is the story of five female PKK members who were 
claimed have been consumed by toxic fumes released from a generator in 
2011, but turned out to have actually been executed. 
An Interior Ministry report in February, "Exploitation of Children and Women by 
PKK/KCK [Kurdistan Communities Union] Terrorist Organization," cites several 
cases of abuse of women and children, but also points to other reports from 
international organizations concerning the issue. 
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Reports by Human Rights Watch, for instance, say that the YPG uses children 
under the age of 18 and the PYD and YPG does not deliver its commitment to 
discharge child soldiers, similar to reports from the U.N. Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry. A Human Rights Watch report with several 
interviews with families says that any children appeared in PYD youth centers 
without the knowledge of their families and afterwards, no communication was 
available with them and families figured that their children joined or were 
forcibly recruited at a later time. 
"In May 2015, the YPG and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) announced 
compulsory 'self-defence duty' for all those aged 18 and older in the Kurdish 
canton of Afrin in the northern part of the Aleppo Governorate; however, in April 
2015, a 16-year-old girl in Aleppo was allegedly recruited by the YPJ against 
the wishes of her family," the U.S. State Department June 2016 "Trafficking in 
Persons Report" says. 
Similarly, according to the report by Kurds Watch, people are compulsorily 
recruited through the so-called self-defense law, adapted by the PYD, and 
children up to age 12 are subjected to the practice, as well. "While adults are 
trained in Syria, children are taken to the PKK's camps in northern Iraq," the 
report added, emphasizing that this issue is against international law. 
Reports from Kurds Watch also cite stories of women's suffering, including 
Fatıma Salim Ali's. "Fatıma Salim Ali, one of many child militants used by the 
PYD/YPG, was recruited by the terrorist organization at age 12. During the 
interviews, her parents told that Fatıma suddenly disappeared and they didn't 
want their daughter to join the organization – although they were supporters of 
PYD/YPG – as well as they were prevented from contacting with their child at 
later stages," the report said. 
WESTERN MEDIA GLORIFIES PKK, IGNORES EXPLOITATIONS 
However, in spite of this evidence and the stories of many abused women, 
Western media continues to stay silent on the issue. Rather than revealing the 
true face of the terrorist organization, many media outlets glorify the PKK and 
other organizations linked to it, including the PYD and YPG. The portrayal of 
female terrorists as freedom fighters as well as pointing to the high number of 
female fighters to highlight how the terrorist organization gives importance to 
gender equality are the main themes while mentioning the PKK. 
The internet is full of pictures of and articles on female PKK fighters who are 
glorified and act as heroines by highlighting their fight against Daesh. Yet, there 
are few sources that show the abusive acts of the terrorist organization on the 
women. Abductions, forcible recruitment, the armament of under-aged girls as 
well as rape seem to be seen as insignificant in the Western media compared 
to the fight against Daesh. 
Last year, The New York Times published an article by Rod Norland with the 
headline: "Crackdown in Turkey Threatens a Haven of Gender Equality." The 
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article was one of the best examples of glorification of female PKK fighters, with 
claims like "Kurdish guerrilla units are fully integrated by gender," and that the 
outlawing of the terrorist organization by the Turkish government is "one big 
problem with this aspect of Kurdish life in Turkey." Praising the PKK's vision, the 
article further claims that it "may be a terrorist organization in the view of the 
Turkish government, Europe and the United States, but it has also long made 
women's rights a centerpiece of its political platform." 
Responding to and condemning the article, the Women and Democracy 
Association (KADEM) published its own article, stating that the term "gender 
equality" was abused by using what it called blatantly false information. 
"With this article in The New York Times, the Western media has produced a 
false image of female PKK fighters, tying together women's struggle for freedom 
and equality and their militarization in a terrorist organization. The PKK's 
radicalization of women with the incitement of violence should not be 
interpreted as emancipation," the KADEM's article says, adding that the PKK 
has not decreased violence against women and has instead pulled them into a 
vicious cycle of violence, socially justifying it through the women themselves. 
"Kurdish girls are taken hostage, made hostile to their families and society and 
are militarized with psychological and ideological oppression. They are forced to 
live with a cold, numb identity that glorifies destruction and fighting," the article 
says. 
However, the article in The New York Times is not the only one that 
manipulates facts regarding the PKK. Another example is Marie Claire's article 
titled "These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS. It's Time You Know Who 
They Are." The article makes heroines out of the female PKK terrorists while 
failing to see that they have been radicalized. The same article was also 
published in Esquire magazine. 
Similarly, Russia Today published a documentary titled "Her War: Women vs. 
ISIS: Women against DAESH". Focusing on the training process of the female 
terrorists, the documentary says that the age of those who join the organization 
falls to 16, but it has been claimed that the only precondition for joining is to be 
unmarried. 
Outside of the media, the fashion retailer H&M's 2014 collection was inspired by 
the female terrorists of the YPJ, which, the company later apologized for. This is 
another noteworthy attempt to turn terrorists into heroes and overlook the 






Tips from The New York Times on how to beautify YPG terrorism 
available at   
https://www.dailysabah.com/feature/2018/02/03/tips-from-the-new-york-times-
on-how-to-beautify-ypg-terrorism 
(accessed: 10 November 2018) 
Especially since the launch of Turkey's Operation Olive Branch against PKK-
linked YPG terrorists in Syria, The New York Times has turned into a platform 
for the group's women's affiliate YPJ, which uses feminist rhetoric as a tool to 
aestheticize terror 
Will there come a day when The New York Times publishes an op-ed piece by 
a Daesh terrorist, or is it enough for now to provide a platform for People's 
Protection Units (YPG) terrorists to whitewash themselves disguised as 
pacifists? Since Turkey launched a military operation against the YPG in Syria's 
Afrin region, the newspaper has been paying special attention to the wellbeing 
of the members of the group, so much so that even Nujin Derik, the commander 
of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), the women's branch of the YPG, wrote 
an op-ed for the paper on Monday, "We Fought for Our Democracy. Now 
Turkey Wants to Destroy It," letting the group take their provocation to a much 
higher level in mainstream media. In addition to that, an article by Rod 
Nordland, published on The New York Times website a day before the first one, 
with the title "Female Kurdish Fighter Kills Turkish Troops in Likely Suicide 
Bombing in Syria," portrayed the YPJ's terrorists as heroines who are brave 
enough to take a stand against Turkey's invasion. 
Let me say from the very beginning that the instrumentalization of women as a 
means to legitimize violence and acts of the YPG, an affiliate of the PKK, itself 
recognized as a terrorist group by the U.S., EU and NATO, is of no use 
whatsoever, as it does not change the fact that a terrorist is a terrorist, no 
matter what gender. 
Without a moment to spare, let's start with the first piece. YPJ leader Derik 
invites the world to become a partner in their crimes with the opinion piece she 
wrote for the American newspaper. Aside from all the elements of some heroic 
saga that she thinks her group accomplished what they consider their fight for 
democracy, Derik resorts to this very typical tactic to speak in the name of 
women who supposedly pursue liberation in their battle against Turkey, which 
she believes is "a different evil" that allied itself with "Islamist jihadists." That 
part of the story is not new, as we keep seeing how Turkey, a country that 
suffered long enough from the PKK's brutal attacks and is now more than 
resolute to not give passage to any terrorist threats, is depicted as an invader in 
Syria since the beginning of Operation Olive Branch. What Derik additionally 
does, and The New York Times mirrors, is to sugarcoat all the violence of the 
group under the guise of fighting for women's liberation. 
Once women were equated with innocence and fragility, as beautiful souls, in 
American political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain's terms, waiting for their 
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men at war to come back home. However, feminism stood against such 
discourse, with the idea that it gives women no agency in warfare. In the age of 
mediatized warfare, nevertheless, there has been a considerable change 
regarding the way women are represented in war. Adapting feminist discourse 
for their own purposes, a terrorist woman can now be praised as a freedom 
fighter who kills for women's liberation and empowerment, which is what the two 
New York Times articles, directly or not, also do with eulogies to the YPJ 
fighters. 
Among accusations against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of crushing 
dissent, threatening democracy and centralizing power, the YPJ's chair portrays 
the president in her opinion piece as "an enemy of women" in order to turn the 
armed group's terrorism into a women's issue with which the world can 
empathize. In the name of those female fighters, she takes a chivalric oath to 
"resist invaders" in Afrin. The way she idealizes the YPJ sounds as if the armed 
women never hurt any civilians, let alone killing soldiers, but they just fought 
against terrorists like Daesh. One can say that it is the same old stuff but a 
different day when the leader of such a group tries to legitimize its terrorist 
actions in the name of democracy and freedom. However, using womanhood to 
legitimize terrorism is far beyond that, and even worse. 
When it comes to Rod Nordland's article, it similarly reads like a eulogy to the 
YPJ's Zuluh Hemo, whom he describes as "a female Kurdish fighter" who killed 
"several Turkish soldiers with a grenade" in order to prevent the advance of 
Turkish soldiers and Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters toward Afrin. Taking direct 
quotes from the YPJ's statement in which the 20-year-old terrorist is hailed as a 
heroine and "a model for free Kurdish women," Nordland does not just report 
but also informs the reader that this young fighter was likened to Arin Mirkan, 
another YPJ suicide bomber who had previously attacked Daesh in Syria. 
Putting Daesh and Turkish soldiers into the same basket against the YPJ is a 
clever way of representing those terrorists as icons of female liberation and 
resilience, which is identical to what the YPJ's leader did in her op-ed when she 
compared the YPG's fight against Turkish soldiers to their previous fight against 
Daesh in Raqqa in order to justify the YPG's terroristic actions during the Afrin 
operation. 
For those who did not get enough YPJ propaganda, Nordland's article offers 
more by sharing two videos, one a Facebook video of Humo singing as well as 
pictures of her, and another from the YPG press office in which the reportedly 
female suicide bomber's story is lauded in addition to some other terrorist 
women. Unlike the clear-cut distinction between being a beautiful soul and an 
active fighter that the YPJ leader made in her opinion piece, Nordland's article 
seems to combine both. In one of the videos accompanying the article, Humo 
says: "People told me to stay at home, that I'm too soft to carry weapons, that 
I'm not tough enough to fight, yet I knew that this step would be the first of 
many." No matter how young she is, positioning a terrorist against all those 
previous arguments that women suicide bombers are incapable of making their 
own choices to participate in warfare, the video characterizes the young terrorist 
as having agency, leaving no space to any bigger arguments like the 
aestheticization of terrorism. 
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I do not think there is any need to say that the second article, which extensively 
quotes what the women in the YPJ forces think of the Afrin operation, does not 
report any information from Turkey's perspective other than giving the numbers 
of YPG casualties and stressing Erdoğan's threats. Nevertheless, it is a rather 
different story, so let's return to our subject and sum up: Framing YPJ terrorists 
as peaceful guardians as they hold guns to allegedly only target jihadists or evil 
under the guise of women's freedom and empowerment does not justify the 







PKK and the 'free female fighter' rhetoric available at  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pkk-and-the-free-female-fighter-
rhetoric-73444 
(accessed: 10 November 2018) 
Over the last two months, there have been dozens of articles published on how 
the brave Kurdish women of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have 
been fighting fiercely against the militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), including publications by BBC News, Foreign Policy magazine 
and the Huffington Post. Indeed, at first sight one feels proud at the fact that 
women are as strong as men and are fighting for what they believe in. Yet, 
something about the rhetoric used by news sources on Kurdish female fighters 
feels deeply dissatisfying.  
 
“Gender equality is a fundamental feature of the PKK, which was founded as a 
Marxist organization,” many news sources reported, while depicting the 
heroines of the PKK, conducting individual interviews and sharing their 
extraordinary life stories. Nevertheless, there are serious complications about 
these statements. Among many, the claim that PKK is still a Marxist 
organization is highly disputable when its political discourse has been redefined 
over many decades. However, what we should concentrate on is the hyperbole 
of "female power and independence" within the PKK. 
 
It is true that since its establishment, the PKK has recruited women as well as 
men. While some of these recruitments were voluntary, others were by force. 
Nihat Ali Özcan, who is an expert on the PKK, claims that women have 
voluntarily joined the PKK because they are attracted to the propaganda and 
aims of the organization, or because of family pressure. However, especially 
during the early stages of the PKK’s existence, it is well-known that the group 
kidnapped young women for recruitment and forced children whose families 
were already involved with the PKK to join the organization. In time, they were 
successful in creating a false notion of gender-equality. 
 
“For me, the freedom of women is more important than land and culture.  A 
woman must be a freedom fighter. You must liberate yourselves,” said Abdullah 
Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, on international women’s day this 
year. However, during an interview in 1997, when asked about his alleged 
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“harem” (where the main male character was surrounded by a group of 
females), he dismissively responded that it is completely natural to have a 
desire to be close to the leader in guerrilla movements, as “the leader delivers 
light and power to those who are around him.” Moreover, the gender-equality 
façade of the PKK took a serious blow when one of its own female militants, 
who escaped from it and found refuge in Iraq, published a book on her 
experiences titled “The Escape to Freedom” in the early 2000s. 
 
After joining the PKK at the age of 13, Dilaram (her codename) spoke to almost 
100 ex-militants about the beatings and rapes taking place within the PKK by its 
leaders and high-level commanders. The story in the book is of a woman who 
voluntarily joined the organization, but then could not leave it once she was in. 
Dilaram became a victim of all types of misconduct. The horrific stories range 
from brutal incidents of rape, to the execution of young women who wanted to 
run away from the group. Thus, all today's arguments suggesting that the PKK 
provides freedom and power for women within the organization should be taken 
with a grain of salt. 
Moreover, those who are familiar with the history of PKK attacks in Turkey will 
recall that more than half of its suicide attacks have been conducted by women. 
There was a time in the country when people became restless when they saw a 
pregnant woman in a crowded place, suspecting that she could be a PKK 
militant ready to detonate a bomb. Indeed, in the book “Women as Terrorists: 
Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs” by R. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly it is 
written that while the PKK has utilized female militants as suicide bombers 
because they would be better able to slip past Turkish security measures, many 
of the female operatives became suicide bombers out of eagerness to prove 
that they could be as fierce as their male counterparts, after being accused of 
being passive fighters.  
 
Needless to say, the PKK is not the only armed group to employ female 
militants in its activities – in its occasionally ideological and at other time 
pragmatic strategy. What's more, there is a great irony in the fact that PKK 
women have lately been combating ISIL, which as an Islamist organization that 
not only prohibits any female fighters’ involvement but also conducts 
unspeakable violence against females in the raided towns. All of this being said, 
before displaying euphoria about women being equal to men in their “fight” and 
before portraying the PKK as if it has no record of gender discrimination, one 
should take a better look at its history. Regrettably, not all stories are as 
marketable as others, but there are many lives that have fallen between these 
gender cracks and deserve to be remembered. 
 
The wide band of territory in northern Syria that is controlled by the Syrian 
Kurds has attracted enormous interest worldwide. 
Media coverage of the area known as Rojava has been broadly favourable. The 
main Syrian Kurdish militia, the People’s Protection Units or YPG has attracted 
particular sympathy for its spirited battle against the so-called Islamic State. But 
foreign journalists usually do not spend more than a week or two in the region. 






Dutch journalist spends five months in Rojava, says YPG and PKK are separate 
but closely linked available at  http://www.diken.com.tr/in-rojava-ypg-pkk-
separate-closely-linked/ 
The wide band of territory in northern Syria that is controlled by the Syrian 
Kurds has attracted enormous interest worldwide. 
Media coverage of the area known as Rojava has been broadly favourable. The 
main Syrian Kurdish militia, the People’s Protection Units or YPG has attracted 
particular sympathy for its spirited battle against the so-called Islamic State. But 
foreign journalists usually do not spend more than a week or two in the region. 
And the steady blast of pro-YPG propaganda dressed up as news can blur the 
picture. 
Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, a Dutch freelance journalist and researcher, is an 
exception. Fluent in the main Kurdish dialect Kurmanji, Van Wilgenburg recently 
spent five months in Rojava, covering the YPG’s operations in Manbij and 
northern Raqqa and collecting material for a book that he is planning to co-
author with Harriet Allsop on the Syrian Kurds’ experiment with self-rule. Diken 
interviewed van Wilgenburg a few weeks after he left northern Syria in August 
just as Turkish troops were moving in from across the border. Here are the 
highlights from that interview. 
The rules are different for foreign and local journalists. Local journalists need to 
have their outlet registered with the canton [Syrian Kurdish] administration. One 
has to register separately with each canton. And you need to get permission 
each time you move from one canton to the other. I was able to move around 
freely without any minder. I did whatever I pleased with a translator or on my 
own. But if you go into an area where military operations are taking place, like 
Manbij for instance, then its tightly controlled. You can’t just show up. 
What would happen if you wrote negative stories? Would you be permitted to 
return Rojava? What are the red lines? 
 There is a lot of tension between the [ruling] PYD [The Democratic Unity Party 
is the YPG’s political arm AZ] and the pro- [Massoud] Barzani bloc of parties 
forming the Kurdish National Council (KNC). If you interview them [the KNC] 
and reflect only their views they [the Rojava administration] get upset. It’s also 
worth noting that they allow journalists who are sympathetic to the Syrian 
opposition and even to jihadist groups like Jabhat al Nusra to come and senior 
officials grant them interviews. I saw this for myself. 
Can you tell us a little about the internal politics of Rojava? Who are the main 
players? 
 Broadly speaking there are two blocs. The PKK, the KDP, and their respective 
affiliates. So you have the PYD and TEVDEM [Movement for a Democratic 
Society] and the KNC. The strongest parties within the KNC are the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S) and the Yekiti party of Ibrahim Birro. Then 
you have a third bloc of parties that have some relations with the PYD and 
TEVDEM. Most journalists don’t know about them but they exist. 
 Which of the parties are armed? 
 There is the YPG of course. The pro-Barzani parties have fighters but they are 
based in Iraqi Kurdistan where they are fighting against ISIS in Gwer, Sinjar and 
in Khazir. So getting battle hardened. 
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 Ibrahim Birro leader of Yekiti was recently kicked out of Rojava. Why? 
Well the KNC says it doesn’t recognise the local administration, or its laws. 
Their differences date back to October 2014 when their power sharing 
agreement [brokered by Massoud Barzani] broke down completely and Turkey 
played a role in this. Since then tensions have been growing worse. Several 
KNC leaders were arrested after staging protests. The PYD says they were 
arrested because you are supposed to seek permission from the local 
authorities before staging a protest. The KNC says it won’t seek permission 
from an administration that it does not recognise. Relations between the PYD 
and Turkey and between the PYD and Barzani are also very bad and this is 
reflected through local rivalries, tensions and arrests. For instance the KDP 
prevents PYD politicians from traveling through their territory to Europe. And the 
PYD also put restrictions on KNC entering Rojava. Turkey also supports the 
KNC and wants it to have more influence, which often makes life worse for the 
KNC. 
 How would describe the ideological differences between these two blocs? 
 The KNC says it wants a Kurdistan region in Syria similar to what the Kurds 
have in northern Iraq. But that is hard to achieve because if we draw a line from 
Derik to Efrin and accept this as Rojava the Kurds will be in the minority. 
 How so? 
 I don’t much believe in percentages but the Kurds would amount to around 40 
percent of the population in that band of territory. 
Going back to the differences, PYD and TEVDEM say they want federalism for 
northern Syria but they want this not just for the Kurds but also for other groups, 
meaning Christians and Arabs as well. 
 How much support does the KNC have? 
 There is no way to measure this because there are no elections but the KNC 
parties have a good amount of support in al-Hasakah province but as you go 
towards Afrin and Kobane, significantly less so. The PYD and YPG are 
especially popular in Kobane.  Also you have a lot of Kurds who support 
Barzani who don’t necessarily support the KNC. 
 People often draw comparisons between Rojava and the Iraqi Kurds’ 
administration? Are there any similarities? 
 The political dynamics are very different in Iraqi Kurdistan where you have two 
political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan governing over two separate zones. Yes, you do have a [Iraqi] 
Kurdistan parliament and a [Iraqi] Kurdistan regional government that binds 
them but they are still quite separate in many ways. This fracturing was avoided 
in Rojava because they resisted the KNC’s attempts to divide territory and 
power. Rojava is far more bureaucratic and better organised. And there are 
obviously ideological differences. Rojava is all about self-sufficiency, 
communalism. 
 Tell us about the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Does the YPG call all the 
shots? 
 There isn’t much difference between the YPG and the SDF, its kind of like two 
different names for the same group. The SDF is a coalition of different factions 
but the dominant force is the YPG. 
 Its mainly Kurdish right? 
 It’s impossible to call it “Kurdish” anymore because the YPG is recruiting a lot 
of Arabs especially in Manbij and Shadadi. The number of Kurdish recruits from 
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Turkey has gone down. Military service is obligatory in the cantons so the draft 
applies to all local residents including Christians but this does not necessarily 
mean they will be fighting on the frontline. The Christians are happy about this 
and the Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate just put out a statement criticising the 
forced drafting of Christians. 
 So do the Arabs support the canton system? 
 They deal with the realities on the ground. They look at who is the dominant 
actor. Plus they get salaries from the administration. Something, between 30 to 
50 dollars, the same as Kurds working for the administration would. Their 
families enjoy protection again as the YPG fighters’ families would. 
 Is the Rojava experience rubbing off on the PKK? Transforming it in any way? 
 It’s hard to pin down. There are some PKK in the leadership and among the 
cadres [of the Rojava administration] but the PKK likes to keep things separate. 
I don’t see them changing their own rules but they have to deal with the reality 
on the ground. You can’t have everyone living like PKK cadres. There is a 
difference between PKK cadres and the YPG fighters who can marry and have 
kids. Also some YPG fighters volunteer for a given period and return to civilian 
life when the battle is over. 
 What exactly is the relationship between the PKK and the Rojava 
administration? 
 It’s difficult to understand this relationship between Qandil [the PKK 
headquarters in the Qandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan] and Rojava. There are 
a lot of administrators who were in Qandil. But it’s unclear to me whether they 
do their own thing or report first to Qandil and then do it. And for example you 
recently had comments from a senior PKK commander Riza Altun who said the 
PKK only made suggestions [to the canton administrations]. In the same 
interview he criticized the cantonal authorities for failing to adequately explain 
the “democratic federalism” project and for continuing to call the areas under 
their control “Rojava”  [which connotes Kurdish ethnicity AZ] instead of  [the all 
embracing AZ] “northern Syria.” 
 How important is Abdullah Ocalan in Rojava? 
 Ocalan is viewed as the person who created the idea of Rojava, who came up 
with the whole system, who embodies the “Rojava Revolution” as they call it. 
You see his pictures everywhere. He’s a symbol. 
 If Turkey and Ocalan struck a deal whereby the Rojava authorities gave up on 
linking the cantons with Efrin and in return Turkey normalised relations with 
Rojava, allowed unfettered access to Efrin, and helped to rebuild Kobane for 
instance, would the Syrian Kurds accept this? 
 It’s very complicated because they have been talking about Efrin for such a 
long time. Giving up on connecting Kobane with Efrin would be a tremendous 
loss of face. Yet the Rojava administration can be very pragmatic. If there are 
real guarantee that Efrin will no longer be besieged by Syrian rebel groups and 
that its secure and that Syrian Kurds are allowed to travel freely to Efrin via 
Turkey without any negative repercussions of any kind then perhaps. But there 
needs to be a lot of trust between Turkey and the Canton administrations. 
 What if Ocalan stepped forward as a guarantor? 
 Well I think its very hard for them [the Rojava administration] to go against 
anything Ocalan says. But then Ocalan is not stupid either. He will not commit 
himself in ways that would damage his own credibility. More likely he will make 
vague pronouncements that can be interpreted in many different ways. I don’t 
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think he can make concessions to Turkey without securing something 
substantial in exchange like decentralisation in southeast Turkey, letting the 
Kurds have their own political system. I do think if relations improved between 
Turkey and Rojava it would be better for Syrian Kurds’ economic future. Until 
relations are normalised they can survive but not much more. 
 The US has repeatedly said it will not help the YPG connect the cantons. At the 
same time the US envisages a key role for the SDF in capturing Raqqa. Is the 
YPG ready to do Raqqa without US help in linking the cantons? 
 TEVDEM officials say they want recognition of their federal region [the 
Northern Syrian Democratic Federation] and that they want to be at the table 
during any future Syria peace talks. They are unlikely to do Raqqa without 
support for linking the cantons. The Americans seem to be trying to make up for 
the lack of support by offering the YPG more weapons. If the Americans don’t 
help them then they will work with the Russians to capture al Bab. Its not 100 
percent confirmed whether they received Russian help in doing so but the YPG 
recently captured ten villages moving eastwards from Efrin towards el Bab. 
They are 25 to 30 kilometers away from el Bab. 
 After five years of self-rule how separate is Rojava from the rest of Syria? 
 It’s getting more and more separate [from the rest of Syria]. For instance the 
official Syrian education system is being phased out. Most education is now in 
the Kurdish language but Christians are allowed to have their own Christian 
education and the Canton Administration formally announced this. The Arabs 
are also permitted to have their own separate schools. 
 Are any of these schools funded by the central government? 
 Teachers in the new schools are paid directly by the Canton administrations. 
And those among them who previously worked for schools run by the central 
government no longer receive salaries from the central government. 
 How does the Rojava administration fund teachers’ salaries? 
 By taxing civilians and through its control over economic resources in northern 
Syria, like oil for instance. 
 So do kids born after the canton administrations were declared in 2012 learn 
Arabic? 
 They do, but not as their main language. 
 How secular are the Syrian Kurds? 
 I think the Syrian Kurds are quite secular because Syria in general is quite 
secular. This has nothing to do with the PKK YPG ideology per se. The Syrian 
Kurds are not very observant and there aren’t that many women who cover their 
heads. 
 There is a lot of talk about women’s rights in Rojava. How much real power do 
women actually have? 
 Women are far more powerful now in Rojava than they have ever been. So 
much so that even parties that oppose the PYD joke about it saying “we no 
longer have any power as men.” Marriage of minors has been banned. 
Polygamy [permitted under Syrian law] has also been banned in Rojava. The 
canton administrations are very eager to pass new laws to improve women’s 
rights even though there is some resistance to this among locals. There are 
plenty of women in key positions. But when you look at the pro-Barzani parties 
the number of women in power is close to zero. While there are numerous 
women fighters in the YPG, mandatory conscription applies to men only 
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 How would you characterize relations between the Syrian Kurds and the Assad 
regime particularly after the regime bombed YPG targets in al-Hasakah? 
 I think the YPG was initially quite happy about what happened in al-Hasakah 
because they gave a message to the Assad regime. The message was: “don’t 
think you can do your deals with Turkey and that there will be no 
consequences.” As you know there was a lot of talk at the time of secret deals 
between Turkey and the regime that targeted the Kurds. And the American 
chased away the Syrian planes. But the situation changed when Turkey 
intervened in Jarabulus soon after. The timing of the Turkish intervention 
suggested there was a deal between Turkey, Iran, Assad and Russia. 
 So do you think what happened in al-Hasakah is part of an emerging pattern of 
regime YPG confrontation? 
 Not necessarily. A lot of the tensions are local There have been clashes 
between pro-Assad militias and the YPG. For instance in Qamishlo a pro-
regime Christian militia was unhappy about checkpoints set up by the Asayish 
(the Rojava administration’s internal security units) and so there were clashes. 
Assad’s strategy is to deal with the insurgency first. Once he feels stronger he 
will of course shift his gaze to the Kurdish areas because this area is rich in oil 
and agriculture. He would not want to leave this in the hands of the Kurds. 
 What sort of contact is there between the regime and the Kurds? 
 There is an airport in Qamishlo controlled by the regime. And there are civilian 
flights between Qamishlo and Damascus. In the past there was medicine 
coming from Damascus to Qamishlo but recently because of the tensions that 
has stopped so there are huge medicine shortages in Kobane and Jazeera 
cantons. There are still some economic deals with oil and products being sold 
back and forth. 
 How do the Syrian Kurds get along with US Special Forces? 
 It’s difficult to gauge. You see them riding around but reporters are not allowed 
to get close to them, especially after the incident when they were photographed 
with YPG patches on their uniforms. The YPG does view the whole thing as 
more of a tactical alliance but its very popular among locals. Be they pro or anti-
PYD people like westerners. You will never hear anti-PYD people criticizing this 
alliance with America. They say American support is good and that there should 
be more. 
 
Bianet articles on Kurdish Female fighers 
 
Necla Açık (2014) 
Kobane: the Struggle of Kurdish Women Against Islamic State available at   
https://bianet.org/english/world/159851-kobane-the-struggle-of-kurdish-women-
against-islamic-state 
The international community should support a secular, multi-religious and multi-
ethnic Rojava with democratic ambitions, that is a threat for IS and equally for 
the conservative Islamic government in Turkey. This is democracy in action in 
the Middle East. 
For several days tens of thousands of Yezidis [Ezidi people] got trapped on 
Mount Sinjar in early August 2014 in an attempt to flee the attacks of the Islamic 
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State (IS) on their towns and villages in Sinjar region in north-west Iraq, close to 
the Syrian border. 
It soon turned out that these attacks were not just a strategic move by IS to 
provide them with a free gateway to northern Syria, but horrific tales of 
execution, abduction of women and children, forced conversions to Islam, and 
the mass exodus suggests a more sinister plan. 
Amnesty International documented the atrocities of IS and accused them of 
carrying out ethnic cleansing on a historic scale, systematically targeting non-
Arab and non-Sunni Muslim local communities, such as the Yezidi Kurds, 
Assyrian Christians, Turkmen Shi’a, Shabak Shi’a, Kakai and Sabean 
Mandaeans.  
Several months before the IS attack, Yezidi leaders feared that they would be 
targeted by IS and tried to lobby for protection and intervention with trips to 
Baghdad and to the Kurdish capital Erbil. The Iraqi Army had already deserted 
the region, but they were reassured by the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) that their Peshmerga Armed Forces were prepared for an onslaught by 
IS and were ready to defend their Kurdish co-patriots. 
Yet, as IS started to advance and attack village by village, to the surprise of 
everyone, the Peshmergas quickly withdrew, leaving the civilian population 
widely unprotected. Left behind were poorly equipped local militia and a few 
Peshmerga fighters who, at their own risk, stayed behind. They managed to 
hold back IS for a few days, enabling civilians to flee to the Sinjar mountains, 
but they had little power to prevent what Yezidis call the 73rd massacre on their 
community. This included group executions, abduction of women as spoils of 
war, rape and the trafficking of women and girls as sex slaves. 
Kurdish female fighters rescue the trapped Yezidis from IS 
As news of this humanitarian disaster went around the world and the 
international community was debating about a possible intervention, help came 
from somewhere else. The Kurdish women fighters (Women’s Protection Unit, 
YPJ) of Rojava (the self-proclaimed Kurdish autonomy region in northern Syria) 
and the women’s guerrilla units (YJA-Star) of the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) along with their male comrades were the first forces to respond to the 
calls of the trapped Yezidi refugees. Setting off from Rojava, these fighters 
cleared more than a 100km passage through northern Iraq to Mount Sinjar and 
broke the siege of IS. They provided the desperate refugees with a secure 
corridor, which enabled them to embark on a 24 hour march into the relatively 
safe northern part of Syria/Rojava, where they received immediate medical 
attention, food and shelter. 
The PKK guerrillas and the fighters from Rojava were the only force on the 
ground to respond immediately to the crisis preventing further IS massacres in 
early August. It was also striking that whole women’s units were among them, 
not just individual female fighters. Especially, as female fighters arouse so 
much attention. IS fighters were said to be dreading that the door to paradise 
would be shut to them if they had been killed by a woman. 
While such tales have certainly increased the popularity of Kurdish female 
fighters in the international media - this was even featured in the free paper 
Metro - the reality is that these women and men who dared to stand up against 
IS put themselves in a very vulnerable position; they became the primary target 
of IS. Although they have been the strongest to fight back against IS, only the 
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Peshmergas have been supplied with weapons and included in the US coalition 
to combat IS. 
The PKK and Rojava administration were neither consulted about co-ordinated 
actions against IS, nor were they supplied with weapons to defend themselves 
and the population against further IS attacks.  As the founder of Medecins Sans 
Frontieres Dr Jacques Bérès has stated, the Kurdish women fighting IS have 
nothing but their “courage and Kalashnikovs”.  Even two months after the IS 
massacre on Mount Sinjar, it is again the women’s defence force of the PKK 
who are protecting the civilian population from ongoing IS attacks. They have 
also vowed to find the thousands of abducted Yezidi girls and women. Swedish 
politicians joining this campaign have urged the United Nations to investigate 
and identify the young women who may have been trafficked to other countries. 
The ‘Rojava Revolution’ and the Kurds in North Syria 
Amid the civil war in Syria and the withdrawal of the Syrian Army in the north of 
Syria in 2012, the population of Rojava took control of their region and declared 
a democratic multi-ethnic and multi-religious autonomy similar to the Swiss 
model with three separate and geographically detached administrative regions 
or cantons (Kobane, Afrin and Cizire). 
Despite economic hardship and a de facto embargo from trade with other parts 
of Syria, Turkey and KRG, the people of Rojava have been using their newly 
acquired freedom to experiment with radical democracy. They are applying the 
Democratic Autonomy project propagated by the imprisoned leader of the PKK, 
Abdullah Öcalan, which is also being embarked upon by the Kurdish movement 
in North Kurdistan/ Turkey. 
Within two years Rojava has witnessed substantial institutional and political 
changes and for the first time in Syrian history, the communities are governing 
themselves without the intervention of an authoritarian central government. 
Referring to these developments as the ‘Rojava Revolution’, the people of 
Rojava have eagerly been involved in organising their own affairs, from running 
schools and hospitals to generating electricity and even making their own tanks. 
The most visible change has perhaps been the inclusion of women in the 
defence force and the police as separate units through the establishment of the 
Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Women's Security Forces (HAJ). 
According to various estimates, female fighters make up between 7,000 and 
10,000 of the Kurdish forces fighting in Syria, representing roughly one third of 
the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) in Rojava, the military force that has been 
set up to defend Rojava. 
The empowerment of women has been a key to the Rojava revolution, which 
explains its popularity particularly among women. A recent report on Rojava 
commissioned by the London based women’s rights and advocacy group Roj 
Women, shows that since the self-declared autonomy, Kurdish women have 
established a dozen women’s unions, associations and committees and have 
carried out gender awareness campaigns on a large scale in all three cantons. 
Among the new regulations instigated to combat gender discrimination are a 
ban on polygamy for men and underage marriage. Also, unusual for the region, 
cases of domestic violence are being taken more seriously by being referred 
directly to the police and courts, while women and their children are provided 
with temporary safe accommodation. To ensure that women are represented in 
public offices and in civic life, positive discrimination measures, similar to those 
practiced within the Kurdish movement in Turkey, are introduced. These include 
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the co-chair system where key decision-making positions are shared by men 
and women, and the establishment of various women-only bodies making sure 
that women’s voices and interests are no longer ignored.  
Rojava’s model of gender equality borrowed from the Kurdish movement 
in Turkey  
Rojava’s model of empowering women is based upon the gender liberation 
perspective developed by the PKK and applied by the Kurdish movement and 
the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in Turkey, which runs the 
local governments in a number of Kurdish provinces in the South-East of 
Turkey or Northern Kurdistan.  
A strength of the PKK and the Kurdish movement in North Kurdistan has been 
their criticism of Kurdish society in terms of class and gender inequalities. 
Women’s participation in the armed struggle and their success as political 
activists has broken many taboos in Kurdistan as national movements very 
often do, but it has not stopped there. 
While in the 1990s women were mobilised into the Kurdish national movement 
primarily to support and legitimise the national cause, with the new political shift 
towards Democratic Autonomy, stronger emphasis has been put on everyday 
politics and of provoking change from below and within the society rather than 
waiting for the ‘big revolution’ to happen. The Kurdish movement and the PKK 
put so much emphasis on women’s liberation, that women’s demands for more 
power and recognition within the movement could not easily be ignored. 
In addition to this, very much to the dismay of many feminists however, the 
women trusted Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, in guiding them towards 
gender liberation. Despite his imprisonment since 1999, it was women who 
supported him most during the turbulent years following his arrest and the 
declaration of his new political, and at that time controversial, line. In return 
Öcalan became more radical in his promotion of gender liberation and urged 
women within the party to question male dominance within their own ranks. 
Thus, the ideological support provided by the PKK and its leader Abdullah 
Öcalan has helped women within the Kurdish movemnet in North 
Kurdistan/Turkey to question and challenge women’s oppression and gender 
inequalities and many women began to develop a feminist consciousness. They 
strengthened their position within the legal Kurdish movement and built 
autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations including women’s 
assemblies within the pro-Kurdish political parties, women’s centres and 
associations, a press agency, women’s cooperatives, women’s academies and 
so on. 
Within the guerrilla movement, women also organised as separate and 
independent units by setting up their own party, the Kurdistan Woman's 
Liberation Party (PAJK) and their own guerrilla force (YJA-Star). 
Today, women constitute a strong force within the pro-Kurdish parties in 
Turkey. They have been working initially on low level grass-roots mobilization 
but have also demanded more recognition for their political work. This has led 
to the introduction of positive discrimination policies and includes the 
implementation of a 40 per cent quota of women by the pro-Kurdish parties in 
Turkey. It ensured that women were elected into local and national 
governments as councillors, mayors and as members of parliament. 
For example in the 2007 national election the pro-Kurdish parties won 21 seats, 
with a female representation of 38 per cent. This was a significant achievement 
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as the overall female representation in the parliament of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) and the main opposition, the Republican's Peoples 
Party (CHP) was only 9 per cent. In the latest local elections in March 2014 in 
Turkey, only 37 women were elected as mayors (out of a total 1,364), of which 
over half were women from the pro-Kurdish parties who have applied the 
women’s quota rigorously. Besides the quota, the pro-Kurdish parties have 
been applying a pioneering power sharing system since 2009 that allows key 
decision-making positions within the party to be shared by both men and 
women. This means that all elected mayors and councillors have a co-chair 
who share their salary as well as duties and have equal rights of representing 
their constituency. 
This system has been expanded to other civil society organisations embedded 
within the Kurdish movement. These and other positive discrimination policies 
have been highly effective in bringing women’s issues to the agenda of Kurdish 
politics and raising the profile of women in politics more generally. Arguably, 
Kurdish women’s representation in political positions and parties has become a 
yardstick for democratization that has challenged other parties in Turkey to 
follow suit. 
Rojava benefited from the political expertise of the PKK and the Kurdish 
movement in North Kurdistan/Turkey in setting up a self-governing system and 
in pursuing gender equality initiatives. The Rojava revolution might seem very 
ambitious, given that no regional or international power has any interest in 
supporting and maintaining them. Yet, it was their idealism and their belief that 
diversity in the Middle East is an asset rather than a problem that led them to 
take responsibility and to go to Mount Sinjar to rescue the besieged civilian 
population. Their vision of self-rule and their success in building political 
capacity has enabled Rojava to become a relatively stable and secure region, 
offering tens of thousands of refugees from Syria and Iraq, a shelter. This 
however changed with Rojava becoming the focus of intense IS attacks.   
The siege of Kobane 
Rojava is now paying the price for taking on IS and for exercising popular self-
governance. Despite ongoing US air-strikes on IS strongholds for over three 
weeks, the Kobane canton of Rojava has been under heavy attack by IS since 
September 15. The geographical position of Kobane makes it difficult for any 
outside help from the other cantons and the PKK guerrillas to get through. Its 
border to the north with Turkey is heavily guarded. The rest of Kobane is 
encircled by IS. The surrendering of Kobane is most likely to set off another 
massacre similar to that on Mount Sinjar. Most of the estimated 160,000 
inhabitants of Kobane have already fled the area, but for those thousands of 
residents who have remained in Kobane attempting to defend themselves 
against IS, the future looks very grim. 
An unclassified US memo written by the former US Ambassador to Syria Robert 
Ford, suggests that Turkey is pushing for a Sunni-Islamic state in Syria, 
regardless of the demands of much of the opposition for a secular and multi-
ethnic federation as suggested by many Syrians and particularly the minorities 
such as the Christians, Alawites, Druze and Kurds. 
Moreover, in the same memo, Turkish officials are reported to have suggested 
that a future Syrian constitution should be “Without mention of the Kurds and 
that any Kurdish problems should be resolved through local municipalities”. It is 
exactly this mentality of denial and the subsequent assimilation policies of the 
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Turkish state – and similarly that of Iraq, Syria and Iran - that led to the 
uprisings of the Kurds in the region, causing the loss of over 40,000 lives in the 
conflict in Turkey alone. 
Thus, despite being besieged by IS in Kobane, the Kurds in Rojava deeply 
mistrust any Turkish military intervention, not least because they accuse Turkey 
of actively supporting IS by allowing them to cross the border back and forth. 
For Turkey, struggling with concessions for their own Kurdish population, an 
autonomous Rojava run by Kurds affiliated to the PKK is an absolute no. A 
Turkish intervention in Rojava would not only threaten the autonomy of Rojava, 
which represents a model for the PKK in Turkey, but would also threaten the 
peace process with its own Kurds in Turkey.    
Democracy in action in the Middle East 
The autonomous region of Rojava and its unique population is illustration 
enough of what we have long understood from Afghanistan, Iraq and other 
conflicts around the world; that democracy has to come from within. No military 
intervention from the west or from a third power can teach a country and its 
citizens how to reconcile differences and build a future together. 
Yet, Rojava is being punished for trying to stand on its own feet and for their 
alliance with the PKK which has helped them ideologically and logistically to set 
up their own administration as well as with their fight against al-Qaida affiliated 
groups. 
Although the PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation, and has indeed been 
engaged in violent conflict and has been ruthless at times towards internal 
opposition, their policies and strategies have changed over the years. Their 
popularity among the Kurds remains high as they have been leading the 
struggle for civil liberties, political representation and recognition of cultural 
rights for the last 30 years or more. 
The Democratic Autonomy project has been one of the key political projects of 
the PKK devised as a long term solution for the Kurdish question in the Middle 
East. Proposed as an alternative to a separate Kurdish nation state, it focuses 
on widening democratic forms of participation and developing alternative forms 
of governance and economy. This moderate political line of the PKK, compared 
to the 1980s and 1990s, has allowed the Kurdish movement in Turkey to 
strengthen its legal political struggle and aims to open up negotiations for a 
peaceful political solution.  
A secular, multi-religious and multi-ethnic Rojava with democratic ambitions 
constitutes a threat for IS and equally for the conservative Islamic government 
in Turkey. For the west however, which complains about the lack of democracy 
in the Middle East, what makes them hesitate to support such a progressive 
movement, one wonders? 
This movement has not only been halting the advance of IS but has also 
providing security and stability in the areas run by them, it has empowered 
women and built an inclusive form of governance, involving many of the 
region’s diverse populations such as the Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and 
Armenians. 
• Necla Açık is visiting Research Fellow at the Regent’s Center for 
Transnational Studies in London. Her expertise is in gender and 






La Repubblica’articles about female Kurdish fighters 
 
 
(La Repubblica 2008) PKK . Così combattono le donne-guerriere 
Kobane, la guerra delle donne curde contro l'ISIS 
available at 
https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2008/10/17/pkk-cosi-
combattono-le-donne-guerriere.html (accessed 10 November 2018) 
 
DIYARBAKIR «Noi non abbiamo paura. L' attacco dell' altro giorno vicino a 
Sendimli è stato un massacro. Per noi e per loro. I soldati turchi vengano pure a 
colpirci ancora, come hanno annunciato. Il Pkk continuerà la sua battaglia fino a 
quando i curdi non otterranno i loro diritti. E saranno considerati cittadini pari 
agli altri e non un popolo di serie B». Le montagne dietro Diyarbakir sanno 
ancora di guerra. Quella di un tempo. Fosse, muri e trincee. E guerriglia che ti 
sorprende all' improvviso. Basta allontanarsi di qualche chilometro dal grande 
centro curdo non lontano dalla frontiera irachena, e inerpicarsi lentamente per 
strade che pullulano di carri armati e soldati con il volto dipinto di pietra nera, la 
migliore per mimetizzarsi, per piombare subito in un' atmosfera fatta di agguati 
e di tiri con il kalashnikov. Una battaglia durissima e interminabile. Una guerra a 
bassa intensità, quella che da quasi 25 anni oppone i poco più di 4 mila 
guerriglieri comunisti del Pkk alle truppe di Ankara, un' armata seconda nella 
Nato come quantità e volume di fuoco solo all' esercito americano. Una guerra 
che, con l' ultimo massacro di alcuni giorni fa (40 morti, 17 militari e 23 ribelli, 
tra loro alcune donne), ha sfondato il muro delle 40 mila vittime. La Turchia è 
sconvolta dalla nuova strage, che in un lampo ha catalizzato l' attenzione dell' 
opinione pubblica, lasciando in secondo piano la crisi finanziaria che attanaglia 
l' economia anche qui. «E' terrorismo - urlano le tv, i giornali, i politici - il Pkk 
vuole rafforzare la linea dura, costringere l' esercito a continuare il conflitto 
trasferendolo sui monti del Nord Iraq (dove si annidano le basi guerrigliere, 
ndr), e nelle città della Turchia, atterrendole con l' esplosione di ordigni». Ikram 
non ha paura. Porta una frangetta nera sopra occhiali da intellettuale. Nascosta 
all' ombra di un solido rifugio, condivide il tè con alcune compagne. 
«Terrorismo? - replica all' accusa che tutti imputano al Pkk - può essere. 
Dipende dai punti di vista. Noi consideriamo questa guerra una battaglia per la 
libertà. I metodi possono essere discutibili, il nostro fine è però chiarissimo. 
Perché senza le nostre incursioni il popolo turco si dimenticherebbe 
completamente del problema curdo, e il mondo ci abbandonerebbe al nostro 
destino. Invece noi dobbiamo continuare a lottare per la visibilità e la nostra 
sopravvivenza». Non ci sono solo uomini fra i "santuari" sicuri del Kurdistan. A 
combattere assieme a loro una battaglia antica e disperata spuntano ragazze 
fra i 18 e i 35 anni. Donne severe, il fisico tosto e il volto indurito da anni 
trascorsi in un territorio aspro come quello delle montagne curde. Dove il 
confronto con la morte è quotidiano. «Naturalmente siamo più deboli degli 
uomini - dice Ikram - e alcune, invece di combattere, si occupano dell' 
organizzazione del movimento. Ma da un punto di vista mentale le donne 
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reagiscono meglio e possono sopportare di più le durezze della guerra. E 
anche il Pkk alla fine ha dovuto cambiare idea su di noi, per la passione che ci 
mettiamo. Capisco che non sia normale per una ragazza prendere un' arma e 
mettersi a sparare. Io l' ho fatto anche come una forma di ribellione nei confronti 
della mia famiglia e della società. Da un punto di vista emozionale noi donne 
siamo più esposte in guerra. Se catturate finiamo per essere torturate più a 
lungo. Un uomo può anche accettare di essere preso vivo, una donna 
preferisce morire». Dentro il Pkk c' è una gerarchia ferrea, ma anche molto 
cameratismo. Le ragazze si conoscono e si aiutano. Molte comandano i corsi 
politici, organizzati nelle strutture mobili dentro la foresta. In una di queste 
sembra di entrare a scuola. La cattedra da una parte, i banchi in fila come in un' 
aula. Alle pareti i poster con il volto di Apo, e le bandiere rosse giallo e verdi dei 
curdi. «Ora sono quattro anni da quando sono salita in montagna. Qui la vita è 
diversa rispetto alla città. E' un altro mondo. L' amicizia è una cosa vera e i 
rapporti sono solidi. A casa ero sorda e cieca. Qui ho imparato molto. La tua 
visione delle cose cambia. Ed è come rinascere. Solo fra queste montagne 
prendiamo finalmente coscienza della nostra identità, e impariamo a rapportarci 
nel modo giusto con il mondo. Nei grandi centri la società ti impedisce di farlo». 
Dai "santuari" segreti i guerriglieri si spostano in continuazione. L' esercito va 
alla loro caccia, e le marce avvengono soprattutto di notte. Si mangia poco, i 
frutti che il bosco offre. «Capisco i turchi che ci prendono per semplici terroristi - 
continua Ikram - i giornali pubblicano le foto dei funerali dei soldati. A me 
dispiace per queste vite. Ma anche i guerriglieri sono uccisi, hanno delle madri 
e spesso non vengono seppelliti. Questa è una guerra, è dolore, da entrambe le 
parti. E la loro parte è raccontata molto. La nostra, no. Molti dei soldati turchi 
sono di origine curda. Qui i fratelli uccidono i fratelli. C' è una famiglia con 5 figli: 
3 sono diventati guerriglieri, gli altri 2 si sono arruolati come militari. Due ragazzi 
sono morti, uno era un membro del Pkk e uno un soldato dell' esercito. La loro 
madre, adesso, li piange entrambi». 
 
Paolo Gallori,2017),La liberazione di Raqqa ha il volto di una donna in armi: 
ecco chi è Rojda Felat, La Repubblica 17 ottobre 2017, available at 
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/10/17/foto/rojda_felat_la_comandante_curd
o-siriana_della_raqqa_liberata-178553602/1/#1 (accessed 10 November 2018) 
Quando a Raqqa l'insopportabile crepitio dei proiettili è finalmente sostituito 
dalle urla di giubilo, la combattente curdo-siriana impugna la bandiera delle 
Forze Democratiche Siriane per sventolarla in piazza al Naim, dove i fotografi 
catturano tutta la sua gioia. Il suo sorriso diventa il simbolo della liberazione 
della città siriana che lo Stato Islamico aveva eletto a sua capitale. Ma dietro 
quel sorriso c'è molto di più. Perché Rojda Felat, questo il suo nome, 
comandante del Ypj (Unità di protezione delle donne), braccio femminile del 
Ypg, le "unità di protezione curdo-siriane", è soprattutto l'ufficiale che ha guidato 
le operazioni militari delle Fsd nella riconquista di Raqqa. Prima di lasciarsi 
andare nel giorno della gioia e dei festeggiamenti, per mesi ha impartito ordini, 
studiato mappe, discusso con i consiglieri militari statunitensi, affrontato il 
nemico. Felat si era arruolata nel Ypj nel 2013, per contrastare l'avanzata 
dell'Isis. Della sua vita precedente si sa poco o nulla, se non che la sua età si 
aggira tra i 30 e i 40 anni. Da allora, ha scalato la gerarchia militare, nel suo 
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gruppo e nelle Fsd, fino ad assumere il comando delle operazioni nella spallata 
decisiva a ciò che restava del Califfato. Ha combattuto per la libertà di un 
popolo dal terrorismo e dalla tirannia avendo ben presente anche la conquista 
di un'altra libertà: "Quella delle donne curde, e siriane in generale, dai vincoli e 
dal controllo della società tradizionale", ha detto in passato. Una femminista 
radicale piantata nell'inferno siriano, Rojda Felat, in prima linea per una 
mutazione culturale che porti al pieno riconoscimento dei diritti, delle 
aspirazioni, delle vite delle donne di ogni etnia in Siria. E non solo. Perché, a 
ben vedere, per Rojda Felat anche le donne d'occidente ne avranno bisogno 
finché "il sistema capitalistico le considererà come oggetti". Oggetti 
perfettamente in grado di guidare uomini alla vittoria. "In ambito militare, spesso 
siamo viste con condiscendenza, ci si crede troppo delicate e prive del coraggio 
necessario per usare anche solo una pistola o un coltello. Potete vedere da voi 
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MURSITPINAR (Frontiera turco-siriana) «Quei mostri ci vogliono umiliare. 
Minacciano di decapitare quelle tra noi che cadono prigioniere, perché dicono 
che i loro uomini uccisi nella cosiddetta guerra santa dalle donne nemiche non 
vanno in paradiso. Che stupidi! Che terribili stupidi e ignoranti Non sanno che 
comunque andranno tutti all’inferno?». Ride, ride di gusto Arin Mahmud 
Mohammad. Ha solo 19 anni, ma dal cellulare il timbro leggero della voce 
sembra molto più giovane, una bambina. Timida, allegra, eppure anche 
terribilmente seria. È in prima linea con le brigate dei curdi siriani che 
combattono in difesa della cittadina di Kobane. Da un mese resistono 
all’assedio dei guerriglieri jihadisti del cosiddetto Stato Islamico. «Li vedo tutti i 
giorni quei criminali. Sono ad un centinaio di metri dalla nostra postazione. 
Bestie che non hanno nulla di umano, che godono nel terrorizzare e torturare 
civili inermi e prigionieri. Sono animali: si muovono come animali, agiscono 
come animali», aggiunge. 
A dire il vero Arin ci fa anche vergognare un poco. Noi qui al riparo, dietro i 
fili spinati del confine controllato notte e giorno dalle unità corazzate turche. E 
lei invece esposta sulle barricate che sorvegliano i quartieri sud-orientali, dove 
più profondamente sono penetrate le avanguardie jihadiste. Un anno fa ha 
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abbandonato la facoltà di ingegneria edile all’università di Aleppo ed è tornata 
dalla famiglia a Kobane per battersi tra la sua gente. Per lunghi mesi si è 
addestrata all’uso delle armi. Come tante, si è anche data un nome di battaglia: 
Nesrin, una sorta di stella alpina del Medio Oriente. «I miei genitori e sei tra 
fratelli e sorelle sono profughi in Turchia. Da oltre un mese vivono nella 
cittadina di Soruch, a soli quindici chilometri dal confine. Ma mi sostengono 
pienamente, ci sentiamo spesso per telefono e sono fieri che io sia qui a 
difendere le nostre case». 
Non è facile però restare ben sapendo che il rischio è altissimo. A metà 
settembre erano un migliaio le donne soldato nell’enclave isolata di Kobane. 
Poi sono diminuite.«Adesso siamo rimaste in 450 combattenti del Ypj», 
specifica lei utilizzando l’acronimo che indica le «Unità di autodifesa femminili», 
in poche parole le donne soldato curde siriane, che sono trattate in tutto e per 
tutto al pari dei commilitoni maschi. Combattono come loro, muoiono come loro. 
I jihadisti hanno diffuso sulla rete le foto di almeno tre sue compagne 
decapitate. Altre immagini mostrano soldatesse morte con le mimetiche 
insanguinate, i capelli lunghi trasformati in blocchi di polvere e fango, mischiate 
tra mucchi di cadaveri scomposti. Il momento più pericoloso? «È stato venerdì 
scorso. Ero con la mia unità nel nostro quartier generale in pieno centro, 
quando siamo stati attaccati a colpi di mortaio. Ho visto morire dodici compagni, 
altri quindici erano feriti gravi. Siamo riusciti a scappare. Dopo esattamente 25 
minuti i caccia americani hanno bombardato, distruggendo l’intero edificio». 
Tuttavia, ieri Arin-Nesrin aveva ben motivo per essere sollevata. «Ormai da 
tre giorni è evidente che i raid aerei americani assieme agli alleati hanno 
finalmente fermato l’avanzata dello Stato Islamico su Kobane. Non so quanto 
durerà. Ma adesso il nostro morale è molto migliore che non la settimana 
scorsa. Ho visto le bombe americane distruggere con precisione i carri armati e 
i cannoni che stavano per ucciderci tutti. Noi curdi siamo passati dalla difesa 
all’attacco. E abbiamo ricevuto cibo e acqua in quantità sufficienti per tre mesi», 
ci ha detto. A riprova ci fa avere la foto di lei assieme ad alcuni commilitoni 
ripresa da una compagna due o tre giorni fa nei pressi della sommità della 
collina di Mishtanur, che domina da sud tutta la cittadina. Quando due 
settimane orsono i jihadisti vi avevano piantato sulla cima la loro bandiera nera, 
Kobane era stata data per spacciata. Ora anche Arin col suo sorriso semplice e 
disarmante è lì, di guardia. 
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Appendix C- The Times articles on the Kurdish Female Fighters7 
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